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Republic of Uganda

COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME EVALUATION



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Republic of Uganda

Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation

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Photos of activities supported by IFAD-financed projects in the Republic of Uganda

Front cover: Women supported by the Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas sorting their soybean for roasting and packing, in Bungwayi, Sironko District. ©IFAD/C. Sebatta

Back cover: A household supported by the Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region showing their maize harvest, in Omoro District. ©IFAD/C. Sebatta (right); a member of the Shiner Savings and Credit Group, supported by the Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas in Bumanganga Village, Sironko District. Her investment in group sharing and the sales from her crops allowed her to buy a cow. ©IFAD/H. Kabuchu (left)

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Foreword

This is the second country strategy and programme evaluation in Uganda and covers the period from 2013 to 2020.

In the past decade, Uganda's economy has grown slowly and poverty has worsened, with high inequality, especially in rural areas. Although agriculture provides just a quarter of national gross domestic product, it employs nearly three-quarters of the labour force and is the main driver of poverty reduction. Challenges to sector growth include poor infrastructure and the predominance of smallholder farmers practicing rain-fed, low-yielding agriculture.

In this context, IFAD's focus on the poor northern and eastern regions was appropriate, as too were continued investments in rural infrastructure. The shift in the portfolio from community development to value chain investments was relevant to Government priorities and for the economic viability of smallholder farming. The increasing private sector investment in these projects largely offset the limited levels of development partner cofinancing.

Smallholder farmers, men and women, have benefitted from increased productivity and better access to markets and rural financial services. The projects have also contributed to their growing incomes, and strengthening individual and group capacities.

Building on this solid performance, future IFAD investments need to continue supporting effective value chain approaches, expanding to commodities like livestock and horticulture. The successful gender transformative approaches also need to be delivered across the portfolio and tailored to meet the specific needs of women and young people.

The capacity of farmers and rural communities to adapt to climate change has improved thanks to better access to sustainable land management practices, climate information systems and all-weather roads. Yet, these local achievements are modest when set against the increasing climate variability in Uganda, requiring the new country strategy and projects to mainstream climate change more extensively.

Finally, IFAD alone cannot bring about the scale of change required for Uganda to transform agriculture into an inclusive, resilient and commercially viable sector. This evaluation recommends that the new country programme develops a strategy for knowledge management, partnership and policy engagement that is sufficiently resourced. The Government of Uganda also can improve operations by strengthening project monitoring, reporting and financial management, vital for both good governance and the assessment of results.

This evaluation report includes an Agreement at Completion Point, which contains the evaluation's main recommendations and proposed follow-up actions, as agreed on by the Government and IFAD. I hope that the results of this independent evaluation will be useful in strengthening the partnership between the Government of Uganda and IFAD for inclusive and sustainable rural development and poverty reduction.



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*Available online at <https://bit.ly/3nA6pAE>

Currency equivalent, weights and measures

Currency equivalents

Currency unit = Uganda shilling
US\$1.0 = 3,840 Uganda shillings

Weights and measures

1 kilogram (kg) = 2.204 pounds (lb)
1 000 kg = 1 metric tonne (t)
1 kilometre (km) = 0.62 miles
1 metre (m) = 1.09 yards
1 square metre (m²) = 10.76 square feet (ft)
1 acre (ac) = 0.405 ha
1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres

Abbreviations and acronyms

AAMP	Area-based Agricultural Modernization Programme
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRACA	African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association
ASSP	Agriculture Sector Strategic Plan
ATAAS	Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services
CABI	Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience International
CAIIP1	Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme, Project 1
CAR	community access road
CBNRM	community-based natural resource management
CGAP	Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest
COSOP	country strategic opportunities programme
COVID-19	corona virus disease 2019
CPE	country programme evaluation
CPM	country programme manager
CPMT	country programme management team
CPO	country programme officer
CSCG	community savings and credit group
CSPE	country strategy and programme evaluation
DCO	district commercial officer
DCDO	district community development officer
DLG	district local government
DLSP	District Livelihoods Support Programme
DPMO	district production and marketing officer
EAC	East African Community
ENRM	environment and natural resources management
ERR	economic rate of return
ESA	East and Southern Africa Division of IFAD
ESS	environmental and social safeguards
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFR	Financing Facility for Remittances
FGD	focus group discussion
4Ps	public-private-producer partnerships
FTE	full-time equivalents
GALS	Gender Action Learning System
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GLRG	Global / regional grant
ICO	IFAD Country Office

ICR	implementation completion report
ILC	International Land Coalition
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
IPAF	Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility
KOPGA	Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association
KOPGT	Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MFI	microfinance institution
MOLG	Ministry of Local Government
MOFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MSP	multi-stakeholder platform
MTIC	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives
MTR	mid-term review
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NARO	National Agricultural Research Organisation
NDP	National Development Plan
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NOPP	National Oil Palm Project
NOSP	National Oilseeds Project
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPUL	Oil Palm Uganda Limited
OSSUP	Uganda Oilseeds Subsector Platform
OWC	Operation Wealth Creation
PCR	project completion report
PCRV	project completion report validation
PRELNOR	Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region
PROFIRA	Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas
PMU	Project Management Unit
PPP	public-private partnership
PSP	private sector provider
RETs	renewable energy technologies
RFSP	Rural Financial Services Programme
RIA	Research and Impact Assessment Division of IFAD
RIMS	Results Impact and Measuring System
SACCO	savings and credit cooperative
SECAP	Social Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SLM	sustainable land management
SMADF	Small and Medium Agribusiness Development Fund
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
UCA	Uganda Co-operative Alliance
UCSCU	Uganda Cooperative Savings and Credit Union
UMRA	Uganda Microfinance Regulatory Authority
UNFFE	Uganda National Farmers Federation
VHH	vulnerable household
VODP2	Vegetable Oil Development Project 2
VSLA(s)	village savings and loans association(s)
WFP	World Food Programme
WOCAT	World Overview of Conservation Approaches and Technologies
WOCCU	World Council of Credit Unions
ZARDI	Zonal Agricultural Research Development Institute

Map 1. IFAD ongoing projects¹

Republic of Uganda

IFAD-funded ongoing projects

Country strategy and programme evaluation



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

Map compiled by IFAD | 05-02-2020

¹ The National Oilseeds Project was approved by the IFAD Executive Board in December 2019, but has not yet been approved by Parliament. Therefore, it is technically not an ongoing project. It will be assessed for relevance based on the project design.

Map 2. IFAD closed projects

Republic of Uganda

IFAD-funded closed programmes

Country strategy and programme evaluation



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

Map compiled by IFAD | 05-02-2020

A community savings group supported by the Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas, in Kacyanga Village, Kayunga District. ©IFAD/H. Kabuchu



Executive summary

A. Background

1. The Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) conducted a country strategy and programme evaluation (CSPE) in the Republic of Uganda. This is the second such evaluation in the country; the first country programme evaluation (CPE) was published in 2013.
2. The main objectives of this CSPE are to: (i) assess the results and performance of the country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) 2013–2018 and IFAD-financed programme¹ in Uganda; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the next COSOP and the future partnership between IFAD and the Government of Uganda. This CSPE also reviews the extent to which the recommendations of the 2013 CPE have been followed up, and assesses programme performance.
3. **Country background.** Uganda's economy has shown strong growth over the past 20 years, slowing to 5.2 per cent in the past decade, with a per capita growth of only 1.6 per cent due to high population growth. Agriculture provides just a quarter of the GDP but employs 72 per cent of the labour force. Imports of processed food, particularly vegetable oil, remain high. Poverty has worsened in recent years, with a fifth of Ugandans now living below the poverty line. Inequality persists, particularly in rural areas and the north, and among women, youth and refugees. Gender equality has improved, but is still subject to deeply entrenched social norms that discriminate against women.
4. Multiple structural challenges constrain agricultural growth, including the predominance of smallholder farmers practising rainfed, low-yield agriculture; growing population density; land tenure insecurity; and poor infrastructure. Uganda is consuming its natural resources at an unsustainable rate. Forests provide over 90 per cent of the country's energy, mostly for the poor, and are being reduced by over 5 per cent annually – the second highest figure globally. Climate change has resulted in unpredictable rainfall, more pests and diseases, higher temperatures and rising water levels in Lake Victoria.
5. Government policy frameworks over the period sought to transform agriculture into a commercially viable sector around a set of key value chains. Policy on extension and rural financial services has alternated between supply-driven and demand-driven approaches. Although official development assistance (ODA) has grown steadily, it has declined as a proportion of GDP from an average of 14 per cent (2000–2008) to 7 per cent (2009–2017). Budget support was suspended in 2012 and aid has reverted to project interventions. Non-ODA loans, primarily from China, have increased substantially in importance.
6. **IFAD.** Uganda's share of IFAD's resource envelope has risen to a point where it now represents 11 per cent of the East and Southern Africa Division's allocation. Under the most recent COSOP, IFAD has three strategic objectives: increased production, market access, and access to rural financial services. The nine projects evaluated under this CSPE² together received funding commitments of US\$1.4 billion, of which IFAD loans comprised US\$430 million. A sample of regional and global grants was also assessed.
7. The IFAD Country Office (ICO) has been in place since 2006. The Country Director post was located in Uganda only between 2014 and 2018. In mid-2018, the post

¹ The Rural Financial Services Programme (RFSP); District Livelihoods Support Programme (DLSP); Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme 1 (CAIIP1); Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services (ATAAS); Vegetable Oil Development Project 2 (VODP2); Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas (PROFIRA); Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region (PRELNOR); National Oil Palm Project (NOPP); and National Oilseeds Project (NOSP).

moved to IFAD's regional hub in Nairobi. Staffing levels and the country programme budget both declined over the period.

B. Project portfolio performance

8. **Relevance** of the portfolio is rated as satisfactory. The lending portfolio objectives aligned well with the current and previous COSOPs and with national and sector policy frameworks, especially the focus on regional poverty dimensions in the north and east as well as on value chain approaches. Project designs also aligned well with IFAD's evolving corporate policies, including in rural finance, nutrition, environment and natural resources management, climate change and value chains. The portfolio reflects a tension around delivering on poverty reduction objectives while focusing on a more commercial growth strategy. Yet the shift from a broad and rather scattered engagement to a more focused, geographically contiguous presence has been a positive strategic thrust.
9. The conscious sequencing of projects has proved highly relevant, building on lessons learned and extending the use of experienced project staff. The limited levels of development partner cofinancing have been offset by increasing private sector investment. Over time, the increasing complexity and scale of design have introduced higher risk and implementation challenges. In this regard, a stronger political economy analysis could have helped to manage underlying pressures within government systems and the private sector.
10. Targeting has been addressed well through a recognition of regional and district disparities in poverty levels and access to services. Social inclusion and gender mainstreaming approaches of varying robustness have been included, using methodologies such as household mentoring. However, more specific interventions could have been conceived for youth.
11. **Effectiveness** of the portfolio is rated moderately satisfactory. Improved market access for smallholders has been achieved through the provision of community access roads that led to higher farm gate prices and reduced journey times. Higher road design standards have improved durability, but have also caused delays and higher costs. Those benefiting from roads under the Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme, Project 1 (CAIIP1) saw a 40 per cent increase in their share of market prices, while farm gate prices rose by 30 per cent, and journey times were reduced by 7 per cent. For the District livelihoods Support Programme (DLSP), benefits include a 60 per cent reduction in transport costs. Support for agro-processing and market infrastructure has achieved mixed results in terms of their full operation and use. The portfolio has broadly succeeded in developing and disseminating a variety of technologies through enhanced research capability and building smallholder capacity to adopt them. For example, in the Vegetable Oil Development Project 2 (VODP2), use of improved seed increased from 17 per cent at baseline to 67 per cent by project end, although this fell short of the target of 90 per cent. Institutional changes in the mechanism for input supply and extension services have, however, caused disruption and led to low production performance and losses, and in some instances to elite capture.
12. In rural finance, the microfinance sector has become more effective and responsive through IFAD's support, and new legislation has improved regulation of the industry. Support for oil palm and oil seed value chains has improved access to markets and strengthened bargaining power. Bulking has enabled farmers to negotiate as a group and receive higher prices, although milling capacity has been underutilized. Finally, farmer productivity has been below expectations, although vegetable oil production exceeded targets.
13. Overall, outreach levels are in line with project designs, with five projects equalling or exceeding the revised targets for beneficiaries reached, including the Rural Financial Services Programme (RFSP), DLSP, CAIIP1, ATAAS and the Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas (PROFIRA). The shift away from community

development and rural infrastructure towards value chain investments has, nevertheless, affected the level of outreach achieved. ATAAS, CAIIP1 and RFSP have collectively reached around 8 million people, while later projects – VODP2, Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region (PRELNOR), DLSP and PROFIRA) have reached 4 million.

14. Household mentoring and the Gender Action Learning Systems (GALS) – coupled with food security grants – have successfully targeted poorer households, including women- and youth-headed households, in DLSP and PRELNOR. Although highly effective, the intensity and duration of such approaches have limited their level of coverage.
15. **Efficiency** is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The portfolio's efficiency was enhanced by good overall disbursement levels, sound financial management and positive rates of return. However, efficiency was constrained by several factors. Delays in implementation resulted in project extensions, while lower initial disbursements necessitated large disbursements near completion. Lengthy fiduciary, procurement and contracting processes reduced efficiency, as did periodic vacancies and high staff turnover in several management units. While financial systems were generally satisfactory, there were several instances of ineligible expenditures, including in ATAAS, RFSP and PRELNOR.
16. **Rural poverty impact** is rated moderately satisfactory. While there are some questions about the reliability of impact studies, incomes and assets have risen for beneficiaries of the seven projects assessed, in some cases well above targets (CAIIP1, ATAAS and VODP2). Average annual household incomes have risen from 44 per cent for CAIIP1 to an estimated 226 per cent for ATAAS. These changes have been driven by increased use of improved technologies and greater market access. Targeted communities also show improved food security and income diversification, although reductions in levels of malnutrition are less clear. In rural finance, savings and expenditure have grown while income was not directly measured.
17. While qualitative findings suggest that human and social capital have improved, systematic routine data collection was often missing and the reach of household mentoring methodologies was limited. The capacity of households, with support from community volunteers, has improved in areas such as adult literacy, financial planning and management, and increased participation in common interest groups. RFSP, for example, achieved improvements in education levels and health status for 94 per cent of beneficiaries. Grassroots institutions, including production and credit-based groups, have been strengthened, while capacity for better service delivery of local governments and zonal research institutes improved slightly, although broad-scale changes in service delivery are not so evident.
18. IFAD's lending programme for agriculture and integrated rural development has had limited or no influence on policy. The value chains projects have, however, provided a successful model of public-private-producer partnership and potential policy impact is seen in the adoption of these approaches in the Third National Development Plan. The most significant policy results have been in rural finance in terms of improved regulation and governance.
19. **Sustainability of benefits** is rated moderately satisfactory. In terms of institutions, prospects for the sustainability of farmers' organizations appear favourable, particularly where financial viability has been established or strong community ties have been built. Self-sufficiency in the rural finance sector faces challenges from the mixed efficiency of savings and credit organizations, weak apex organizations that are unable to provide ground support, and recent legislative changes. The profitability of the targeted value chains bodes well for the continued viability of smallholder producers. The prospects for maintenance of the higher-grade community access roads are also better than those of lower-grade roads due to their greater resilience and future access to the Uganda Road Fund. The Government's

commitment to research and extension services has shown improvement, yet a recent expenditure review indicates that there are still grounds for funding uncertainty, while the continued subsidized input distribution programme constrains technical as well as financial sustainability.

20. **Innovation** is rated as moderately unsatisfactory. While the portfolio features a number of innovations in the Ugandan context, most of the examples were inherited from the earlier COSOP period. VODP2 has built on innovative VODP1 features, including most notably the continued development of oil palm as a new perennial crop via a public-private-producer partnership approach. Household mentoring approaches have continued to be pursued although their introduction predates the CSPE period. Support for agricultural research has led to a range of technologies being disseminated, some of which were innovative in Uganda. There were also a number of missed opportunities to be innovative, in particular the furtherance of demand-led extension reform processes started under the National Agricultural Advisory Services and the use of technology to increase rural finance outreach.
21. **Scaling up** has been rated as moderately satisfactory. There are some examples of scaling up that have occurred beyond IFAD projects, although more could have occurred if stronger knowledge management efforts to share results and lessons beyond IFAD to its partners had been achieved. Three examples include: (i) the wider adoption of the oil palm nucleus plantation model following VODP1 and VODP2; (ii) the replication of household mentoring and GALS methodologies by non-state actors in Uganda and by other IFAD projects outside Uganda; and (iii) the spread of improved agricultural technologies to zonal research stations, private sector actors and farmer groups. Some of IFAD's non-lending activities have also been a driver for scaling up innovations, especially grants embedded into projects such as ATAAS and PRELNOR.
22. **Gender equality and women's empowerment and youth** are rated collectively as moderately satisfactory. There was a high level of commitment across the portfolio to implement gender interventions in line with IFAD's Policy on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment as well as relevant Ugandan national policies. Indeed, the Uganda programme has been at the forefront of developments in gender transformative approaches. Positive results have occurred in women's participation and in access to assets, income generation and leadership roles. However, the interventions largely concentrated on increasing the number of women and fell short in addressing systemic gender constraints and power relations that continue to prevent the empowerment of women. Youth have been mobilized effectively to participate in some projects, yet the earlier projects had no clear strategy for addressing constraints to the involvement of young men and women around labour and land issues.
23. **Natural resources management** is rated as moderately satisfactory. The environment and natural resources management has been a largely successful theme for the projects that addressed this topic, especially VODP2, PRELNOR and ATAAS. Major issues such as the increasing variability and uneven distribution of rainfall, decline in soil fertility, deforestation and encroachment on wetlands have been mitigated through provision of technical and financial support to empower communities. Activities such as terracing and rehabilitation of degraded watersheds have resulted in improved access to natural resources and better community management. Under VODP2, preliminary evidence suggests that deforestation rates have decreased and the main actors have made efforts to ensure sustainable production of oil palm. However, there have been challenges around ongoing projects facing more stringent environmental management requirements and guidelines from both IFAD and the Government, including the designation of more recent projects as category A operations, requiring more extensive management plans.

24. **Climate change adaptation** is also rated as moderately satisfactory. Under the IFAD portfolio, several projects targeted climate change adaptation in varying degrees, including ATAAS, VODP2, PRELNOR, PROFIRA and DLSP. This has resulted in a number of climate change adaptation achievements, although mainly at a local rather than national scale or in terms of policy. The sustainable land management practices promoted under ATAAS to avert climatic risks to agricultural production have been significant, with an estimated sequestration of nearly 2 million tons of carbon with a value of US\$151 million. Research activities have led to the production of drought-resistant seed varieties, while development of e-weather systems show promise in providing climate information to farmers. The resilience and durability of community roads have been improved by upgrading them to an all-weather design that incorporates reforestation and water harvesting.

C. Assessment of non-lending activities

25. Over the COSOP period, fluctuations in ICO staffing affected IFAD's capacity to engage in portfolio management and non-lending activities. The main change was the move of the Country Director from IFAD headquarters to Kampala in 2014 and then to the regional hub in Nairobi in 2018. Each of the three main strategic areas has been managed separately by different IFAD team members. However, this efficient division of labour limits knowledge exchange across the programme and lacks an overall country programme approach.
26. **Knowledge management** is rated as moderately unsatisfactory. The knowledge management strategy was based on drawing learning from projects to feed into policy dialogue. However, the strategy lacked a stable architecture and sufficient resources for consistent implementation. A specialist knowledge management officer was in place until 2015, and knowledge management activities were promoted during this period, although mainly at the project level. Grants linked to projects and sequential project designs have enabled learning from past projects and continued knowledge management practices among project staff, despite a steep decline in dedicated knowledge management resources.
27. For most projects, the focus of knowledge management has remained on communication rather than strengthening monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems and drawing from them for knowledge management and policy dialogue with the Government. Equally, the contribution of grant-funded knowledge management activities varied depending on the strength of their linkages with the lending programme.
28. **Partnership-building** is rated as moderately satisfactory. The 2013 COSOP had ambitious aims for building partnerships with the Government, private sector, development partners and rural organizations. However, limited staffing in the ICO made partnership-building at the country level (beyond projects) challenging. This constrained the building of partnerships over time by reducing the number of regular interactions, including informal meetings.
29. IFAD has been a respected partner in sector working groups such as the agriculture development partners group. All the same, the United Nations and bilateral partners have limited knowledge of IFAD's work, although they recognize its staff as highly knowledgeable. IFAD's partnership with the Government was cultivated mainly through the lending portfolio, and private and civil society sector partners were also engaged primarily as part of project implementation. IFAD has been less proactive in developing collaboration with donor initiatives in the same geographic area or sector, as evidenced by the lack of cofinancing in projects designed under the 2013 COSOP.
30. **Country-level policy engagement** is rated as moderately satisfactory. Under the 2013 COSOP, IFAD has primarily pursued a strategy of policy engagement through the lending programme with mixed results. Of the four areas outlined for engagement, only one has been satisfactorily achieved around an improved

regulatory framework for inclusive rural finance, whereas engagement in the area relating to extension was not achieved and those relating to supporting rural institutions were achieved only in part. Country-level policy engagement based on drawing evidence from projects to inform policy decision-making was evident in the rural finance projects and VODP2. However, there was no evidence of capacity-building of government agencies to formulate pro-poor policies or support for rural organizations to promote their own policy agenda.

D. Performance of partners

31. **IFAD's** performance as a partner is rated moderately satisfactory. IFAD performed well in developing the portfolio in line with COSOP aspirations, and in bringing its expertise to key sectors such as value chains and rural finance. IFAD's design approach, while consultative, would have benefited from greater analysis of the political and economic context. Supervision was effective, except in the case of ATAAS where IFAD played a less influential role. This has ensured that projects deliver as expected and are re-designed when needed. ICO resources are focused on the lending portfolio, particularly on supervision and implementation support. The resources allocated to administer the country programme reflect this, but a declining trend in allocations has limited the capacity to deliver on the non-lending side.
32. **Government** performance is rated as moderately unsatisfactory. The Government provided active support for project design and implementation. Project management benefited in most cases from high-quality staff, especially for transitioned projects. Procurement processes were often slow, while fiduciary performance regarding counterpart funding was mixed. Although government transparency and accountability frameworks have evolved gradually over time, the violation of financial rules is still a relatively widespread phenomenon and enforcement is weak. Major areas of vulnerability in the IFAD portfolio that have been subject to investigation include financial management, procurement and contracting.
33. Project M&E systems were of mixed quality in terms of the reliability and completeness of information generated and shared. Many projects failed to conduct baseline studies, mid-term reviews or end-of-project assessments within required time frames. While grant funding was introduced for extension services and road maintenance, and extension staff were recruited, the Government's broad budgetary commitments to the sector and to supporting local government delivery, relative to national spending demands, were not fully satisfactory over the CSPE period, and this affected project performance.

E. Country programme strategy performance

34. **Relevance** of the COSOP is rated as moderately satisfactory. The country programme had mixed success in following the 2013 CPE recommendations. Two out of the five recommendations were fully addressed (funding in the north and value chains) while the remaining three show limited and moderate progress (policy dialogue, synergies between projects and analysis of ICO staffing requirements).
35. The 2013 COSOP showed close policy alignment with the Government's policy framework for rural poverty reduction and the agriculture sector as well as with IFAD's global objectives. The COSOP was weaker around defining the fit between lending and non-lending activities, as well as identifying and mitigating risks. The ambition to resource the ICO appropriately to ensure that synergies occurred across the programme was initially appropriate but was not realized for the entire period.
36. **Effectiveness** is rated as moderately satisfactory. For the first strategic objective to increase production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture, the evidence indicates that planted areas and yields show positive gains, partly due to improved growing conditions and because of the legacy from earlier investments prior to this COSOP period. Climate resilience has improved with IFAD lending and

non-lending assistance, although impact is modest in the national context. Land tenure reforms have produced limited results.

37. For the second strategic objective, the integration of smallholders into the market, agroprocessing and market linkages have been strengthened along selected value chains, but most benefits have tended to reach those farmers with the potential to improve their level of commercial operation. With 7,246 km of community access roads provided across four projects, road outcomes have been positive in terms of improved access. Value chain projects are complex, and while production and incomes have risen, there have been issues around the provision of credit, processing and marketing.
38. Under the third strategic objective, strengthened outreach and sustainable access to financial services, particularly at the community level, have been achieved in a difficult policy environment. Some 1.1 million households have benefited from higher savings and credit, especially at the community level.
39. Despite the above achievements, the country programme approach has been less effective than envisaged. The COSOP expected strong synergies and complementarities between the projects as well as between lending and non-lending. While geographic coherence has improved, this has not led to strong operational linkages. Although the three COSOP strategic objectives have been pursued through good project sequencing, the projects developed under each objective have been operating largely in silos with modest cross-learning. Beyond the projects, greater interaction between the lending and non-lending elements and the ICO could have been achieved.

F. Conclusions

40. IFAD's portfolio has been effectively sequenced around a relevant set of objectives, with recent interventions building on earlier projects. **Greater geographical coherence in the north and east has also reduced inefficiencies while improving poverty targeting.**
41. **The COSOP strategic objectives have been pursued through sequencing rather than a programmatic approach and, as a result, the level of interplay and cross-fertilization has been limited.** This is partly due to the adoption of a portfolio approach that entailed meeting each objective through separate strands. Such an approach has also been necessary with a small country team with a declining administrative budget supporting an increasing lending portfolio.
42. **Evolving strategic thinking has seen greater emphasis on value chain approaches rather than on broader community development.** While this has led to a significant rise in private sector co-investment and higher farmer incomes, it has also reduced beneficiary outreach. This was partly offset by the continued inclusion of access roads, the reach of the rural finance investments, and the number of indirect beneficiaries from value chain activities. Additionally, this move has helped insulate IFAD's investments from the repercussions of unexpected political events and election processes, and low capacity in local government service provision.
43. Agro-processing and market linkages have been strengthened for the selected commodities through IFAD's integrated value chain approach. Reduced transport costs and higher market prices due to improved road access, plus added value through bulking and processing, have contributed to higher household incomes. While there have been implementation delays, **building infrastructure and support services around confirmed market demand has proved a successful approach, together with the extended support made possible by sequencing projects.**
44. Sufficient evidence indicates that **IFAD-funded programmes have contributed alongside other factors to growing productivity and incomes,** although some of these increases derive from the success of past investments and to better weather

conditions in recent years. IFAD's investments in rural finance have been effective in terms of outreach, building linkages between local savings and credit groups and service providers, and in terms of regulatory reforms. IFAD's decision to move out of the sector is aligned with government policy. However, sustainability now depends on the ability of groups to pay for services, while apex organizations still face challenges.

45. Resilience has been enhanced within the communities reached, but the achievements are modest when set against the climate change challenges facing Uganda. **Climate variability is increasing and its effects may negate IFAD's otherwise positive achievements on the livelihoods of rural poor people if not addressed more significantly going forward.**
46. Non-lending performance has not met the ambitions laid out in the 2013 COSOP. The lack of a documented strategy specifying how non-lending activities would be achieved hampered the direction of the work, while resources earmarked for non-lending activities were insufficient. The **ambitions to deliver policy influence and build partnerships were constrained by the lack of resources in the ICO and the transfer of the head of office to the subregional hub in Nairobi.** Although IFAD is seen as an active and knowledgeable partner, the wealth of experience arising from the project portfolio has not been effectively translated into useful knowledge products.
47. The Government discharged its obligations in funding and staffing but has been less effective in procurement, financial management and M&E. Overall funding for agriculture has fallen below the Government's international commitments, and support to local government services has been confined mainly to support the growth in the public extension labour force. **IFAD's projects have faced challenges around governance and corruption issues, which have been exacerbated by weak record keeping and M&E.** Although M&E systems have advanced in their use of technology, impact measurement remains dogged by delayed studies and weak methodology.

G. Recommendations

48. **Recommendation 1. Expand IFAD's effective value chain approach to other commodities with greater beneficiary outreach potential.** There are opportunities to expand marketing hubs to the entire country and regionally, built around key commodities identified in the Third National Development Plan (e.g. livestock, especially dairy, horticulture and fisheries). IFAD should: (i) identify opportunities for small-scale producers to improve income diversity around production and processing; (ii) enhance access to reliable markets and raise product quality; (iii) expand mechanisms such as the Yield Fund to help build private sector capacity; and (iv) strengthen synergies between the programmes, where relevant and practical.
49. **Recommendation 2. Mainstream climate change more extensively with direct approaches in the new COSOP, given the growing urgency in Uganda.** Climate change has been indirectly addressed in the past COSOPs. IFAD's portfolio going forward contains more category A projects than before. Therefore IFAD should: (i) build into the next COSOP stronger support for the measures under the Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures, including social and environmental safeguards, and the technical expertise to supervise category A projects; and (ii) partner with the most appropriate government entities (Ministry of Water and Environment, Ministry of Works and Transport), non-governmental and donor partners to undertake climate mitigation and adaptation measures more directly around the supported value chains.
50. **Recommendation 3. Deliver more transformative approaches and interventions tailored to the specific needs of women and youth.** This could be pursued by: (i) including strategies and targets on these aspects in the new

COSOP; (ii) mainstreaming and scaling up proven methods such as GALS and household mentoring; (iii) greater cross-project learning and use of specialized service partners to identify opportunities around constraints, such as land and ownership norms; (iv) strengthening staffing in the Project Management Unit to support and monitor the work of service providers; and (v) ensuring IFAD, in particular the Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion Division (ECG), provides better and more consistent technical oversight on gender and youth.

51. **Recommendation 4. Develop a non-lending strategy that systematizes knowledge management, partnerships and country policy engagement and provides the necessary resources for its implementation.** In order to foster innovation and scaling up within Uganda, IFAD needs to have a knowledge management system that captures project experiences and innovations so that they can be shared with partners and also used as evidence for policy engagement. This requires a documented strategy, and a stronger country presence that includes the Country Director in Uganda. IFAD's decentralized model also requires greater coordination within IFAD. Therefore, relevant divisions (ECG, the Research and Impact Assessment Division, and the Sustainable Production, Markets and Institutions Division) should be more involved in the knowledge management process to support non-lending aims by leveraging financial and human resources from IFAD headquarters as well as the regional hub in Nairobi.
52. **Recommendation 5. Strengthen M&E, reporting and financial management to bolster governance and anti-corruption measures and improve the assessment of results, especially at the impact level.** Relevant IFAD divisions should ensure risk mitigation around procurement, staff advances and related areas of financial management. In order to take a programmatic approach and to leverage IFAD's full capacities and resources, the ICO requires a knowledge management and/or M&E officer who can: (i) strengthen M&E systems in projects to ensure timely reporting and better documentation that will underpin improved governance and anti-corruption measures; (ii) aggregate results across the portfolio (for lending and non-lending) and share them with the Government and other partners; (iii) capture resources at the regional and/or global level (e.g. grants) for capacity development; (iv) support stronger design and analysis of impact studies to improve their statistical accuracy and delivery of more robust results, as well as include impact on reducing malnutrition; and (v) extend the use of new monitoring methods by improving the use of web-based systems, drone monitoring, and others.

Agreement at Completion Point

A. Introduction

1. This is the second country strategy and programme evaluation (CSPE) in the Republic of Uganda conducted by FAD's Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE). The main objectives of the CSPE were to: (i) assess the results and performance of the country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) 2013–2020 and the IFAD-financed programme in Uganda for the same period; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the next COSOP and the future partnership between the Government of Uganda and IFAD for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication. The CSPE also assessed the extent to which: (i) the recommendations of the 2013 country programme evaluation (CPE) were followed up; and (ii) programme performance has improved.
2. The CSPE assessed the IFAD–Government partnership pursued under the 2013 COSOP. To inform the assessment, the CSPE covered: (i) the lending portfolio (US\$1.45 billion¹ across nine loans approved or effective between 2013 and 2019); (ii) non-lending activities (knowledge management, policy dialogue, partnership-building, and selected grants); and (iii) performance of IFAD and the Government.
3. This agreement at completion point (ACP) contains recommendations based on the evaluation findings and conclusions presented in the CSPE report, as well as proposed follow-up actions as agreed on by IFAD and the Government. The ACP is signed by the Government of Uganda (represented by Minister of Finance, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development) and IFAD Management (represented by the Associate Vice President of the Programme Management Department). The signed ACP is an integral part of the CSPE report in which the evaluation findings are presented in detail, and submitted to the IFAD Executive Board as an annex to the new country strategic opportunity programme for Uganda. The implementation of the recommendations agreed upon will be tracked through the President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions, which is presented to the IFAD Executive Board on an annual basis by the IFAD's Management.

B. Recommendations and proposed follow-up actions

4. **Recommendation 1: Expand IFAD's effective value chain approach to other commodities with greater beneficiary outreach potential.** There are opportunities to expand marketing hubs to the entire country and regionally, built around key commodities identified in the Third National Development Plan (e.g. livestock, especially dairy, horticulture and fisheries). IFAD should: (i) identify opportunities for small-scale producers to improve income diversity around production and processing; (ii) enhance access to reliable markets and raise product quality; (iii) expand mechanisms such as the Yield Fund to help build private sector capacity; and (iv) strengthen synergies between the programmes, where relevant and practical.
5. **Proposed follow up.** The new COSOP (2021–2027), covering two performance-based allocation system cycles will explore the opportunities, in value chain development, of key commodities identified by the Government of Uganda. Currently, vegetable oils, livestock and fisheries have been identified. While this is not a definitive list, the commodities chosen for investments will take into account the following aspects: (i) greatest relevance for smallholders, including women and youth, ensuring increases in incomes and/or employment; (ii) geographical targeting where highest levels of poverty exist; and (iii) high potential for growth while dovetailing existing investments (past and current).

¹ IFAD financing during the same period amounted to US\$430 million.

6. The first strategic objective of the COSOP, therefore, focuses on the aspects of increasing production, productivity, value addition, competitiveness and inclusion of smallholders. In line with the third National Development Plan (NDPIII) significant investments in productive physical and marketing infrastructure are expected, thereby ensuring accessibility to markets.
7. Mechanisms such as the Yield Fund, will be actively pursued under the new COSOP (two potential non-sovereign operations are currently being developed) as supplementary funding to the investments over the next two performance-based allocation system cycles. These will be assessed in relevant chosen value chains to ensure the potential to provide inputs or markets (e.g. fish, dairy). However, dairy for smallholders would need investment capital (processing capacity such as cold storage, milk chillers, transport) and working capital (to purchase milk and crops) to grow.
8. To ensure synergies between programmes, and to ensure a consistent learning approach across the lending and non-lending portfolio, including identifying opportunities for scaling up, the new COSOP includes the development of a country level strategy for knowledge management. This will include mechanisms for inter- and intra-cross learning between IFAD projects, and projects of other development partners.

Responsible partners: Government of Uganda and IFAD

Timeline: Beginning in 2021, until the end of the COSOP (2027)

9. **Recommendation 2. Mainstream climate change more extensively with direct approaches in the new COSOP, given the growing urgency in Uganda.** Climate change has been indirectly addressed in the past COSOPs. IFAD's portfolio going forward contains more category A projects than before. Therefore IFAD should: (i) build into the next COSOP stronger support for the measures under the Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures, including social and environmental safeguards, and the technical expertise to supervise category A projects; and (ii) partner with the most appropriate government entities (Ministry of Water and Environment, Ministry of Works and Transport), non-governmental and donor partners to undertake climate mitigation and adaptation measures more directly around the supported value chains.
10. **Proposed follow up.** The second strategic objective in the new COSOP addresses the issues of climate adaptation and mitigation by ensuring a strengthening of environmental sustainability and climate change resilience of poor rural people's livelihoods and economic activities and enterprises.
11. Current measures for the appropriate technical expertise in the Category A project are in place and followed closely by the projects and IFAD country teams. While IFAD projects do not have investments implemented by the Ministries of Water and Environment or Ministry of Works and Transport, linkages to those ministries are made, as required, by the main implementing partners within the existing projects through formal channels and/or through their representation in project steering committees and at the district local government level.
12. The Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP) within the new COSOP, address specific challenges in potential value chains that are under consideration over the next two investment periods. It also provides recommendations and the required additional assessments at the time of project/programme development to ensure that all measures contribute to the climate change adaptation and mitigation targets set out in Uganda's nationally determined contributions.
13. Value chain investments should focus on climate proofing incorporating production, storage, processing and marketing stages of the chain. Specific considerations should

be given to the siting, design and construction of any infrastructure included in the investments to promote climate resilience and reduce post-harvest losses.

14. In the nationally determined contributions submitted for the Paris Agreement, Uganda reiterated that adaptation to climate change is a priority. Mitigation targets were included, with the larger part being conditional on external support. Therefore, the Climate Change and Environmental partnerships include resource mobilization under the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility. This can be explored further once the subsequent IFAD investments are agreed on with the Government.
15. Within the COSOP, IFAD will contribute to national targets for achieving sustainable development goals and targets for gainful employment, productivity and economic transformation while adapting the agricultural sector to the adverse effects of climate change and contributing to mitigation efforts. IFAD intends to introduce more climate-smart production systems, and introduce the use of Information and Communications Technologies for Development (ICT4D) for the agriculture sector for access to extension, market and weather information as well as access to financial services and digital finance.

Responsible partners: Government of Uganda and IFAD

Timeline: Ongoing through 2027

16. **Recommendation 3. Deliver more transformative approaches and interventions tailored to the specific needs of women and youth.** This could be pursued by: (i) including strategies and targets on these aspects in the new COSOP; (ii) mainstreaming and scaling up proven methods such as GALS and household mentoring; (iii) greater cross-project learning and use of specialized service partners to identify opportunities around constraints such as land and ownership norms; (iv) strengthening staffing in the Project Management Unit (PMU) to support and monitor the work of service providers; and (v) ensuring IFAD, in particular the Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion Division (ECG), provides better and more consistent technical oversight on gender and youth.
17. **Proposed follow up.** While specific strategies and targets for women and youth will be explored during the development of the investments under the new COSOP, the COSOP does set out a strategic objective of enhancing sustainable livelihood development for marginalized and poor households, especially women and the youth, for the period 2021–2027. Core activities will include support for household mentoring and graduation strategies within the selected value chains for greater inclusion of the marginalized, including women and youth. In line with IFAD's intention to ensure that its projects take a more gender transformative approach, women's empowerment will be promoted by increasing women's access to decision-making, assets (especially land tenure rights) and access to finance and skills.
18. The overarching target group identified, within the COSOP, are primarily: (i) poor smallholder households who have the willingness and potential to engage in productive economic activities; (ii) women and youth who are interested in engaging in productive enterprises; (iii) small- and medium-scale players² along the selected commodity value chains, who can help strengthen linkages and create employment opportunities for the rural poor; and (iv) farmer groups, women's groups, youth groups, community savings and credit groups.
19. As is currently practiced, technical assistance will be rolled out to project staff (harnessing the grants currently being implemented in the portfolio) to strengthen PMU staff in the aspects of gender and youth transformation.

² As facilitators to the core target group as well as direct beneficiaries for non-sovereign lending.

20. The Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion Division is actively involved and will continue to remain actively involved in the IFAD Uganda portfolio as they are a member of the project delivery team.

Responsible partners: IFAD and the Government of Uganda

Timeline: Ongoing until 2027

21. **Recommendation 4. Develop a non-lending strategy that systematizes knowledge management, partnerships and country policy engagement and provides the necessary resources for its implementation.** In order to foster innovation and scaling up within Uganda, IFAD needs to have a knowledge management system that captures project experiences and innovations so that they can be shared with partners and also used as evidence for policy engagement. This requires a documented strategy, and a stronger country presence that includes the Country Director in Uganda. IFAD's decentralized model also requires greater coordination within IFAD. Therefore, relevant divisions (ECG, the Research and Impact Assessment Division and the Sustainable Production, Markets and Institutions Division) should be more involved in the knowledge management process to support non-lending aims by leveraging financial and human resources from IFAD headquarters as well as the regional hub in Nairobi.
22. **Proposed follow up.** Knowledge management, which has predominantly centred around project-specific activities, will be broadened and enhanced under the new COSOP. The following enhancements will be operationalized: (i) knowledge management will help disseminate the successful elements of climate-resilient practices and technologies; (ii) each investment project will develop its own knowledge management plan (if one is not available); and (iii) at the country level, the cross-learning between projects will be shared through annual workshops and/or portfolio reviews, policy briefs and development partner and sector working groups.
23. To ensure a consistent learning approach across the lending and non-lending portfolio, including identifying opportunities for scaling up, the country team will develop a knowledge management strategy for the country programme, in full collaboration with partners on the ground and other IFAD divisions. IFAD will continue to support international exchanges through its networks and partnerships. These opportunities for exchange will be provided to IFAD's primary target group, farmer organizations, financial service providers and government functionaries. Specific opportunities for learning from innovations in the region and through South-South Cooperation will be explored.
24. IFAD is in the process of updating the strategy for decentralization, which will determine IFAD's country presence in Uganda.

Responsible partners: IFAD, project teams

Timeline: The country level strategy for knowledge management will be developed by 2022; while other activities are currently ongoing and will continue through 2027.

25. **Recommendation 5. Strengthen M&E, reporting and financial management to bolster governance and anticorruption measures and improve the assessment of results, especially at the impact level.** Relevant IFAD divisions should ensure risk mitigation around procurement, staff advances and related areas of financial management. In order to take a programmatic approach and to leverage IFAD's full capacities and resources, the ICO requires a knowledge management and/or M&E officer who can: (i) strengthen M&E systems in projects to ensure timely reporting and better documentation that will underpin improved governance and anti-corruption measures; (ii) aggregate results across the portfolio (for lending and non-lending) and share them with the Government and other partners; (iii) capture resources at the regional and/or global levels (e.g. grants) for capacity development; (iv) support stronger design and analysis of impact studies to improve their statistical accuracy and delivery of more robust results, as well as include impact on reducing

malnutrition; and (v) extend the use of new monitoring methods by improving the use of web-based systems, drone monitoring, and others.


26. **Proposed follow up.** The strengthening of M&E and fiduciary aspects within the portfolio commenced about 15 months ago by addressing the specific weaknesses that were identified either through missions or by the projects themselves. This will continue through 2021 and will taper down once the results emerging from the projects indicate higher levels of quality in those areas.
27. A knowledge management officer, present at the Nairobi hub office, has been supporting the knowledge management agenda on the portfolio in the last 12 months. This is expected to continue with increased involvement, and it is not foreseen that a separate person will be hired for knowledge management at the IFAD Country Office in Uganda.

Responsible partners: IFAD and the Government of Uganda

Timeline: Ongoing through 2022

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
Matia Kasaija
Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
of the Republic of Uganda



Date: 19th Feb 2021

and

Mr Donal Brown
Associate Vice-President
Programme Management Department
International Fund for Agricultural Development



Date: 24/02/2021

Republic of Uganda

Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation

I. Background

A. Introduction

1. In line with the Evaluation Policy of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),⁶ and as approved by the 128th Session of the IFAD Executive Board in December 2019, IFAD's Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) has undertaken a country strategy and programme evaluation (CSPE) in the Republic of Uganda.⁷ This is the second such evaluation in Uganda. The first country programme evaluation (CPE) was published in 2013. The CSPE follows the IFAD Evaluation Manual (second edition, 2015).

B. Objectives, methodology and processes

2. The main objectives of the CSPE were to: (i) assess the results and performance of the COSOP 2013–2018 (country strategic opportunities programme) and IFAD-financed programme in Uganda; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the next COSOP and the future partnership between IFAD and the Government of Uganda for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication. The findings, lessons and recommendations from this CSPE will inform the preparation of a new COSOP in 2021. This CSPE also provides an opportunity to: (i) review the extent to which the recommendations of the 2013 CPE have been followed up; and (ii) assess the extent to which programme performance has improved.
3. **Scope.** The CSPE assesses the results and performance of the activities conducted since 2013, following the conclusion of the previous CPE and approval of the 2013 COSOP. The CSPE covers the full range of IFAD support to Uganda, including: (i) the lending portfolio; (ii) non-lending activities; (iii) the performance of the main partners (the Government and IFAD); and (iv) COSOP.
4. In terms of **lending operations**, the projects reviewed are presented in. The nine projects include: (i) three that are closed and were assessed by IOE through Project Completion Report Validations (PCRVs) so that the CSPE drew on the existing evaluation findings; (ii) two that are completed, one of which was evaluated in 2020 through a co-terminus Project Performance Evaluation (PPE); (iii) three that are ongoing; and (iv) one that was only approved by the IFAD Executive Board in December 2019.
5. The evaluability of the lending operations depends on their stage of implementation. Seven projects are assessed according to the entire set of evaluation criteria (table 1). One project, the National Oilseeds Project (NOSP) was evaluated in terms of "relevance" alone, given that it was approved, but not yet effective. Whereas another project, the National Oil Palm Project (NOPP) was evaluated in terms of only "relevance" and "efficiency" as it is still in the early stages of implementation.

⁶ IFAD, 2011, Evaluation policy.

⁷ Hereafter referred to as Uganda.

Table 1
Evaluation criteria covered for IFAD-supported projects

<i>Project name</i>	<i>Project acronym</i>	<i>Project status</i>	<i>Disbursement level IFAD loan</i>	<i>Evaluation criteria current CSPE</i>
				All criteria
Rural Financial Services Programme	RFSP	Evaluated	100%	PCRVR Available
				All criteria
District Livelihoods Support Programme	DLSP	Evaluated	100%	PCRVR Available
				All criteria
Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme	CAIIP1	Evaluated	98%	PCRVR Available
				All criteria
Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services	ATAAS	Completed	97%	PPE ongoing
				All criteria
Vegetable Oil Development Project 2	VODP2	Completed	100%	All criteria
				All criteria
Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas	PROFIRA	Ongoing	79%	All criteria
				All criteria
Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region	PRELNOR	Ongoing	64%	All criteria
				Relevance
National Oil Palm Project	NOPP	Ongoing	8%	Efficiency
				Relevance
National Oilseeds Project	NOSP	Approved	N/A	Relevance

Source: IOE elaboration on data from Oracle Business Intelligence.

6. **Criteria for loan portfolio analysis.** For the performance of the lending portfolio, the CSPE adopts internationally recognized criteria (relevance; effectiveness; efficiency; impact on rural poverty; sustainability of benefits) as well as IFAD-specific ones (gender equality and women’s empowerment; innovation; scaling up; environment and natural resources management; and adaptation to climate change). Definitions of these criteria are presented in annex I.
7. The CSPE also assesses the performance of **non-lending activities:** (i) knowledge management; (ii) partnership building; and (iii) policy engagement. The analysis of non-lending activities focuses on goals set by the 2013 COSOP as well as achievements not initially foreseen in the COSOP.
8. During the evaluated period, IFAD approved and/or supervised 50 grants, of which 38 were funded by IFAD and 12 funded by various partners including, *inter alia*, the Financing Facility for Remittances, the International Land Coalition, the Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility, the European Commission (EC), Government of Canada, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the American Jewish World Service, and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) (annex IV). Among the IFAD-funded grants, two were country-specific to Uganda and 35 were global and regional. Taking into account their diverse themes⁸ and coverage of all grant functions (knowledge management, partnership building, policy engagement, innovation and impact evaluations), a sample of seven grants were selected for review (see annex V). The CSPE also reviews the Uganda Yield Fund, a social impact investment fund, which was implemented by IFAD in 2017 with supplementary funding from the European Union.
9. **Assessment of partners' performance.** This relates to the performance of IFAD and the Government at the project level and overall country programme

⁸ Value chain development, public–private–producer partnerships, inclusive rural finance, remittances, extension services, apex organizations, farmers’ organizations, agricultural productivity, genetic breeding and diversity, climate change adaptation, sustainable land management, land, gender, youth, nutrition and livestock.

management level. It assesses the implementation of their respective responsibilities in design, implementation support, monitoring and evaluation, and partnership and policy engagement, taking into account the specific context of Uganda. Fiduciary aspects of the Government's performance are also reviewed, drawing from findings from supervision reports, supplemented by interviews with IFAD staff, project staff and other stakeholders.

10. Building on the analysis of the above-mentioned three dimensions, the CSPE assesses **the relevance and effectiveness at the country strategy level** of how IFAD has defined and implemented its strategies to contribute to rural poverty reduction in partnership with the Government and in coherence with governmental strategies (relevance), and what results it has achieved and how (effectiveness).
11. Performance in each of the above areas is rated on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest). While the ratings for the above topics and criteria are viewed individually, the synergies between the components are considered as well.
12. **Evaluation process.** The evaluation began with an approach paper and a desk review of available documentation listed in annex X. A self-assessment was conducted by the IFAD Country Office (ICO) in Uganda and by project management teams, based on guidelines elaborated on by IOE. A list of potential interviewees was assembled and interviewed remotely. Through snowball sampling, further contacts were identified and interviewed, which led to 60 remote respondent interviews. A field mission was undertaken by a team of four national consultants from 12 to 30 July 2020 (annex VII). The team used a standard interview guide and collected data using pro formas from selected project sites. Key informant interviews and focus groups included Government representatives at both the national and local level, IFAD staff and consultants, NGOs, research institutions and private entrepreneurs and beneficiaries. At the end of the mission, a virtual wrap-up meeting was held on 30 July 2020 with Government officials discussing the preliminary findings. Thereafter, the report was drafted and peer-reviewed within IOE in November 2020. It was shared with the Government and IFAD Management in November 2020 and then revised, taking into account the comments received. It was finalized in December 2020. A virtual national stakeholder workshop was held on 29 January 2021 to discuss the CSPE findings and recommendations; agree on key points to be included in the Agreement at Completion Point (ACP); and reflect on strategic issues that will inform the forthcoming Uganda COSOP.
13. **Limitations.** Due to the corona virus disease 2019 (COVID-19), a preparatory mission was not undertaken and all key stakeholders were interviewed via video conference or telephone. Travel restrictions to Uganda also meant that international members of the evaluation team could not join the main field mission in July. This restriction limited the ability of the whole team to engage in a flexible and fully interactive manner. The national team also faced challenges in their availability, given the curfews and other movement restrictions⁹ that were in place, as well as the variable quality of their internet connection.
14. During the field mission, districts on the national border were also not accessible due to Government travel restrictions. Telephone interviews were conducted in these border districts to ensure coverage. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, field interviews were conducted at safe distances and group numbers were limited. Nevertheless, some 43 IFAD investments (such as roads, vehicles and processing centres) were visited and meetings held with over 80 farmers, farmer groups, cooperatives and district staff. To compensate for the limitations on field investigation, the team also arranged further remote meetings by video conference with a wide range of interlocutors, including farmer and savings groups, local government officials,

⁹ At times, only key Government personnel could obtain passes to allow movement to offices during the COVID-19 restrictions put in place by the Government. As a result, the national team could not interact as fully as needed.

development partners, project management units (PMUs), service providers, international donors and Government staff (see annex VIII).

15. Overall, while the above measures helped to obtain a broad range of views and empirical evidence under difficult circumstances, the process of triangulating findings through team discussion and validation was less effective than it would have been under normal circumstances. This may have left some unresolved biases in the CSPE team's interpretation of the findings. Follow-up efforts were nevertheless made to review the quality of evidence through email exchange, team video meetings and through careful analysis of the quality of secondary data (see online Appendix III).¹⁰

Key points (chapter I)

- The CSPE has been assessing the performance of IFAD's activities since 2013, after the conclusion of the previous CPE, and since 2013 COSOP.
- The CSPE covers the full range of IFAD support to Uganda, including: (i) the lending portfolio (nine projects); (ii) non-lending activities (including 50 grants); (iii) the performance of the main partners (the Government and IFAD); and (iv) COSOP.
- A wide source of information was used, drawing from a desk review, self-assessment, impact studies, interviews and field visits.
- COVID-19 placed considerable restrictions on the evaluation process, reducing the missions to Uganda to one main field mission led by national consultants, but this was compensated for by an unusually extensive list of interviews conducted remotely.

¹⁰ Appendices to the report are available online at <https://bit.ly/3nA6pAE>

II. Country context and IFAD's strategy and operations for the CSPE period

A. Country context


16. The Republic of Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa, bordered by Kenya to the east, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, South Sudan in the north, and both Rwanda and Tanzania in the south. It contains significant bodies of water that make up almost one-fifth of the country, most notably Lake Victoria as well as others along the Nile River. It is a low-income country with a population (in 2018) of 42.7 million people, of whom 76 per cent live in rural areas.¹¹

A.1. Economy

17. Since gaining power in 1986, the National Resistance Movement introduced a number of structural and pro-market reforms and investments. This resulted in macroeconomic stability that generated a sustained period of growth from 1987 to 2010 of 6.7 per cent average annual real GDP. This declined over the period from 2011 to 2018 to 5.2 per cent and was estimated at 5.9 per cent in 2019. Meanwhile, real GDP per capita growth declined from an average of 3.6 per cent (1987–2010) to 2.2 per cent, and 1.6 per cent in 2015 and 2016, respectively, mainly driven by a high population growth rate.¹²
18. The main sources of economic growth have come from the industry and services sector (including information and communications technology, transport and financial services) and less so from agriculture (see Figure 1). Foreign direct investment (inflow) was variable from 2009 to 2019, but generally increased, albeit slowly over time. It was at its lowest in 2010 (US\$0.5 billion) and highest in 2019 (US\$1.3 billion), with an annual average of (US\$0.9 billion).¹³ Newly discovered oil reserves have given the country important future growth prospects, but the pace of development has been slow and significant benefits may not emerge in the near term. Inflation has been volatile over the COSOP period but declined generally from 4.9 per cent and 5.6 per cent in 2013 and 2017, respectively, to 2.9 per cent in 2019.

Figure 1

Performance of the economy, value added by sector (annual rate of growth)



Source: World Bank, 2019a.

19. Economic growth has been uneven across the country. Progress, in terms of consumption levels, has been much faster in the western and southern regions, due to growth in the services sector and an increase in regional trade and global markets. This also has been supported by the Government's focus on physical infrastructure

¹¹ World Bank, 2019a.

¹² African Development Bank, 2017.

¹³ World Bank, 2019a. Foreign direct investment net inflows (Balance of Payments, current US\$).

development. From the late-1980s until 2006, northern Uganda suffered from a 20-year insurgency by the Lord's Resistance Army. The conflict, which internally displaced up to 1.8 million people, held back the northern region economically, resulting in a slower rise in incomes and high poverty levels.¹⁴

20. **Agricultural value added.** Over the past three decades, the structure of the Ugandan economy has gradually changed from agriculture to manufacturing and services. In that time, agriculture's contribution to GDP has declined from 53 per cent in 1990 to just under 25 per cent in 2018 (see Table 2). Since 2012, the sector has grown at a low average annual rate (2.6 per cent) relative to population growth (3.5 per cent) and agricultural growth in other East African Community (EAC) countries (3 to 5 per cent).¹⁵ Yet, agriculture continues to employ 72 per cent of the country's labour force, whose earnings have been the main driver of poverty reduction over the past couple of decades. The economic gains (employment, income, and poverty reduction) from the agricultural sector have been fragile, however, due to its largely underdeveloped state and below par performance.

Table 2

Performance of the economy, value added by sector (per cent of GDP)

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Services	46.9	46.2	48.5	47.6	45.8	46.7	47.1	47.9	47.5	47.1	47.6
Agriculture	21.4	26.1	26.2	25.1	26.1	25.5	25.1	24.0	23.7	24.6	24.2
Industry	25.8	20.2	18.1	20.2	21.3	20.6	20.4	20.0	20.6	20.3	19.9

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Statistical data, accessed 5 February 2020.

21. **Agricultural trade.** Uganda is an active member of the EAC and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The Government has adopted a common external tariff and free trade agreement within the Common Market Agreement of the EAC. Membership in these economic communities has sharply increased Uganda's regional trade volumes, resulting in both export and import benefits.
22. Agriculture's role in total exports remains high, although this is declining slowly. Over the last decade, agricultural products (primary and processed) have accounted for 54 per cent of total exports. They also represent about 20 per cent of the country's total foreign exchange earnings from exports of goods and services and transfers. Uganda is a large importer of processed foods and a growing one for fresh food. It also imports vegetable oil because its net domestic vegetable oil production can only meet half the national demand. In addition, Uganda exports and re-imports by-products of processed oilseeds, in particular, oilseed cakes used for animal feed.
23. **Private and non-farm sector.** The domestic business community is young, with most businesses (90 per cent) being micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. They operate in the informal sector and mainly in the light manufacturing and retail sectors. Enterprises are fragmented and weakly integrated into the national, regional, and global industrial value-chains and markets. They are further characterized by low and declining productivity, low levels of product, process, and organization innovation, low competitiveness, informality, weak governance standards, and limited access to finance. Over the past decades, growth in non-farm self-employment, and to a lesser extent wage employment, contributed to raising incomes of the bottom 40 per cent.

¹⁴ World Bank, 2016a.

¹⁵ World Bank, 2019a.

A.2. Poverty, gender and food security

24. **Rural poverty.** Past economic growth contributed to reducing poverty at national poverty lines from 56.4 per cent in 1993 to 24.5 per cent and 19.7 per cent in 2009 and 2013, respectively.¹⁶ Uganda therefore met the 2015 Millennium Development Goal 1 target – of halving poverty – ahead of schedule. However, progress towards other Millennium Development Goals that are important for human development was mixed, principally due to unsatisfactory and ineffective public service delivery.¹⁷ Ugandans also remain vulnerable to slipping back into poverty – for every three Ugandans that escape poverty, two fall back.¹⁸ Poverty at the national level (approximately US\$1.00 per day) has worsened in recent years, rising once more to 21.4 per cent in 2016.¹⁹ Similarly, “extreme poverty”, the internationally recognized poverty headcount ratio at US\$1.90 per day, increased from 35.9 per cent in 2012 to 41.7 per cent in 2016.²⁰ The 2018 Human Development Index value for Uganda was 0.528, ranking it 159 out of 189 countries and above average in the low human development group, but below the average for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.²¹ Poverty and vulnerability remain primarily a rural phenomenon (where 89 per cent of the poor live, compared to 11 per cent in urban areas),²² concerning large families and households relying on farming as their main source of income.
25. **Inequality.** Poverty reduction and economic growth have not improved at the same pace across the country and inequality persists. Over the last two decades, the Gini index – a measure of income inequality – has oscillated between 40 and 45 per cent.²³ Inequality is most pronounced in terms of area (rural versus urban), region (northern and eastern regions compared to the rest of the country), gender and age. Northern Uganda had the highest poverty rate in 2012/2013 of 44 per cent. Eastern Uganda also had a poverty rate of 25 per cent, higher than the average national poverty level of 20 per cent.²⁴ The sub-region of Karamoja in north-eastern Uganda had the highest poverty rate of 60 per cent following years of instability from armed cattle rustling within the area and across the border in Kenya. It is also the driest and one of the less fertile regions.
26. The three main demographic causes of inequality are high annual population growth rates, high fertility rates among low-income households, and a burgeoning youth²⁵ demographic, with almost half its population below 15 years of age²⁶ and 78 per cent below 30 years of age.²⁷ The resultant drivers of inequality include: (i) high unemployment of women and youth; (ii) low access to basic social services and infrastructure; (iii) limited capacity to absorb the large number of youth entering the labour market every year and the gap between their skills and the market’s needs; (iv) low savings; (v) declining productivity; (vi) gender discrimination (such as women’s rights to land, assets and inheritance); and (vii) a lack of and/or insufficient social safety protection services.

¹⁶ African Development Bank, 2017. The national poverty headcount ratio is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.

¹⁷ Good progress was made on access to HIV treatment, reduction in the incidence of malaria and other major diseases. Progress was slow – and in some cases reversed – with regards to universal primary education, gender equality, maternal health and the spread of HIV/AIDS. World Bank, 2016a.

¹⁸ World Bank, 2016a.

¹⁹ World Bank, 2019a. Last data available are from 2016.

²⁰ World Bank, 2019a. Poverty headcount ratio at US\$1.90 a day (2011 public-private partnership). Latest data available are from 2016.

²¹ UNDP, 2018b.

²² Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018.

²³ World Bank, 2019a.

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Uganda defines its youth as being between 18 and 30 years old. The national Youth Policy refers to 12–30 year olds. The National Strategy for Youth Employment in Agriculture adopts the African Union definition of youth of 15 to 35. MAAIF, 2017.

²⁶ 47 per cent from 0 to 14 years old in 2018. World Bank, 2019a.

²⁷ FAO, 2017.

27. Three-quarters of working youth are in vulnerable employment and most do not own bank accounts. They mainly provide unpaid family labour in households primarily practicing subsistence farming. Limited skills hinder their ability to find employment along agricultural value chains (especially in post-harvest handling, processing and agri-business).
28. **Gender equality.** The Government has improved the institutional and legal environment to support gender equality and protect women's human rights. The Constitution upholds an affirmative action policy that increased women's representation to at least a third of all members of local government councils and stipulates that every district has female members of Parliament. Over the past couple of decades, women's level of education, participation in the labour market and access to finance has increased.²⁸
29. Yet, Uganda is ranked 159 out of 189 countries according to the 2018 Gender Inequality Index.²⁹ Deeply entrenched attitudes, beliefs and practices that discriminate against women in many parts of Uganda, have stymied progress towards gender equality in daily life. Consequently, long-standing gender issues remain for women, including sexual and gender-based violence, HIV/AIDS³⁰, limited access to social services and economic opportunities, and weak representation, with limited influence in customary decision-making structures, thus adversely affecting their access to land, finance and property. This results in a persistent gender gap in agricultural productivity and women's concentration in lower-value activities and crops.³¹ Women make up more than 75 per cent of total farm labour and perform over 90 per cent of farm-level primary processing operations.³² With lower levels of education and access to assets, women also have been less able than men to benefit from the growth in non-farm self-employment, and are generally in lower-earning self-employment activities.
30. **Food security and nutrition.** Uganda joined the Scaling-Up Nutrition movement in 2011 by supporting efforts towards a multi-sectoral approach to nutrition. The more recent Nutrition Advocacy and Communication Strategy 2015 to 2019 aims to create awareness among the population on approaches to adequate nutrition. Key governmental instruments to improve nutrition include the 2003 Food and Nutrition Policy, the Uganda Nutrition Action Plan (UNAP) 2011 to 2016 and the more recent Nutrition Advocacy and Communication Strategy 2015 to 2019.
31. Although undernutrition among children under-five has declined in recent years, rates of stunting³³ are still high (34 per cent in 2010 and 29 per cent in 2018), particularly in rural areas.³⁴ Diets typically lack diversity and micronutrient-rich foods. Contributing factors for inadequate diets among the poor, especially in the north and east of the country, include a fast-growing population; an underdeveloped agricultural sector; the presence of the world's third largest refugee population; and climate change impacts. Inadequate storage facilities to protect harvested crops from pests, moisture and mould results in food losses of up to 30 per cent.³⁵ The food

²⁸ UNDP Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2019 Statistical Update – Uganda.

²⁹ UNDP, 2019.

³⁰ While HIV infections and AIDS deaths have declined since 2010, 1.3 million people were HIV positive in 2017 with prevalence rates being four times higher for young women than young men.

³¹ World Bank, 2016a.

³² World Bank, 2018. NDPII, notes that 70% of the women engaged in agriculture, less than 20 per cent control their outputs. Only 27 per cent of the registered land in Uganda was owned by women. Female-headed households comprise 80.5 per cent of agriculture subsistence workers compared to male-headed households. NDPI also noted that plots managed by women produced 17per cent less per acre than plots managed by men (p. 74).

³³ Low height for age. This is the result of chronic or recurrent undernutrition, usually associated with poor socio-economic conditions, poor maternal health and nutrition, frequent illness, and/or inappropriate infant and young child feeding and care in early life. Stunting holds children back from reaching their physical and cognitive potential. WHO, 2018.

³⁴ Concern and Welthungerhilfe, 2019.

³⁵ WFP, 2020.

security situation is compounded in the northern and eastern regions by significant land degradation and vulnerability to climate change.

A.3. Agriculture, natural resources and climate change

32. **Agriculture.** Biodiversity in Uganda is high due to rich volcanic soils, multiple freshwater lakes with irrigation potential, and two rainy seasons per year – all of which are beneficial to agricultural production.³⁶ Agricultural land in Uganda was reported as 144,157 km² (2016), which computes to 71.9 per cent of the total land, including arable land of 69,000 km² (2016), which is 48 per cent of the estimated agricultural land and 34 per cent of the total land area. Agricultural incomes have depended on external factors, such as good weather and commodity prices as well as unsustainable expansion of acres under cultivation. The sector also has been beset with droughts and damaging diseases and pests, such as the fall armyworm and, more recently, locusts.
33. Multiple structural challenges constrain growth including the predominance of smallholder farmers practicing rain-fed, low-yielding agriculture; growing population density on arable land; land tenure insecurity with 80 per cent of land under undocumented customary tenure; poverty; poor infrastructure; and low levels of educational attainment. Other deficiencies include: limited research and development and innovation; weak public extension services; use of low quality and inadequate inputs (such as seeds and fertilizers); low product diversification; high post-harvest losses; weak land and water resources management; and inefficient and uncompetitive farm-to-agro-processing and -market linkages.
34. The sector is also constrained by farmers' and small and medium-sized agribusinesses' limited access to rural and agricultural finance. At the national level, 54 per cent of adults were financially included in formal institutions in 2013, but rural adults were twice as likely as their urban counterparts to access financial services from informal groups.³⁷ Reasons for this include the lack of usable collateral, high transaction costs due to the remoteness of clients, dispersed demand for financial services, the small size of farms and of individual transactions, underdeveloped communication and transportation infrastructure, and high risks due to variable rainfall, market fluctuations and recurrent incidences of pests and diseases.
35. **Environment and natural resources management.** Uganda is consuming its natural resources at an unsustainable rate. Forests, which provide over 90 per cent of the country's energy, and mostly to the poor, are being reduced in size by over 5 per cent annually.³⁸ Fisheries and soils are also being depleted and degraded at alarming rates, and the country is estimated to be losing between 4 and 12 per cent of GDP a year due to soil erosion.³⁹ The reasons for natural resources degradation include: (i) conversion of forests to farmland and inappropriate farming methods; (ii) high rates of urbanization, increasing charcoal and timber demand for energy, construction and furniture use; (iii) increasing population on scarce land; and (iv) wasteful use of energy resources.
36. **Climate change.** Uganda is experiencing less predictable and more variable rainfall, more crop and animal pests and diseases, and higher temperatures.⁴⁰ This is expected to seriously impact natural ecosystems, water resources, food security, savannah and rangelands, forests, human health, settlements and power generation. For example, increased rainfall has led to an unprecedented rise in the water levels of Lake Victoria. The resulting floods have disrupted businesses and displaced communities, ruined crops, damaged basic infrastructure and interrupted hydro-

³⁶ Concern and Welthungerhilfe, 2019.

³⁷ Bank of Uganda, 2017, National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2017–2022.

³⁸ World Bank, 2016a.

³⁹ World Bank, 2018.

⁴⁰ Fall armyworm outbreak (2017) and major locust plagues in early 2020 are recent examples.

power generation, causing temporary black-outs.⁴¹ The implications of rising water levels affect upstream and downstream Nile Basin countries, representing a regional issue of concern. Relative to countries along the same latitudes, Uganda has one of the least adapted agro-economic systems and is, therefore, one of the most vulnerable to climate change.⁴² Farming households are constrained in their ability to adapt quickly enough to climate change, hindering agricultural growth. They also have very few alternatives in terms of finance and other safety nets to improve their resilience to climate-related shocks.

A.4. Governance framework

37. **Rural development policies.** The Uganda Vision 2040 outlines development pathways to transform the country from a low-income country to a competitive upper middle-income country by 2040. The National Development Plan (NDPII) from 2015/16 to 2019/20 contributes to the vision with the goal of propelling the country towards middle-income status by 2020. The NDPII aims to strengthen the country's competitiveness for sustainable wealth creation, employment and inclusive growth by pursuing a private sector-led, export-oriented and quasi-market approach. The recently released NDPIII (2020/21–2024/25) places greater focus on sustainable industrial growth through value addition, import substitution and mineral development. It contains 18 programmes, the first of which emphasizes agricultural production and processing around a set of key value chains.
38. Agriculture is recognized as critical towards achieving both the NDPII and NDPIII goals. The National Agriculture Policy (2013) guides the sector to achieve food and nutrition security and improve household incomes by focusing on enhancing sustainable agricultural productivity and value addition; providing employment opportunities; and promoting domestic and international trade. Key sectoral strategies over the results-based country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) period 2013–2018 were the Development Strategy and Investment Plan (DSIP) for 2010/2011–2014/2015 and the Agriculture Sector Strategic Plan (ASSP) for 2015/2016–2019/2020.
39. The goal of ASSP is to transform Uganda's agricultural sector from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture. ASSP also mainstreams the crosscutting issues of gender, youth, environment and climate change adaptation, HIV/AIDS, and food and nutrition security.⁴³ Thus, the transformation aims to help create employment opportunities, especially for youth and women, and increase household incomes, while ensuring household food security along the entire commodity value chain. The overall goal is to achieve an average growth rate of 6 per cent per year over the five-year period.
40. Government policy on extension services delivery and rural financial services has alternated over the last few decades between supply-driven and demand-driven approaches. Over the COSOP period, extension services were provided through the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), which is decentralized, largely farmer-owned (through the formation of farmer groups) and private sector-led but publicly funded. However, it was associated with a myriad of challenges that caused inefficiencies in extension delivery. In 2014, government policy reverted to a "single spine" publicly funded and publicly provided model of extension services delivery. The Agricultural Extension Policy (2016) proposes that advisory services should be

⁴¹ Nile Basin Initiative, 2020 <https://nilebasin.org/new-and-events/307-unprecedented-rise-in-water-levels-of-lake-victoria>.

⁴² Ministry of Water and Environment, 2015, Uganda National Climate Change Policy.

⁴³ Gender issues are raised in NDPII and the country adopted the National Gender Policy in 1997, which was revised in 2007. In addition, the agricultural sector has a National Adaptation Plan (2018) to support the National Climate Change Policy (2015), and a National Strategy for Youth Employment in Agriculture (2017).

pluralistic and involve multiple actors, but the focus is confined to how state actors will guide and coordinate services.⁴⁴

41. Since the 2006 Rural Financial Services Strategy, the Government has intervened in the rural finance sector, most notably supporting savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) in each subcounty. Presently, it is questioned whether Parliament's passing of the Tier IV⁴⁵ Microfinance Institution and Moneylenders Act 2016, and the Government's reluctance to borrow for further capacity-building projects signals a swing back to a less interventionist approach.⁴⁶ However, increased access to finance by poor rural households remains pivotal to reducing rural poverty by stepping up production and productivity as well as absorbing the impact of external shocks.
42. **Government institutions.** The Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) is mandated to promote and support sustainable and market-oriented agricultural production, food security and household incomes in the country. It also has seven semi-autonomous agencies, two of which have played an important role in the IFAD country programme: the NAADS and the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO). The Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MOFPED) have also played an important role in the IFAD country programme. MOLG is responsible for supervising and supporting local governments across Uganda under the decentralization policy, in coordination with other ministries with decentralized functions. MOFPED is responsible for mobilizing resources for public expenditure, managing and controlling public finances, overseeing national planning and strategic development initiatives, and coordinating with development partners.
43. **Decentralization.** The Government began decentralizing in 1993 in order to promote people's participation in the country's democratic process, and to improve service delivery and proximity with its citizens. Uganda's 1995 Constitution and 1997 Local Government Act devolved functions, specifying five levels of local councils – district, county,⁴⁷ sub-county, parish and village – among which the districts and sub-counties are local government units with political authority and financial autonomy.⁴⁸ While service delivery had initially improved, decentralization and the quality of services have been weakened by the proliferation of districts from 36 in 1995 to 135 by 2020. Districts have faced underfunding (see Ch.V.B.iii) (although there is a new grant for extension), and many have limited capacities in areas such as procurement, contract management and some technical skills.⁴⁹ Throughout the COSOP period, governance issues in public institutions have reportedly been adversely affecting how public policy is implemented, the provision of public services and more generally, the economic development of the country.⁵⁰ In addition, the Corruption Perceptions Index score for Uganda has shown only slight improvement, from 26 out of 100 in 2013 to 28 out of 100 in 2019.⁵¹
44. **Civil society.** Civil society in Uganda includes labour unions and domestic NGOs as well as international NGOs. The last few decades have seen considerable growth in their numbers, although in 2019 the Government "validated" 2,119 NGOs out of the over 14,000 NGOs registered.⁵² Their role has been to plug gaps in public service

⁴⁴ National Agricultural Extension Policy and National Agricultural Extension Strategy 2016.

⁴⁵ Tier 1 are commercial banks, Tier 2 are credit institutions and Tier 3 are micro deposit-taking institutions. All are regulated by the Bank of Uganda and the key classification parameter is the minimum capital of the financial institution (for purposes of licensing by the Bank of Uganda). Non-regulated farmers' institutions are under Tier 4, including SACCOs and non-deposit-taking farmers' institutions.

⁴⁶ PROFIRA mid-term review.

⁴⁷ The majority of counties have become districts. Counties no longer have councils or administrative structures.

⁴⁸ OECD, 2016a.

⁴⁹ CSPE interviews. Also see Public Expenditure Governance in Uganda's Agricultural Extension System, ACODE Centre for Budget and Economic Governance, 2018.

⁵⁰ Transparency International, 2013; EIU 2019; Kjaer A.M. and Joughin J., 2019; World Bank 2016a; AfDB 2017.

⁵¹ Transparency International, 2019; The CPI measures perceived levels of public sector corruption, according to experts and business people. Scores range from 0 meaning "highly corrupt" to 100 which signifies "very clean".


⁵² https://www.scribd.com/document/435119466/Validated-National-NGO-Register-VNNR-as-of-07-09-2019-Converted#from_embed.

provision and, with support from donors, to cultivate citizen engagement, political accountability and ultimately deepen democratic governance. While they have notably contributed to service provision, especially in poverty reduction programmes, their impact on government policies and accountability is more debatable. In addition, farmer groups, producer groups and cooperatives have proliferated and are engaged in agribusiness and agro-industrial development and agroprocessing and marketing. They contribute to improved food security and employment opportunities and mainstreaming environmental, HIV/AIDS and gender concerns.

A.5. International development assistance

45. **Overseas development assistance.** Overseas development assistance (ODA) totalled US\$2 billion in 2017, accounting for 7.7 per cent of GDP. Figure 2 shows that over the last couple of decades, both ODA and remittance inflows have generally increased. However, as GDP has grown, the proportion of ODA to GDP has generally declined, while the proportion of remittances received to GDP has remained relatively stable, between 4 and 5 per cent.

Figure 2
Official development assistance and remittances to Uganda in absolute terms (current US\$ million) and proportional to GDP, between 2000 and 2017



Source: World Bank 2019a.

46. The largest commitments of development finance in the rural development and agricultural sector between 2000 and 2018 came from the United States of America (US\$1.5 billion), followed by the United Kingdom (US\$1.1 billion), the World Bank (US\$1 billion), the European Union (US\$0.5 billion), the African Development Bank (US\$0.4 billion) and IFAD (US\$0.3 billion). Agriculture and rural development ODA as a percentage of total ODA commitments varied from 11 per cent in 2000 to an average of roughly 20 per cent between 2002 and 2017, recently peaking at 38 per cent in 2018.⁵³ In addition, non-ODA loans (primarily from China) have become increasingly important in Uganda to finance large-scale infrastructure projects. Moving forward, non-ODA loans are expected to account for 70 per cent of new government borrowing to 2025–2026.
47. **Aid modalities.** Donors suspended general and sector-budget support in 2012 after a series of disagreements with the Government on the use of funds and some proposed changes to Government policies. Since then, donors have reverted to project interventions. The exit from budget-support led to less Government involvement in donors' programmes and less donor involvement in Government decisions, as well as less donor harmonization. Some forums for dialogue remain

⁵³ FAO Aid Monitor <http://www.fao.org/aid-monitor/en/>. Overseas development assistance commitments to FAO-related sectors in Uganda, at current prices.

including 16 sector working groups, which have shown varying degrees of effectiveness.⁵⁴

B. IFAD's strategy and operations for the CSPE period

B.1. Overview of IFAD country strategy

48. Since IFAD operations in Uganda began in 1981, it has approved 18 projects for a total financial volume of US\$562 million, financed by highly concessional loans. Taking into account counterpart funding from the Government (US\$616 million), beneficiary contributions (US\$38 million) and external cofinancing from local and international partners (US\$122 million and US\$433 million, respectively), the estimated costs of these operations were US\$1,773 million (see Table 3).⁵⁵

Table 3
Snapshot of IFAD operations in Uganda since 1981

First IFAD-funded project	1981
Number of approved loans	18
Ongoing projects	3
Total amount of IFAD lending	US\$562 million
Counterpart funding	US\$616 million
Beneficiary contributions	US\$38 million
Co-financing amount (local)	US\$122 million
Co-financing amount (international)	US\$433 million
Total portfolio cost	US\$1,773 million
Lending terms	Highly Concessional
Main co-financiers	World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB)
COSOPs	1998, 2004, 2013
Country Office	Country Programme Officer (CPO), SMADF ⁵⁶ Programme Officer and SMADF Financial Officer, Administrative Assistant and driver
Country programme managers since 1998	Lakshmi Moola (Aug 2018 - present) in Nairobi hub, Alessandro Marini (2012–2018) based in Kampala, Marion Bradley (2006–2012) and Joseph Yayock (1998–2006) in Rome.
Main government partners	MAAIF, MOLG, MOFPED

Source: Oracle Business Intelligence.

49. **Historical COSOPs.** The first IFAD COSOP for Uganda produced in 1998 focused on an area-based approach to smallholder production and commercialization issues; agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption; strengthening the rural financial system; and targeting the north and north-eastern parts of the country for community-based integrated development. The second COSOP was produced in 2004 and was supposed to cover the four-year period from 2005 to 2008, but the country strategy and programme took a different course from 2006 (see paragraph below). Its design was influenced by the Government's shift in 2003 towards a sector-wide, national programming approach and a general or sector budget-funding mechanism. Although IFAD explicitly endorsed the sector-wide approach, it also recognized the need for specific and innovative programmes to tackle unresolved issues and to allow for eventual scaling-up and replication. The 2004 COSOP focused support on empowering poor rural men and women to participate in smallholder agricultural commercialization through: nationwide, multi-donor marketing and agro-processing; community-based and demand-driven integrated development in

⁵⁴ German Institute for Development Evaluation, 2018, The Effects of the Exit from Budget Support in Uganda.

⁵⁵ Rounding errors occur because values are given to the nearest million.

⁵⁶ Small and Medium Agribusiness Development Fund that was later branded the Uganda Yield Investment Fund.

the north and east that were emerging from conflict; and, consolidation of the Uganda Women's Effort to Save Orphans Development Programme. It also specifically aimed to enhance development effectiveness and non-lending activities by establishing a presence in the country with a full-time local representative.

50. **2013 CPE.** The first CPE IOE conducted in Uganda, which was published in 2013, examined the cooperation and partnership between IFAD and the Government between 1998 and 2011, and covered both COSOPs. Key findings are outlined in Box 1. The CPE highlighted that the 2004 COSOP was not fully implemented due to changes from 2006 in the national context and IFAD's operation model (i.e. introduction of direct supervision and country presence). The Government's strategies for development reverted to more supply-driven approaches for rural financial services provision and extension service delivery. The Government also shifted away from using loans for capacity development and the integrated rural development approach. These changes – along with reversals in the decentralization policy – affected IFAD-supported local government projects. IFAD's transition to direct supervision in 2007 required additional programme management resources, which limited participation in policy dialogue. Finally, support programmes outlined in the COSOPs for northern Uganda also were not realized due to the prolonged insurgency.
51. The 2013 CPE concluded that the IFAD and Government partnership had been moderately satisfactory. Moving forward, the main challenges related to disagreements on government policies and strategies for agriculture and rural development together with unpredictable and sudden policy changes. In addition, country programme management was being stretched by direct supervision, combined with significant fiduciary issues.
52. **2013 COSOP.** The overall goal of the 2013 COSOP was increased incomes, improved food security and reduced vulnerability of rural households living in poverty. Table 4 outlines the main characteristics of the 2013 COSOP. Following the 2004 COSOP, there is a continued focus on improved production and market access, and a more explicit focus on improving access to rural financial services. The 2013 COSOP also puts significant emphasis on developing the resilience of rural poor people to the effects of climate change. However, there is less emphasis in the strategy on gender equality, land issues and local government development compared to the 2004 COSOP. Other major changes include a more nuanced understanding of the target group in the 2013 COSOP and the bolstering of the Country Office with the presence of the country director. A timeline of IFAD-supported projects over the past three COSOP periods, including the last CPE, is in annex V.

Table 4

Main features of the 2013 COSOP

COSOP 2013	
Objectives	<p>1. The production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture is sustainably increased.</p> <p><i>Support would be focused on improving access to technologies for sustainable intensification, enhancing the provision of advisory services, securing land tenure rights, supporting sustainable land and water management and generally making smallholder agriculture more climate-smart</i></p> <p>2. The integration of smallholders into the markets is enhanced.</p> <p><i>This would be achieved by investing in smallholder inclusive value chains and climate resilient economic infrastructure, promoting agroprocessing and value addition and strengthening farmers' organizations.</i></p> <p>3. The access to and use of financial services by the rural population are sustainably increased.</p> <p><i>Investments would focus on community-based financial institutions through strengthening existing SACCOs, scaling-up community savings and credit groups, and supporting the institutional, policy and regulatory frameworks of these financial institutions</i></p>
Geographic priority	<p>Areas with the highest incidence of poverty (north) and/or with the greatest density of poor people (east). Geographic consistency, both within the same project and among different projects.</p>

COSOP 2013	
Subsector focus	Agricultural research and extension, sustainable land management and climate change adaptation, market access, value chain development, rural financial services and social inclusion
Main partners	World Bank and other development partners and United Nations agencies MOFPED, MAAIF, MOLG, NARO, NAADS, National Environmental Management Authority and Ministry of Water and Environment, rural organizations, private sector
Main target group	(i) poor smallholder households that have the potential and minimal assets to expand and commercialize their economic activities, but are not yet fully integrated into the markets (ii) highly vulnerable households with limited assets and restricted livelihood options that are generally bypassed by development initiatives (iii) women and young people within these two target groups
Policy dialogue	Reorientation of NAADS from distribution of subsidized agricultural inputs to provision of relevant pro-poor advisory services Support for the establishment of smallholder oil palm growers' organizations that are financially sustainable. Establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework for fourth-tier institutions (including SACCOs) and a conducive policy framework for savings and credit groups. Support to the Uganda Cooperative Savings and Credit Union
Country presence	Country office, with national and international officers and the country programme manager

Source: COSOP 2013.

53. A theory of change of the COSOP has been elaborated by this CSPE (annex VI) to show the causal linkages between the lending and non-lending activities in collectively achieving the three strategic objectives. Ten assumptions are identified that could influence the delivery of outputs, intermediate and strategic outcomes and goals. At input and output level the key assumptions relate to the Government's willingness and capacity to fulfil the resource and/or policy commitments agreed at design, and also that political interference is minimal. These issues are discussed later in the report under Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness. The policy environment also affects how well the COSOP pillars reach their outcomes – how conducive these are in encouraging private sector participation, extension service delivery or profitable and equitable rural finance. The ability of the vulnerable and rural poor to access and use project opportunities will also depend on their wider circumstances such as weather events, affordable social services and lack of economic shocks.


B.2. Overview of IFAD operations

54. **Investment projects.** The total estimated cost of the nine investment projects approved between 2013 and 2019 covered in the CSPE amounts to US\$1,446 million, representing 81.6 per cent of the historical total project costs in the IFAD programme in Uganda presented in Table 2. The sources of financing were highly concessional loans amounting to US\$430 million (76 per cent of the IFAD financing to Uganda), national counterpart funding of US\$575 million (93 per cent of counterpart financing), beneficiary contributions of US\$30 million (79 per cent of beneficiary contributions), and external cofinancing from local partners of US\$86 million (70 per cent of local co-financing) and from international partners of US\$325 million (75 per cent of international cofinancing). In four projects, IFAD funded a smaller proportion of project costs relative to the African Development Bank (CAIIP1), the Government and the World Bank (ATAAS), local private sector organizations and other institutions (VODP2) and international private sector organizations (NOPP).
55. On the other hand, IFAD has been the leading financier for five projects in the CSPE period (annex V, figure 2). Discounting ATAAS, which was a World Bank and Government investment that was supplemented by a small IFAD loan, IFAD has funded or will fund 53 per cent of the total resources for the other eight projects. For

four projects the proportion of IFAD’s funding is 75 per cent or above (DLSP, RFSP, Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas (PROFIRA) and PRELNOR).

56. The main common areas of interventions across the projects included in this CSPE were support for agricultural production and productivity (ATAAS); agricultural production and marketing (DLSP, PRELNOR), market access and development (VODP2, NOPP, NOSP); economic infrastructure (CAIIP1) and rural finance (RFSP, PROFIRA). Delving deeper into the financing of the various thematic areas in projects over time shows some key trends (see annex V, figure 3): an increasing proportion invested in rural markets; a recent return to substantial financing on rural infrastructure (focused on improving access to markets rather than providing basic infrastructure); and an increase in the proportion of financing on agronomy. All of the projects included in this CSPE build upon projects designed under the 1998 or 2004 COSOPs (see annex V, figure 1). Basic information on investment projects covered in the evaluation is further presented in Annex III.
57. The IFAD resource envelope for Uganda – as per the performance-based allocation system – is US\$99.6 million for the period 2019–2021 and was US\$77 million for 2016–2018 and US\$71.6 million in 2012–2015. The latest allocation represents 11 per cent of the East and Southern Africa Division’s (ESA) total allocation in the same period, indicating a marked increase of 29 per cent over the previous period 2016–2018. In the period 2019–2021, the resource envelope for Uganda has been the second largest in the region after Ethiopia (US\$129.9 million). IFAD’s average project financing in Uganda has shown a steady rise (figure 3), overtaking ESA’s average project financing.

Figure 3
IFAD average project financing for Uganda compared to the East and Southern Africa Division



Source: Oracle Business Intelligence.

58. The key lead agencies at the national level for the nine projects were: MOFPED as the representative of the borrower or recipient (i.e. signatory of financing agreements) and the lead implementing agency in two projects; MAAIF as the lead implementing agency in four projects; and MOLG as the lead implementing agency in four projects.⁵⁷ Key partner agencies at the national level have also included the NARO, an agency within MAAIF, and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives (MTIC). From the district level downwards, the main supporting implementing agencies have been local governments and, more recently, private sector providers.
59. **Grants.**⁵⁸ The preliminary desk review identified 50 grants approved and/or supervised between 2013 and 2019 (annex IV). The 50 grants covered diverse

⁵⁷ MAAIF and MOLG are both lead implementing agencies of NOSP, each responsible for one of the two main components.

⁵⁸ Grants described here are should be distinguished from ASAP grants and GEF grants that cofinance loan programmes.

themes,⁵⁹ functions⁶⁰ and went to various types of recipients.⁶¹ Among the 38 IFAD-funded grants, two were large country-specific grants, one was a large country-specific grant in Malaysia but with links to Uganda, 11 were small global regional grants and 24 were large global regional grants, totalling US\$46.9 million in funding. See Table 5 for more information.

Table 5

Overview of IFAD-funded grants over the CSPE period, 2013–2019

<i>Grant sub-window</i>	<i>Number of grants</i>	<i>IFAD grant amount at approval US\$</i>
Country specific - small	0	0
Country-specific - large	3	3 140 000
Global-Regional - small	11	3 899 913
Global-Regional - large	24	39 845 000
Total	38	46 884 913

Source: Data retrieved from: GRIPS, the Grant Status Report tool, grant design documents, the CPO, and the IFAD website.

60. IFAD also implemented and supervised 12 other grants and supplementary funds linked to Uganda from the Financing Facility for Remittances (FFR), the International Land Coalition, the Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility (IPAF), the European Commission, Canada, SIDA, the AJWSSID and the GAFSP (annex IV). Financing amounts varied from US\$39,000 through a micro IPAF grant to US\$6 million from SIDA for technical assistance in climate insurance and totalled US\$21.9 million. In addition, IFAD supervises the Uganda Yield Fund that leveraged financing from the European Union and the private sector amounting to EUR 20.4 million.
61. **IFAD Country Office.** IFAD has had a presence in Uganda since 2006, with the establishment of a country office in Kampala, staffed by CPO and hosted by the United Nations Development Programme. In February 2011, IFAD and the Government signed a host country agreement and out-posted an associate country programme manager (CPM) there. The country office also had an associate professional officer as well as a knowledge management consultant from 2011 to 2015. The CPM position was transferred from headquarters to the country office in April 2014. The CPM was given the title of country director and accredited as country representative. In July 2018, the country director position was transferred to the IFAD Regional Hub in Nairobi. In addition, IFAD’s Country Office (ICO) also benefited from two additional staff⁶² to support the Uganda Yield Investment Fund from 2017.
62. Overall, in the period 2013–2020 the country team consisted of seven staff. In terms of full-time equivalent (FTE), there were four FTEs in 2014–2015 falling to 2.6 from 2018–2020.⁶³ The budget for the country programme has shown a gradual decline over the period, from US\$0.66 million to US\$0.34 million.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Namely, value chain development, public–private–producer partnerships, inclusive rural finance, remittances, extension services, apex organizations, farmers’ organizations, agricultural productivity, genetic breeding and diversity, climate change adaptation, sustainable land management, land, gender, youth, nutrition and livestock.

⁶⁰ Knowledge management, partnership-building, institutional strengthening, policy engagement, innovation, scaling-up and impact evaluations.

⁶¹ Research organizations, centres of excellence, private sector, civil society organizations, not-for-profit development organizations, and United Nations agencies.

⁶² Uganda Yield Fund staff are funded mostly by supplementary-fund fees from the European Union grant.

⁶³ FTEs are based on the allocation of time spent on the Uganda country programme as reported by officers.

⁶⁴ Except for 2019, when the design of NOSP pushed the budget up to US\$0.63 million.

Key points (chapter II)

- Uganda's economy has grown strongly in the past 20 years although it has slowed to 5.2 per cent in the past decade, while per capita growth has slowed to 1.6 per cent due to high population growth.
- Agriculture provides just a quarter of national GDP but employs 70 per cent of the labour force. Imports of processed food, particularly vegetable oil, remain high.
- Poverty has worsened in recent years with a fifth of Ugandans living below the poverty line, and inequality persists particularly in rural areas, the north, among women, youth and refugees.
- Under NDPII, NDPIII and ASSP, the Government seeks to transform agriculture into a commercially viable sector around a set of key value chains.
- ODA has grown steadily but as a proportion of GDP it has declined to under 10 per cent compared to levels before 2007. Non-ODA loans, primarily from China, have increased substantially in importance.
- IFAD has operated in Uganda since 1981 lending over half a billion dollars through 18 projects. Under the recent COSOP, IFAD has focused on three strategic objectives: improved production, market access and access to rural financial services. Over the period 2013–19, nine projects have received funding commitments of US\$1.4 billion, of which IFAD loans comprised US\$430 million (76 per cent).
- Uganda's share of IFAD's resource envelope has risen to a point where it now represents 11 per cent of the East and Southern Africa Division's allocation.
- IFAD's non-lending activities over the period comprised 50 grants, only two of which were Uganda specific while the rest were regional or global.
- The IFAD Country Office has been in place since 2006. The Country Director post has been in country only from 2014–2018, following re-posting from Rome. In mid-2018, the post moved the regional hub to Nairobi. Staffing levels and the country programme budget have both declined over the period.

III. The project portfolio

A. Project performance and rural poverty impact

A.1. Relevance

63. Relevance considers the extent to which the objectives of development interventions are consistent with the beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities, and partner and donor policies. It entails an assessment of project design (including quality of risk management); coherence in achieving its objectives, including the relevance of the strategies and approaches applied to achieve the objectives; and the relevance of targeting strategies.

Appropriateness of objectives

64. **Policy and strategy alignment with Government policies has been good with some divergences.** The portfolio has shown good alignment with both national and sectoral policy frameworks (DSIP, NDP2, ASSP) for DLSP, CAIP1, VODP2, NOPP and PRELNOR. Consistent priority has been given to infrastructure (beginning with CAIP1, DLSP then PRELNOR and now NOSP) and to sustainable agricultural growth (ATAAS through to PRELNOR). The strategic transformation to a more commercially driven, context-sensitive value chain approach reflects the strategic emphasis in NDP2 and now NDP3 as well as Government's borrowing priorities towards investments that assist in loan repayment. It also reflects IFAD's increasing focus on linking farmers to markets and to increasing commercialization. IFAD's shift towards value chain approaches and private sector involvement has occurred while retaining and building on community and group empowerment and mentoring approaches.
65. **However, the appetite for reform has varied between donors and Government, as well as between different ministries, leading to advances and retreats.** This is seen in changes in approach to extension services, to levels of support for local government services and towards rural finance. The demise of the NAADS private sector extension agenda before and during ATAAS has foreshadowed a growing commitment to public extension by MAAIF while IFAD and others have pursued support for a greater balance of private sector provision with local public sector services (as seen in VODP2, PRELNOR, NOSP and NOPP).
66. **Local government has been central to delivering IFAD's portfolio, yet overall state budget flows have provided relatively fewer resources here** (see Figure 8) while multiplication of districts has affected the local capacity to deliver. The move to value chains and away from integrated community development has somewhat reduced IFAD's links to MOLG and towards MAAIF and MOFPED. However, with PRELNOR, and now partially under Component 2 of NOSP, there has been relevant continuation of support for local government services largely around rural roads.
67. **In rural finance, RFSP dates to a period of rapid inclusive finance growth in Uganda that was consistent with NDP1's goals and sector frameworks.**⁶⁵ Later, at the time of PROFIRA design, the Department of Micro-Finance in MOFPED emphasized a market-oriented approach to rural finance.⁶⁶ As much of the required legislation and growing supply was in place for Tier I and III inclusive finance institutions by 2013, the Government began placing less priority on the sector's development, as have donors, leaving IFAD alone in funding the rural finance sector.⁶⁷
68. RFSP design complemented the goals of the Uganda's Micro-Finance Support Centre, Micro-Save Africa, and those of MAAIF and MOFPED and its Private Sector Development Section. On the other hand, designs could have articulated more robust

⁶⁵ Expanding the Outreach of Sustainable Micro-Finance in Uganda and the Uganda Micro-Finance Capacity Building Framework, key Government policy frameworks, aimed to grow the sustainable demand-driven inclusive finance sector.

⁶⁶ Drawing on its evaluation of Rural Financial Services Strategy (2014).

⁶⁷ Interview with Agricultural Business Initiative Finance, and Agricultural Business Initiative Development (Uganda), and GIZ, 20 July 2020.

sustainability planning for apex organizations and considered support for emerging mobile money and/or other financial services beyond small-sized loans and savings. Both RFSP and PROFIRA align with IFAD's Rural Finance Policy (RFP 2005, updated in 2009) and the IFAD Rural Finance Decision-Making Tools (2010), as well as good practice donor support for microfinance reflected in Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest donor surveys.⁶⁸

69. **The nine projects associated with the portfolio show good alignment with the two COSOPs** (see annex V, table 1) and their strategic objectives. As demonstrated in annex V, the evolution of projects is well sequenced while contained within each of the three strategic objective pillars. Thus, VODP1 was followed by VODP2 and then by NOSP and NOPP, all on oil palm and oilseed value chains. RFSP was followed by PROFIRA in rural finance, while PRELNOR builds on the integrated development approaches of first DDSP and then DLSP as well as the research and extension linkages pursued under ATAAS.
70. **However, the portfolio also reflects the shifts in strategic emphasis introduced in the 2013 COSOP.** This saw a radical change in strategic direction leading away from several areas of support, including land titling, local government support and integrated community development to a tighter focus on value chains as well as from broader national coverage (such as with ATAAS) to a more specific geographical concentration as recommended by the 2013 CPE (PRELNOR, NOSP and NOPP).
71. **The portfolio reflects a tension around delivering on poverty reduction objectives while at the same time focusing on a more commercial growth strategy.** This is seen in the commodity focus on more commercial crops (VODP, NOPP, NOSP) rather than on food security, the move to value chain approaches from broader community development, and the requirement for farmers and private sector actors to partially fund services rather than relying fully on the public sector (ATAAS, VODP2, NOSP, NOPP). Under DLSP, the intention was to work in the poorest districts and parishes, and to serve the poorest households by improving local roads and building household capacity through mentoring and support land certification for the vulnerable. The approach to targeting under more recent projects (VODP2, NOSP, NOPP) moved towards working with farmers with capacity to commercialize and link to value chain opportunities (see p. 43).
72. **IFAD has adopted negotiated approaches in order to target the poor and more vulnerable households while satisfying the Government's desire to maintain public advisory services and cooperatives as well as spread project benefits widely.** This has seen IFAD choosing objectives that, while including explicit targeting mechanisms to reach the poor at the same time, have had to absorb political pressure for wider coverage so that a range of both poor and less poor and more commercially engaged households have been targeted. While groups focusing on food security were included in ATAAS,⁶⁹ they were not the main target of the commercialization process championed by ATAAS.⁷⁰ Poorer farmers were to be included by having one farmer category that prioritized food security, although these were to be supported alongside three others that were more market-oriented.⁷¹ For RFSP, IFAD was aware of the Government policy to establish one SACCO per sub-county (despite the known poor performance of SACCOs, the political interference in their operation and the usually higher income of members).⁷²
73. The emerging importance of the objectives of environment and natural resources management (ENRM) and climate change has required adjusting objectives to

⁶⁸ Trends in International Funding for Financial Inclusion in 2014, and Trends in International Funding for Financial Inclusion in 2016.

⁶⁹ World Bank Project Appraisal Document, p. 83.

⁷⁰ IFAD President's Report, 2010, para. 12.

⁷¹ ATAAS project performance evaluation.

⁷² Interviews with IFAD consultants and staff.

accommodate these themes, particularly in PRELNOR, NOSP and NOPP. The elaboration of Government (National Environment Management Authority [NEMA]) and IFAD's (SECAP) requirements has taken place during portfolio evolution, with significant effects on implementation (See chapter III.B.5).

74. **Nutrition has been better addressed over time, reflecting IFAD's evolving policy framework (Box 1), however gaps remain.** The loan programmes in Uganda included logframes with an indicator on child malnutrition to assess performance towards the project goal, but with no or few activities to address nutrition concerns. The country programme has made concerted efforts to address this, albeit only in the last few years, in the design of new projects and by adjusting some ongoing projects.⁷³ As a result, PRELNOR has become a nutrition-sensitive project with a comprehensive set of nutrition interventions.⁷⁴ However, the nutrition lens used in the designs of NOPP and NOSP has not resulted in nutrition-sensitive projects, owing to the absence of nutrition objectives and indicators and scope for a more structured approach to improve nutrition outcomes.

Box 1

IFAD's commitment to nutrition

Since 2014, IFAD has committed to mainstreaming nutrition in its programmes. Its strategic framework (2016–2025) sees nutrition as fundamental for increasing poor rural people's productive capacities and rural household's resilience. IFAD10 (2016–2018) and IFAD11 (2019–2021) commitments included that 100 per cent of COSOPs will be nutrition sensitive, while 33 per cent and 50 per cent of new investment projects will be nutrition sensitive, respectively. The IFAD Nutrition Action Plans from 2015 (for 2016 to 2018)¹ and 2019 (for 2019 to 2025)² state that a nutrition-sensitive project has a comprehensive situation analysis and explicit nutrition objectives, activities and indicators. It will also have considered the pathway – for example from food production, income generation and/or women's empowerment to consumption – through which it can maximize its contribution to improving nutrition.

¹ <https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/116/docs/EB-2015-116-INF-5.pdf>

² <https://www.ifad.org/documents/38711624/41237738/IFAD+Nutrition+Action+Plan+2019+2025++web.pdf>

Source: CSPE Team elaboration.

75. **NOPP and NOSP were designed with a nutrition lens, but they could be more nutrition sensitive.** NOPP mainly focuses on nutrition through the promotion of climate-smart agricultural practices that support food and nutrition security and through household mentoring. NOSP addresses nutrition through the provision of equipment and training to support greater aflatoxin control and awareness and through training on nutrition knowledge and a healthy food culture, including in the GALS approach for producer and marketing groups. However, the logframes of both projects lack nutrition objectives and indicators to measure performance and could provide a more comprehensive approach to improve nutrition outcomes.

Appropriateness of project design and approach

76. **The portfolio exhibits good examples of sequencing projects in order to continue good practices, although in different geographical areas.** Examples include projects in integrated community development (DDSP, DLSP, and to a partial extent PRELNOR, although its emphasis is primarily value chain development); in rural finance (RFSP, PROFIRA); and in value chains in the vegetable oil sector (VODP1 and 2, NOPP, NOSP). These "project series" carry lessons forward for example around road design and operation, community mobilization, household mentoring, building

⁷³ The relevance of the portfolio to these latest developments concerning nutrition has been evaluated for projects designed, or those that have undergone a mid-term review, since the IFAD Action Plan for Mainstreaming Nutrition in 2015 – PROFIRA, PRELNOR, NOPP and NOSP. VODP2 is also included because of the attention given to the project through the supplementary funds to Biodiversity International.

⁷⁴ The participatory rural appraisal-CBNRM exercise includes assessing food and nutrition security and setting targets for better outcomes. Household mentoring also includes limited nutrition education and awareness raising for vulnerable households.

value chains for specific commodities, and tackling rural finance at the community and apex level. They have adapted to new circumstances and priorities (such as targeting the poorer districts and regions, while building on past success and even retaining experienced PMU staff.

77. **Efforts to explicitly link or share approaches across projects operating contemporaneously in the portfolio have been few, but useful.** PRELNOR has used value chain approaches developed by VODP1 and 2, while VODP2 and PROFIRA have adopted mentoring approaches from DLSP and PRELNOR. Approaches to credit under RFSP and PROFIRA have been used by VODP2. Yet, while the COSOP intention was to see more of such inter-project linkages, in general this has been limited.
78. There have also been **some efforts to link lending and non-lending** activities to strengthen certain areas such as risk financing, environmental management and catalysing vegetable oil actors, including NOSP and the Yield Fund, ATAAS/Global Environment Facility, PRELNOR, sustainable land management practices (SLM), Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP), PROFIRA, and Canada Credit Association and the World Council of Credit Unions, NOPP and the grant from the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) and DLSP (see chapter IV).
79. **The shift from a broad yet scattered to a more focused, geographically contiguous presence has been a valuable strategic thrust.** The geographical focus has improved from broad coverage in unconnected districts such as under CAIIP1 and particularly DLSP, which spread across 13 widely separated districts (see Map 2), to more contiguous districts and related “hubs” under PRELNOR, VODP2, NOPP and NOSP (see Map 1). This reflects the key lessons from the 2019 quality assurance design review and concerns raised in the DLSP PCRV. Despite the potential political challenge, NOPP and NOSP recognize the importance of investing in contiguous areas.⁷⁵
80. **Growing articulation of theories of change and well-populated logframes in designs has been improving** in the Uganda portfolio since 2013. The 2013 CPE found the RFSP logframe incomplete, and the ATAAS theory of change at design was simplistic,⁷⁶ while more careful and elaborated examples are found in VODP2, PRELNOR and NOSP/NOPP, where the intervention logic is supported by sound indicators and targets.
81. **Over time there has been increasing complexity and scale of design that has brought higher risk and implementation challenges.** IFAD’s contribution to project costs rose from RFSP (2003) US\$18 million, CAIIP1 (2007) US\$32 million, DLSP (2007) US\$47 million, ATAAS (2010) US\$14 million, VODP2 (2010) US\$50 million, PROFIRA (2014) US\$29 million, to PRELNOR US\$60 million including the ASAP grant, NOPP (2018) US\$77 million, NOSP (2019) US\$99.6 million. While this reflects a broad trend in the ESA region of IFAD and may suit limited capacity in country to manage a smaller number of larger projects, there is a higher risk where a portfolio is tied to fewer operations with more complex designs. Such designs may present coordination challenges (NOSP for example is to be managed by two ministries) and financial mismanagement risks (in PRELNOR these have been poorly mitigated).⁷⁷
82. **The portfolio saw limited cofinancing from other development partners but this trend has been compensated for by growing levels of private sector funding** (see annex V, figure 2). IFAD has been the major funder in all projects except ATAAS, VODP2 and now NOPP to which IFAD plans to contribute a third of resources. Apart from NOSP, while there are examples of other funders (AfDB in CAIIP1, OPEC Fund for International Development in NOSP), attempts to increase

⁷⁵ See NOPP Project Design Report, p. 84, which notes the political pressure to spread benefits widely.

⁷⁶ ATAAS project performance evaluation.

⁷⁷ Issues around the sufficiency of financial management and anticorruption measures have been raised in both NOSP and NOPP design reviews.

cofinancing from multi-lateral and bilateral sources have been unsuccessful. In ATAAS, the planned cofinancing from the European Union and Danida was unsuccessful, and in rural finance other donors have left the sector. Instead, private sector funding has been a major new element. In fact, **the growing inclusion of private sector financing has been a significant achievement in Uganda**, with private sector finance providing US\$70 million for VODP2, US\$91 million for NOPP and US\$5.8 million for NOSP).

83. **Design adjustments during implementation have been of mixed quality.** IFAD had a limited role in ATAAS restructuring, due to its loan suspension over the period when a new extension policy was introduced. On the other hand, RFSP was adjusted well at mid-term to overcome unnecessary complexities in the original design and sector policy changes. PROFIRA's mid-term review (MTR) also limited the number of supported SACCOs to the more viable ones. DLSP redesign reduced duplication and increased focus by dropping water supply activities, switching community savings to RFSP to adapt to changes in national lending policy, and upgrade road quality.

Relevance of targeting priorities

84. **IFAD targeting was aligned with the Uganda NDPII which recognized regional disparities and the rural-urban divide in poverty levels.**⁷⁸ Under the 2013 COSOP, IFAD projects targeted Northern and Eastern Uganda, which had the highest poverty rates in 2012/2013 at 43.7 per cent and 24.5 per cent, respectively.⁷⁹ Geographic targeting was driven by poverty incidence and access to crucial services such as roads, water and sanitation and primary healthcare. Project designs also used geographical targeting of communities *within* districts based on poverty levels. Although PROFIRA coverage was national, the project design used a targeting strategy based on geographical and social inclusion considerations to select areas of concentration for targeting community savings and credit groups (CSCGs). NOSP design includes support for a new oilseed hub in Karamoja, the driest, less fertile and poorest subregion with an average poverty incidence of 60.2 per cent.
85. **Objectives around social inclusion and gender mainstreaming approaches have been included with varying strength.**⁸⁰ Overall, social inclusion has been a central feature for the rural finance investments as well as in some aspects of community-based projects such as functional adult literacy, household mentoring and water supply in DLSP and PRELNOR. Pursuing such approaches was less evident in ATAAS and in VODP2 initially, although after mid-term efforts improved through the adoption of household methodologies.

⁷⁸ Republic of Uganda, 2015 June: Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16–2019/20, p. 67: <http://npa.go.ug/wp-content/uploads/NDPII-Final.pdf>

⁷⁹ Ibid: both regions have poverty higher rates than the national poverty average at 19.7 per cent.

⁸⁰ See gender section in chapter III.B.3 for a fuller discussion.

Household methodologies, mentoring and the Gender Action Learning System (GALS)

Household methodologies are participatory methodologies to promote gender equality and livelihoods development. They encourage the development of self-generated strategies that enable family members to work together to improve relations and decision-making, and to achieve equitable workloads. They are also implemented as a participatory planning tool in groups. In the context of IFAD's work, household methodologies usually refer to two approaches, household mentoring and the GALS.

Household mentoring promotes social inclusion, and targets vulnerable households whose members do not participate in community activities and development interventions. Mentors conduct a series of visits to mentee households to help them take basic steps towards improving their homes and livelihoods and gradually becoming more engaged in community and project activities.

GALS is centred on the vision journey in which a family develops a shared vision for its future. Families self-identify the main factors, such as inequalities, hindering the productivity and well-being of the household. Peer support from group members provides encouragement to individuals or couples when implementing their plan, especially if they are addressing challenging behavioural issues. GALS also is used for participatory planning at group and community levels, as well as along value chains.

Source: CSPE Team elaboration.

86. **Most projects focused explicitly on selection criteria of beneficiaries based on rural–urban divide, vulnerabilities arising out of poverty, gender inequalities or poor access to services.** Within these communities, the projects have used participatory techniques to identify men, women, young men and young women to participate in project activities. PRELNOR, PROFIRA and VODP2 instituted affirmative action quotas in targeting, which helped to meet targets for women's participation. Nevertheless, the projects inadequately articulated the targeting strategy for inclusion of people living with HIV/AIDS. While youth were among the stated target beneficiaries included at design, the projects in general lacked adequate strategies and specific youth-friendly interventions that addressed specific constraints faced by youth, in particular access to land and finance, although PROFIRA did use CSCGs as a conduit to reach youth given the difficulty of their becoming members of SACCOs.
87. **IFAD programmes have been designed to support smallholder integration in strategic value chains and improving financial services to the rural poor,** given that only 10 and 29 per cent had access during RFSP and PROFIRA design respectively. Support for sector apex organizations would serve the needs of members, including advocating on behalf of and engaging smallholders through trusted market-making activities. Sound oil seed, oil palm and inclusive financial sector policy ensured interests of rural smallholders and poor households were considered and included.
- Risk management**
88. **Risk management has been an issue in project designs under the CSPE period, even while IFAD has developed a more comprehensive risk assessment framework.** Well-staffed PMUs have tended to compensate for institutional weaknesses especially at the local government level, but this approach may not lead to sustainable exit strategies.⁸¹
89. In a country where the political environment has had a marked and turbulent influence on project operations, particularly around election periods, a **stronger and more explicit political economy analysis would have helped to understand underlying pressures within government systems and private sector**

⁸¹ Quality Assurance Group, IFAD, Quality-at-entry of the 2019 project portfolio: Learning from results for improving design quality.

motives.⁸² IFAD's design documents notably lack any such explicit analysis that seeks to understand the political economy landscape surrounding interventions and how the project design could mitigate them. ATAAS in particular is an example of where deep differences in donor and government appetites for extension reform eventually caused a major redesign following loan suspension.⁸³ During the design of NOPP, concern was also expressed that the country team not underestimate the various socio-political considerations that affect the project.⁸⁴

90. **IFAD's move away from local government and extension service support to selected value chains has allowed the portfolio to be somewhat inoculated against the impacts of the retreat towards a more state-led extension service and subsidized input provision.** Focusing on selected value chains rather than providing broad support to extension and local government services (as under ATAAS) has helped protect the portfolio from political interference. This has been matched by a growing ability to achieve significant private sector investment and use of private sector service providers.
91. **Projects involving infrastructure such as roads and markets have been overambitious in implementation** (DLSP, CAIIP1, PRELNOR and NOSP). The upgrading of roads standards to Class 3 (all-weather) was a deliberate attempt to reduce risks of rapid deterioration and mitigate climate change effects, but at the same time raised design and implementation challenges as well as reduced output targets.
92. **Summary.** The lending portfolio aligned well with the two relevant COSOPs and with both national and sector policy frameworks, in particular the focus on regional poverty dimensions and on growing value chain approaches. Project designs also have aligned well with IFAD's evolving corporate policies, including rural finance, nutrition, ENRM and climate change and value chains. On the other hand, the evolution of the portfolio left behind some pro-poor aspects of the earlier projects, including access to land, even though it was part of the first strategic objective in the 2013 COSOP. The conscious sequencing of projects has proved highly relevant, building on lessons learned and using experienced PMU staff. The limited levels of development partner funding have been well compensated for by growing private sector investment. Targeting has been well addressed, except for youth where more specific interventions could have been conceived. Overall, **the relevance is rated as satisfactory (5).**

A.2. Effectiveness

93. Effectiveness, that is progress against project objectives, is analysed according to the four questions: (i) How effective have the IFAD supported operations been? (ii) What were the main (intended and unintended) results achieved? (iii) Were the intended targeted beneficiaries reached? (iv) What external factors affected results? The analysis covers the seven completed and ongoing projects (CAIIP1, RFSP, DLSP, ATAAS, VODP2, PROFIRA, PRELNOR) and explores the results by four intermediate objectives: (i) improved market access through infrastructure; (ii) increased smallholder agriculture intensification; (iii) greater access to rural finance; and (iv) improved market access through support to value chains.

Improved market access through provision of infrastructure

94. **Road construction was largely successfully delivered and outreach exceeded targets.** The two earlier projects, DLSP and CAIIP1, focused on strengthening farmers' access to markets, improving produce prices, and increasing incomes through investments in rural infrastructure and its sustainable management by well-mobilized communities. Both projects almost met construction targets (94

⁸² See for example, Joughin J. and Kjaer, A.M. 2010 and 2019. Analyses in (i) The politics of agricultural reform, the case of Uganda, 2010, and (ii) Send for the cavalry, political incentives in the provision of agricultural advisory services, 2019.

⁸³ ATAAS project performance evaluation.

⁸⁴ ATAAS project performance evaluation. Final quality assurance Review, NOPP.

per cent CAIIP1 with 4,384 km, 87 per cent for DLSP with 2,087 km), but achieved higher beneficiary outreach than planned with 1.6 million people in DLSP versus 1.2 million at appraisal, and 3.1 million for CAIIP1 matching appraisal estimates. Those affected by CAIIP1 roads benefited from a 40 per cent increased share of market prices while farm gate prices rose by 30 per cent (compared to appraisal target of 20 per cent), and journey times were reduced by 7 per cent. For DLSP, benefits include a 60 per cent reduction in transport costs. VODP2 opened up 250 km among smallholder farmers and 400 km in the nucleus estate. These roads provided access for the produce to the processing plants.

95. **Higher design standards have improved road sustainability, although costs have risen and higher design standards and environmental safeguards are required.** Roads continued to have a key role in VODP2, PRELNOR and in the new NOSP/NOPP projects. Following CAIIP1, PRELNOR raised road quality to Class 3 district roads standards (all-weather). These changes have led to higher costs,⁸⁵ delays and reduced length compared to the design (606 km built so far or 40 per cent of target). However, since Class 3 roads can access the Government's Road Fund, prospects for maintenance are better. The use of geo-mapping of agricultural potential has helped place roads in the most appropriate locations and the limit of 12 km to road length has also helped reduce excessive political interference.
96. **Market structures have been built but with limited benefit in terms of usage.** Most of the 77 built under CAIIP1 were not in use by project closure due to poor location, political interference and limited engagement with intended users. **Agro-processing facilities have been more effective** (although funded under the AfDB loan). The benefits of the 123 facilities are not captured in the project documentation; however, of the seven processing facilities visited by the CSPE field mission, five were found to still be working seven or more years since installation, and all making a profit (see online Appendix III) with some having changed function (from coffee processing to rice) and moved to management by private operators instead of collective management.

Smallholder agriculture intensification

97. **The portfolio has been broadly successful in developing and disseminating a variety of technologies and building smallholder capacity to adopt them.** Quality seed is a major constraint to production in Uganda, and the promotion of seed businesses under both VODP2 and PRELNOR run by farmer groups has been an effective way to meet this constraint while building ownership and incomes. Under VODP2, between 2015 and 2019, the number of farmers purchasing improved sunflower seed and soybean seed increased from 2,488 to 42,325 and from 5,312 to 46,445, respectively. Farmers using improved seeds increased from 17 per cent at baseline to 67 per cent by project end, falling short of the end line target of 90 per cent (annex IX.B, table 1).⁸⁶
98. **Technology dissemination has integrated well with research outputs.** ATAAS was successful in disseminating nearly 200 NARO new technologies spanning yield, nutrition, climate smart adaptation as well as labour-saving technologies. Under ATAAS, the target proportion of farmers using improved crops, livestock and SLM techniques was exceeded or met, although targets for the adoption of improved fisheries were not attained (annex IX.B, table 1). PRELNOR, too, has linked with the Zonal Agricultural Research Development Institute (ZARDI) in its target area to access improved seed materials and technologies. Under DLSP, on-farm demonstrations led to increased adoption of improved farming techniques (improved seeds and animal breeds, animal traction, zero-grazing, fertilizer and manure).

⁸⁵ US\$32,000 per km for PRELNOR (and as much as 80,000/km if bridges are required, compared to US\$15,000 under CAIIP1 (IFAD Infrastructure Adviser).

⁸⁶ The 3ie (2019) impact evaluation found that farmer adoption of oilseeds was most significant for groundnuts and soybeans but that there was less evidence of sunflower up take, "which is the most suitable crop for commercial farming and trade."

However, data are not presented to verify these increases in the project completion report (PCR).

99. **Improved climate resilience in smallholder agriculture has been a positive feature** first in ATAAS, particularly through the Global Environment Facility-funded SLM component that exceeded targets, and later under PRELNOR, which, with the support of ASAP grant funds, was on track to reach targets at midterm, particularly around community-based natural resource management plans that have encouraged groups to plant stress-tolerant varieties of staple crops.⁸⁷ The provision of climate data has been effective in reaching farmers through extension and radio shows. However, the results of this on farmer crop choices or land management has yet to be seen.

Improved access to rural finance

100. **IFAD's finance interventions have contributed towards the development of an effective and responsive rural microfinance industry** through the strengthening of institutional capacity and rural accessibility of microfinance institutions (MFIs). RFSP and PROFIRA both enhanced access to appropriate financial services (savings and credit) as well as strengthened the institutions delivering these services. Under RFSP, 148 SACCOs were formed in subcounties where formerly none existed (against a target of 161) and the project concentrated support on 735 better performing SACCOs (41 per cent of the 1,794 operational SACCOs in Uganda). According to the PCR, there was an aggregate increase above the targeted 10 per cent per annum in share capital, savings and loans, as well as in the volume of transactions within the supported SACCOs.
101. PROFIRA supported less than a quarter of the SACCOs initially planned to be supported in RFSP, focusing on higher performing SACCOs, and still met targets. Average SACCO membership, share capital and savings have increased by 213, 256 and 209 per cent, respectively, from 2017 to 2019. The total share of capital mobilized has been UGX 68.6 billion, while savings mobilized has reached UGX 122.2 billion. Sixty per cent of the SACCOs are operationally self-sufficient as of June 2019. For CSCGs, there has been increased levels of savings and credit and increased annual sharing out at the end of the savings cycle. By the end of 2019, 294,666 members were saving in 10,236 newly established CSCGs, well on the way to achieving the targets of 375,000 members in 15,000 new CSCGs. While the range of financial products and services offered has widened (covering agriculture, school fees, home improvement, transport, solar and more) and access has improved, there could have been greater use of information and communication technologies (ICT) tools to manage credit products.
102. **Achieving changes in the structure of the industry proved more difficult under RFSP, although PROFIRA has had more success** in terms of improving the performance of Uganda Cooperative Savings and Credit Union (UCSCU) and supporting legislation. Both RFSP and PROFIRA worked to support the development and refinement of a national financial sector strategy and reforms, leading to the passage of Tier IV legislation and the establishment of the Uganda Microfinance Regulatory Authority (UMRA) for SACCO regulation. The Act was passed in 2016 and UMRA is now functional and fully staffed and has so far licensed 880 moneylenders and 225 MFIs. PROFIRA also provided inputs into the financial literacy strategy under MOFPED.

Improved access to markets through the promotion of value chains

103. For the value chain projects, interventions have led to **improved access to markets and strengthened bargaining power**. Farmer organizations have obtained better margins, strengthened their business literacy and received extension advice.

⁸⁷ By MTR, 424 CBNRM plans had been completed, of which 217 had been funded against the target of 600. However, most of the plans focused on promoting tree planting, as well as water harvesting and sustainable crop production, and MTR notes the need to further expand diversification.

VODP2's Kalangala oil palm scheme includes an 11,348 hectares plantation, of which, 6,500 hectares are under Oil Palm Uganda Ltd (100 per cent of target) and a further 4,848 hectares (exceeding the target of 4,700 hectares) are under smallholder production for 2,063 (versus target of 1,800) farmers. The largely successful completion of these outputs has resulted in an annual crude palm oil production of 40,005 tons at the end of 2019, exceeding the target of 30,000 tons. The Buvuma oil palm scheme did not take off, however, due to delays in acquiring land for the private partner, but activities have been redesigned under NOPP.

104. **Oilseed objectives have been met, expanding the Lira hub and creating new hubs** in eastern Uganda, northern Uganda and West Nile. The development of commercial hubs was supported by the improvement of linkages between farmer groups and millers and stockists, and bulking produce to attract larger buyers. At the end of 2019, 1,790 farmer groups under VODP2 were bulk selling, surpassing the target of 1,000. Eleven private sector providers (PSPs) provided extension and marketing services to 5,311 farmer groups, just below the target of 5,900. Oilseed farmers (3,959) also accessed financial services from 10 financial institutions with a cumulative credit disbursement of UGX3.4 billion by August 2019 with UGX1.5 billion paid back. Village savings and loans associations (VSLAs) were an alternative source of finance for 5,769 smallholder farmers unable to access loans from formal financial institutions. By August 2019, savings and loans mobilized among the oilseed groups were UGX3.6 billion and UGX2 billion, respectively.
105. **Bulking has enabled farmers to negotiate as a group and receive higher prices from millers, although miller capacity was underutilized.** There is significant evidence of smallholders' inclusion in the vegetable oil value chain through group sales and market access.⁸⁸ An important outcome that was not achieved concerned mill capacity utilization. From a baseline of 30 per cent, the project achieved 65 per cent at the end of 2019 compared to the target of 85 per cent.⁸⁹ VODP2's efforts in promoting new governance systems – through the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust (KOPGT) and the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association – that have strengthened farmers' ownership, and the use of multi-stakeholder platforms that bring actors together, have been widely recognized as being effective.⁹⁰
106. PRELNOR at mid-term had supported farmer groups in oil seed and food crop (rice, beans, maize, cassava) value chains through training, field days and commodity analyses. However, the project does not explicitly address value chains from start to finish. Rather it has selected certain bottlenecks such as access roads, processing and markets. Geographic information systems has assisted in mapping selecting road and market locations that best fit with production areas. Various marketing initiatives have occurred, including linking 3,000 farmers to processing firms to supply cassava, sesame, maize and sunflower. The adoption of post-harvest handling equipment increased from 4 to 26 per cent between the first half and second half of 2019. Similarly, there was a reduction in the percentage of households experiencing post-harvest losses from an average of 55 to 44 per cent.⁹¹ **Overall, however, the effectiveness of the project's value chain support awaits completion of the delayed road and market infrastructure.**

Effectiveness of targeting

107. **Outreach levels are, overall, in line with targets**, with five projects equalling or exceeding the revised targets for beneficiaries reached (RFSP, DLSP, CAIIP1, ATAAS, PROFIRA) (Table 6). Roads, extension and rural finance interventions had the

⁸⁸ 3IE impact evaluation 2019. Knowledge Heterogeneity: Experimental Evidence on Information Barriers to Oil Seed Adoption in Uganda.

⁸⁹ Also attributed to the tangential increase in the number of milling businesses that over compete for the available raw seed material (CSPE field interview with oil seed millers).

⁹⁰ IFAD's Engagement in Pro-poor Value Chain Development, Corporate level evaluation, 2019.

⁹¹ PRELNOR Contribution to the Uganda Economy, July 2020.

greatest level of outreach in terms of beneficiary numbers while value chain projects had the fewest.⁹² Given some projects may have served the same beneficiaries because they operated in the same districts and through similar modalities, there is also the possibility of double-counting. Having said this, the total outreach of the portfolio is remarkably high, covering over a quarter of the rural households in Uganda (ATAAS states this level of achievement on its own account). See online Appendix III for detailed calculations by project.

Table 6
Estimated final outreach versus design by project

Project	Design target outreach	Revised target outreach	Final / latest* outreach	Outreach achieved against revised target	Outreach to women	
					Target	Actual
ATAAS	1.7 million households	1.58 million households	1.68 million households 10 million people	107%	Not reported	52%
CAIIP1	8.9 million people	3.1 million people	4.3 million people	139%	Not reported	51%
RFSP	200 MFIs 300,000 people	735 SACCOs	735 SACCOs 1.9 million people	100%	50%	49%
DLSP	200,000 households; 1.2 million people	-	264,500 households; 1,587 million people	132%	Not reported	56%
VODP2	139,000 farmers 834,000 people	81 500 households	89,782 households 130,359 farmers 538,692 people	110%	30%	53%
PROFIRA	750,000 members	-	*1,101,778 members	147%	70% CSCGs 30% SACCOs	72% CSCGs 27% SACCOs
PRELNOR	140,000 households	155,000 households 852 500 people	*127,890 households 703,395 people	83%	52%	52%

Source: CSPE Team elaboration based on project documents.

108. **The shift away from community development and rural infrastructure towards value chain investments has affected the level of outreach at least in terms of total numbers.** ATAAS, CAIIP1 and RFSP collectively reached 8 million people, while later projects – VODP2, PRELNOR, DLSP and PROFIRA – have reached 4 million. This apparent reduction, however, is moderated by the multiplier effect that value chain investments have, and also that the benefits of the roads provided under VODP2 and PRELNOR to the wider rural community are not explicitly assessed in project documents.
109. **Although the beneficiaries are reportedly in line with the sub-target groups identified at design, this is not well documented,** affecting the proper monitoring of outreach and benefits to the different subtarget groups (such as the food insecure, food secure and more market-orientated households in PRELNOR).
110. **Household mentoring has, however, successfully targeted poorer households, including women and youth-headed households.** DLSP was notable in promoting women’s empowerment through household mentoring and

⁹² Estimates are sometimes ill-defined and inconsistently reported leading to miscounting, often in relation to households versus individuals and between direct and indirect beneficiaries.

GALS, and mentored 18,172 households.⁹³ DLSP instructors also trained 24,707 beneficiaries (75 per cent female) in 52 selected poorer subcounties, resulting in the improvement of their knowledge and social standing. Adult literacy targets were not met and land tenure outreach was disappointing (only 1,882 certificates were issued against a target of 100,000).

111. Coupled with a food security grant, in PRELNOR the targeting approach has enabled poorer members of communities to improve food security and nutrition.⁹⁴ The sustainability of these benefits, however, is less clear (chapter III.A.5). The Government has not yet taken up the approach, so once a family “graduates” from the mentoring scheme there is no follow-up, thus increasing the risk that households fall back into poverty. Outreach to date is also limited.
112. **Significant numbers of youth have benefited either directly or indirectly although there are gaps in reporting.** By 2019, PRELNOR reached 83 per cent of the young adult beneficiary target, while at the farmer group level some 40 per cent who participated were aged 18–35 years. For PROFIRA, youth represented 10 per cent of members of SACCOs and 43 per cent of members of new CSCGs, 34 per cent of mature CSCGs, against the target of 15 per cent. PROFIRA reached 194,728 young people (148 per cent of its end target). In other cases, projects poorly reported youth numbers, and did not report youth by gender. They also failed to capture the numbers of people supported that were living with HIV/AIDS.

External factors

113. **The impact of COVID-19 in 2020 is inhibiting the growth of benefits and in some cases reversing them.** In PROFIRA, the volume of business for SACCOs and CSCGs has come down, with fewer deposits, and repayment and disbursements levels reduced. Annual general meetings have been postponed so that while SACCOs continue to operate, there are governance issues. IFAD has responded by conducting remote missions and repurposing project funding, and in the case of VDOP2 adding a two-month loan extension. For PRELNOR, activities were brought to a standstill in early 2020, with much of the fieldwork halted, including road designs, farmer training, demonstrations, extension and mentoring.⁹⁵
114. The second threat has been pest outbreaks, including fall armyworm (starting in 2016) and, in 2020, locust invasions that have resulted from unusual weather patterns that are likely due to climate change. Although there have been significant effects on crop yields, both threats have been well-managed and there have been reportedly good harvests in the intervening years.
115. Finally, the influence of unpredictable political events such as elections, as well as actions from the national leadership, have played an important role in the course of some projects, most notably with ATAAS where initial support for NAADS was replaced by a shift to support for the Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) and public-led extension and input delivery.⁹⁶
116. **Summary.** Outreach has been in line with targets, although over the CSPE period outreach was reduced because integrated rural development projects were replaced by a more value chain approach. Where figures are available, gender and youth targets have also been met, however there are gaps in the data and some projects have not met targets, including around literacy and land titling. Community roads, while affected by construction delays and higher costs, have improved services and farm-gate prices, while the provision of market infrastructure has not been successful. The portfolio has been broadly effective in developing and disseminating

⁹³ 54 per cent male-headed households and 46 per cent female-headed households. Ruko J. and Bishop-Sambook C. 2014. Case study, household mentoring Uganda, gender, targeting and social inclusion.

⁹⁴ By MTR, 200 mentors had been trained, 2000 vulnerable households had been mentored and received food security grants worth US\$120 in the form of tools, seeds and livestock.

⁹⁵ PRELNOR SM, June 2020. Activities have since resumed to a more normal level with the removal of restrictions.

⁹⁶ ATAAS PPE.

a variety of climate-resilient crop technologies and building smallholder capacity to adopt them. Institutional changes in the mechanism for inputs and technology delivery have, however, caused disruption and led to losses and to elite capture in some instances. In rural finance, while early support through the RFSP showed modest results, the microfinance sector has become more effective and responsive through IFAD’s support, and new legislation has improved regulation of the industry. Under value chains, although farmer productivity has been below expectations, production in both oil palm and oil seeds exceeded targets. **Effectiveness is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**


A.3. Efficiency

117. The criterion of **efficiency** assesses how economically resources are converted into results. This section explores factors that can affect such conversion, positively or negatively, such as timeliness in start-up and implementation, management cost ratios and internal rates of return, and their proximate causes.

Project timeliness

118. **The CSPE portfolio consisted of projects with long duration lengthened by implementation delays and extensions.** Apart from CAIIP1, the project duration for all of the projects was between 7 and 10 years, averaging 7.8 years, as compared to an average of 6 years for projects completed between 2016 and 2018. All the projects in the portfolio faced delays of varying length. This affected the timing of the implementation of project activities and thus the delivery of impact to the targeted beneficiaries (Figure 4).

Figure 4
Portfolio project timelines in years (approval to closing)



Source: Oracle Business Intelligence, and Operational Results Management System.

119. **Overall, the average timeline for start-up of the Uganda portfolio is slightly longer than the ESA regional average** (See Table 7) underpinning the need for the Government to speed up the approval process for designed projects in order to enhance their efficiency.⁹⁷ The average effectiveness lag for IFAD is 12.3 months, while it is 9.0 months for ESA during the CSPE period. CAIIP1, VODP2 and PRELNOR had shorter gaps between approval and effectiveness (3.9 months, 6.0 months and 7.6 months, respectively), while DLSP and NOPP had delays of 10.3 months and 10.5 months, which were better than the IFAD average but worse than ESA. ATAAS,

⁹⁷ This was a weakness acknowledged by MOFPED during the CSPE field mission wrap-up workshop.

PROFIRA and RFSP had unsatisfactory delays of 13.8 months, 14.2 months and 17.5 months, respectively. For ATAAS, the delayed start was due to extended negotiations between the World Bank and Government and then slow parliamentary approval.⁹⁸

Table 7
Timeline between approval and disbursements (months)

	Approval to signing*	Signing to effectiveness*	Approval to effectiveness	Effectiveness to first disbursement	Approval to first disbursement	First to second disbursement
Uganda portfolio average**	7.2	3.4	10.5	8.4	18.9	5.4
ESA subregion average***	-	-	9.0	5.6	14.6	-

* For projects approved between 2000 and 2009 (RFSP, DLSP, CAIIP1), as after 2009, financial agreements enter into force upon signature. ** Eight projects excluding NOSP. *** Average for projects approved between 2000 and 2019. Source: Analysis of data from Oracle Business Intelligence.

120. **The overrun of project completion time reflected negatively on the efficiency of the portfolio** although additional budget was required only for ATAAS. The portfolio's average time overruns of 12 per cent compares unfavourably with the ESA average of 7.8 per cent for the same period. Of the closed and completed projects, only DLSP was completed on time. ATAAS, RFSP, VODP2 and CAIIP had extensions⁹⁹ of 2 years, 27 months, 14 months and 3 months, respectively, after the dates set at appraisal. As outlined in annex IX.A table 3, project extensions were required to allow for the completion of contracts that were still ongoing at the time of original closure due to slow start-ups that reduced the implementation window as well as changes in the project design (i.e. ATAAS).

Disbursement and implementation pace

121. **Disbursement was initially lower than planned for most projects, although it improved in the final years.** The closed and completed projects were characterized by lower levels of disbursement in the early years and accelerated levels of disbursements in the final years to achieve their higher absorption of loan funds (figure 5). All these projects showed S-shaped disbursement curves, which while expected for infrastructure-heavy projects such as CAIIP and DLSP, would not be for others such as ATAAS and RFSP. A similar pattern is emerging for ongoing projects (PROFIRA and PRELNOR) with disbursements of 22 and 19 per cent, respectively, at the end of their second year (see table 2 in annex IX.A). Extensive time required for concluding memoranda of understanding with implementing partners, contracting private sector partners (for PRELNOR, PROFIRA and VODP2) and resolving land disputes affecting roads (CAIIP1) delayed implementation of project activities and initially lowered disbursement rates.
122. **As a result, most of the project funds were absorbed in the final years of completed projects.** While CAIIP1 and DLSP experienced infrastructure delays, in the case of ATAAS, the loan funds were released for last-minute vehicle procurement and training for extension services. The slow procurement of vehicles in 2018 and higher cost of training for ATAAS was also inefficient. The slow absorption of funds in the initial years for VODP2 was also due to delays (and eventual failure) in the acquisition of land for oil palm expansion activities.¹⁰⁰ The failure to implement the planned expansion for the oil palm development in Buvuma and on the mainland caused the private partner (Bidco) not to invest in oil palm processing for these

⁹⁸ PPE ATAAS 2020 and ICCR 2019.


⁹⁹ ATAAS had two extensions and VODP2 had an additional 2-month closure extension due to COVID-19 impact.

¹⁰⁰ PCRV report, VODP2.

areas, which in turn further impacted the disbursement rate prior to the MTR revision.

123. **For ongoing projects, the skewed disbursements resulted from the project design feature to phase the implementation of project components.** PRELNOR’s project design report had its infrastructure component (with the larger share of the project funding) planned for implementation in the latter years of the project, with a gradual rolling out of agricultural production activities. PROFIRA’s initial slow disbursement was due to prolonged delays in contracting PSPs. In addition, PSP contracting terms that required payment after service delivery, while not affecting the pace of implementation, skewed disbursement. Nonetheless, PROFIRA achieved a consistent positive trend of disbursements after the first year of implementation.
124. Overall, the final disbursement rates for the completed projects averaged 99 per cent, thus realising a satisfactory rate of absorption of loan funds. **However, the higher levels of disbursements were enabled by no cost extensions in the majority of projects.**

Figure 5
Disbursements/Absorption of project funds – closed projects



Source: Oracle Business Intelligence.

Project management costs

125. **Staffing issues and project management costs, together with lengthy procurement processes and changes in implementation policies affected the efficiency of projects.** Projects generally recruited professionally competent staff for their PMUs¹⁰¹ as well as by the implementing partners (i.e. DLG). However, cases of vacant staff positions at the PMUs, staff turnover and staffing weaknesses at DLGs, negatively affected the efficiency of specific projects. PRELNOR’s efficiency was reduced by the sudden staff turnover of key project positions (Project Coordinator, Financial Controller and Procurement Officer, with the latter position still vacant and the first two with staff in acting capacities) resulting in governance issues.
126. **Transitioned projects benefited from the recruitment of skilled staff of the previous projects.** DLSP and CAIIP1 benefited from continuity in project staffing (from the District Development Support Programme [DDSP] and the Area-based Agricultural Modernization Programme, respectively) that brought familiarity with IFAD systems. VODP2 and PROFIRA benefited from the transitioned staff from VODP1

¹⁰¹ These are adequately guided by the project steering committees.

and RFSP, respectively, (and NOPP is benefiting from former VODP2 staff). PRELNOR has benefited from the infrastructure engineer previously contracted by CAIIP1 who replaced the one from DLSP.

127. **Lengthy procurement processes affecting timeliness and changes in the design that reduced anticipated outcome levels adversely affected implementation efficiency.** This was especially the case for the infrastructure activities of CAIIP1, DLSP and PRELNOR and the contracting of PSPs (VODP2 and PROFIRA).¹⁰² The lengthy processes mainly relate to compliance with IFAD and government procurement guidelines and regulations. For example, PRELNOR's mid-term review indicated that delays were encountered in the procurement for infrastructure contracts for more than one year. The dropping of the oil palm expansion in Buvuma Island and on the main land (VODP2) reduced the level of anticipated project outcome. The restructuring of RSFP and PROFIRA at MTR to strengthen more effective, although fewer SACCOS, and away from supporting new SACCOS, reduced the scale of outcomes, but arguably prevented wasting resources on under-performing SACCOS. ATAAS showed the most serious issues for project management because of the disruptive effects of loan suspensions by the World Bank and IFAD in 2013–2014 due to ineligible expenditures until funds were reimbursed. Subsequently, policy changes mid-course led to project redesign and to full IFAD loan suspension in 2016 for a year.
128. **Project management costs for closed projects (ranging from 6.5 per cent to 12.7 per cent) were below IFAD's average of 15 per cent and within the limits set at the design, yet a different trend is seen in the ongoing projects** (annex IX.A, table 4). For example, PRELNOR's MTR recommended that the PMU "should improve cost control" to reduce its operating costs. The operational cost overruns have largely been attributed to underbudgeting at design.¹⁰³

Economic efficiency

129. Judging from the available cost–benefit analysis, the closed project portfolio had positive economic returns that exceeded those at design (table 8).
130. Closed projects realized varied levels of economic efficiency (although there are discrepancies in the analyses). For ATAAS, the cost–benefit analysis showed a positive return (37.5 per cent) albeit based on impact study data with reliability issues. The economic rate of return (ERR) of 41 per cent of CAIIP1's at completion compared favourably with the design figure. The benefits included in the calculations were the increase in farm-gate prices of key staples, reduction of transport costs and time, and reduced post-harvest losses. The PCR for DLSP calculated an ERR above 30 per cent although the methodology is unclear. Although no ERR figure was calculated for RFSP, the PCRV noted that the project would have exceeded the ERR at design due to the much higher level of beneficiary outreach achieved.
131. Road construction forms a major element in five projects (CAIIP1, DLSP, PRELNOR, NOSP and NOPP). In the case of CAIIP1, road costs consumed 80 per cent of total project costs and costs per km rose from US\$4,300 to US\$13,000 per km by completion requiring a supplementary loan. Rural markets proved less efficient as only 50 per cent were in use by project end. In terms of rural roads, the estimated average cost per km for DLSP of US\$14,800 was within the estimated range of US\$12,835 to 15,625 per km according to World Bank estimates of 2008.

¹⁰² Interviews with PMUs of PROFIRA, VODP2 and PRELNOR, and supervision mission reports.

¹⁰³ Interview with PRELNOR PMU.

Table 8

Project economic rates of return (ERR) at design and closing

<i>Project</i>	<i>ERR at design (%)</i>	<i>ERR at closing/CSPE (%)</i>
RFSP	12	N/A
DLSP	16.3	> 30
CAIIP1	38	41
ATAAS	33.9	37.5
VODP2	19 - 25	27
PROFIRA	15	N/A
PRELNOR	12	N/A

Source: CSPE elaboration from project design and completion reports.

132. **Cost per beneficiary varied by the type of project, with low costs for rural finance and rural infrastructure, and high costs for value chain projects**, due to the former category's appropriateness to impact many beneficiaries (annex IX.A, table 4). ATAAS, with 1.68 million households (10 million beneficiaries) posted a high cost per beneficiary of US\$43 largely due to the high Government contribution that was essentially used for inputs and salaries. Similarly, VODP2 posted a high cost per beneficiary figure of US\$130 (excluding investment for development loans for oil palm farmers that are recoverable from the beneficiaries), but the costs for the oil palm component was substantially higher (US\$4,805 and US\$34 for the oil palm and oil seeds components, respectively), with 80 per cent of the project financing going to oil palm but with fewer households reached (1,805 as compared to 87,977 households for oil seeds).¹⁰⁴ CAIIP1's cost per beneficiary of US\$19 was due to the extensive rural road component that reached some 4.3 million people. Cost per beneficiary for RFSP is also comparatively low at US\$17 because of the high outreach as compared to PROFIRA.
133. **Ongoing projects are realising good value for money.** In PROFIRA, this is demonstrated by the competitive tendering of PSPs and the cost to support new CSCGs at US\$13 per member and mature groups at US\$22 (at MTR) compared to the budgeted contract prices at design of US\$20 and US\$40, respectively. Cost per beneficiary of US\$24 is considered acceptable, but the budget spent on SACCOs pre-MTR was inefficient, with many SACCOs underperforming after training and others collapsing.¹⁰⁵
134. **Higher costs for PRELNOR relating to community access roads (CARs) and household mentoring were justified.** The cost per km for the CARs in PRELNOR has progressively increased (by 35 per cent at MTR and 76 per cent at CSPE field mission) due to the upgrading of the road design from class 1 to 3 to meet weather tolerance requirements. However, this has lowered the kilometres of roads to be constructed, as well as the number of beneficiaries. The latest cost per beneficiary of US\$49¹⁰⁶ is high, but is projected to decrease with the implementation of the infrastructure component.
135. **The portfolio maintained sound levels of financial management for the project funds, although cases of mishandling of funds surfaced in some projects.** Supervision reports and interviews with PMUs of VODP2, PROFIRA and PRELNOR confirmed the existence of strong financial management systems within the projects. Projects have maintained satisfactory accounting and internal control systems (allowing for segregation of duties) although cases of ineligible expenditures

¹⁰⁴ Oil palm costs include expenditure in Buvuma. If expenditure in Buvuma is excluded from calculations (as was done in the VODP2 PCR), the oil palm cost/beneficiary in Kalangala becomes US\$2055, which is still high.

¹⁰⁵ Field interviews with DCOs (Soroti and Oyam).

¹⁰⁶ PRELNOR Supervision Report June 2020.

have been cited (RFSP, ATAAS). This was severe in ATAAS and caused the World Bank and IFAD to suspend their loans. The financial management systems (SAGE-Pastel, Tally and Integrated Financial Management System) are enabling PMUs to generate the necessary project financial records and accounts and the timely periodic audit of project expenditure and loan performance status.

136. **The issue of large amounts that are advanced to PMU staff for project operational activities, however, raises concern.** This is a widespread practice in the Government system and projects with other development partner and NGOs, but a major financial management weakness.¹⁰⁷ This system is susceptible to abuse by way of diversion of project funds for use to non-project activities as well as delayed accountabilities. The Government is aware of this issue and mechanisms to address it are being sought. Weaknesses are also identified in the delays in approving payments for project expenditure by implementing DLGs due to issues relating to the integrated financial management system of government. This impacts the flow of project funds due to the associated delays in paying service providers and staff engaged in project activities such as extension (PRELNOR).¹⁰⁸

External factors

137. **The COVID-19 pandemic as well as heavy rains have negatively impacted the efficiency of implementing ongoing projects.** Most activities of ongoing projects (PROFIRA, PRELNOR and NOPP) have effectively been brought to a standstill due to lockdown measures. The pandemic also reduced the efficiency of service outreach to project beneficiaries (farmer groups, SACCOs and CSCGs, and VSLAs). In addition, heavy and prolonged rains experienced in 2018 and 2019 affected the pace of infrastructure activities, including the need to upgrade CARs to “all-weather” roads, thereby increasing the cost per km and reducing the total km coverage for PRELNOR.
138. For PROFIRA, the pandemic reduced the efficiency of services outreach to beneficiaries (SACCO and CSCGs). Since March 2020, PSPs have not been able to continue with their activities to strengthen CSCGs as well as to finalize their mentoring activities with SACCOs. CSCGs and SACCOs also have not been able to hold their regular meetings due to limited technology access among members. In the case of PRELNOR and NOPP, field extension and other training by PSPs and DLGs and farmer group meetings have not been possible. PSPs have already asked for contract extensions to manage the impact of COVID-19 on their performance.¹⁰⁹
139. **Summary.** The CSPE portfolio’s efficiency was enhanced by the good overall disbursement levels of project funds, sound financial management and higher realized ERRs. Efficiency, however, was constrained by delays in implementation resulting in: (i) extensions of already long projects; (ii) lower initial disbursements necessitating large disbursements at project completion; (iii) lengthy management (fiduciary, procurement and contracting) processes; (iv) vacant positions; and (v) high staff turnover in a number of PMUs. In addition, there were exogenous factors such as COVID-19 and adverse weather (although outside of project control). Accordingly, the **efficiency of the portfolio is rated moderately unsatisfactory (3).**

A.4. Rural poverty impact

140. This section assesses the impact on rural poverty of the country programme’s seven projects (RFSP, DLSP, CAIIP1, ATAAS, VODP2, PROFIRA and PRELNOR) that have made sufficient implementation progress. The assessment relates to the following impact domains: (i) household income and net assets; (ii) human and social capital

¹⁰⁷ Poor management of advances to staff highlighted in VODP2 SM report (September 2019).

¹⁰⁸ Field interviews.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with South Eastern Private Sector Promotion Enterprise Ltd and Acholi Private Sector Company, and also with PROFIRA PMU.

and empowerment; (iii) food security and agricultural productivity; and (iv) institutions and policies.

141. **The impact pathways draw on the CSPE's theory of change, which aligns with the three strategic objectives of the 2013 COSOP** (annex VI): (i) improved production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture sustainably increased through adoption of suitable technologies, research and extension (ATAAS, PRELNOR, DLSP); (ii) smallholder integration into markets resulting in higher revenues through improved roads, markets, processing and farmer collective action (DLSP, VODP2, PRELNOR, CAIIP1); and (iii) increased access and use of financial services by the rural population through strengthening of savings and credit institutions, policy reforms and community action (RFSP, PROFIRA, VODP2).
142. The content and quality of impact studies are uneven, with issues around sampling strategies, and the limited use of statistical analysis and baseline surveys (see detailed assessment in online Appendix III). Of the 15 impact studies reviewed, only 6 used statistical tests to establish the significance of results. Baselines have been late with delays of three to four years or not done at all (annex IX.B, table 4). PRELNOR, chosen as a project to have the impact study from the Research and Impact Assessment Division of IFAD (RIA), was affected by IFAD's change of policy over doing ex-ante impact assessments¹¹⁰ so that RIA no longer had a budget to follow the original design. ATAAS could not use the baseline results and the impact study used a recall method. Under PROFIRA, data submitted by SACCO service providers were found to be of low quality and hampered by a lack of an online MIS. Overall, therefore, the impact findings presented below are subject to a number of caveats that are noted in each section.

Household income and assets

143. Despite survey limitations mentioned above, **there is broad evidence that IFAD's portfolio of completed or closed projects have contributed to improved incomes and raised the level of household assets owned** (Table 9). The ongoing projects, PROFIRA and PRELNOR, also report an increase in household incomes, but the evidence remains largely anecdotal. Increased use of improved technologies such as improved seed varieties, fertilizers and market access as a result of community access roads constructed, and extension service access have been key drivers of the observed changes in incomes.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ As a result of policy changes from IFAD10 to IFAD11.

¹¹¹ CSPE field surveys.

Table 9
Impact on average annual household income (UGX) by project

Project	Before/ Baseline	Target	End line	Percentage change
DLSP ¹¹²	265 208		422 306	59%
CAIIP1 ¹¹³	136 878	175 500	198 812	44%
ATAAS ¹¹⁴ (female farmers)	698 200	802 930	2 751 231	226%
ATAAS (male farmers)	975 730	1 170 786	3 600 846	205%
VODP2 ¹¹⁵ oil palm	-	-	20 040 673	-
VODP2 oilseeds	-	-	2 137 270	-

Source: CSPE Team elaboration based on project documents (see footnotes).

144. **Community roads have been an important means to increase market access and raise incomes although purchasing power may not have risen to the same degree.** DLSP and CAIIP1 increased average annual household incomes by 59 and 44 per cent, respectively. The DLSP target area also saw a fall in the proportion of households in the lowest income bracket (up to UGX 50,000) by 5 to 7 per cent and a rise in the proportion of households in the highest income brackets by 10 to 12 per cent.¹¹⁶ Both projects contributed to increased farm gate prices, improved marketing of produce and reduced post-harvest losses. In DLSP, increased yields from crops and livestock were also important driving factors, while in CAIIP1 households diversified into non-agricultural income sources, with small business enterprises playing a greater role. The resultant change in household purchasing power is, however, questionable because income data were not adjusted for inflation.¹¹⁷
145. **Projects with an agricultural focus are estimated to have increased household incomes, although the degree to which the projects contributed to these changes is unclear.**¹¹⁸ Even after adjusting for inflation, ATAAS's implementation completion report (ICR) found that incomes doubled for men and increased by 2.3 times for women, far exceeding targets. Despite extensive re-analysis, the ICR and the ICR review¹¹⁹ do not fully examine the extent to which being an ATAAS beneficiary correlates with these positive gains compared to other characteristics of the sampled farmers, and, as mentioned below (para. 154), many well-performing farmer groups had already been formed before the project timeframe. For VODP2, the average net income per hectare of oil palm farmers at completion is relatively high at US\$1,983, exceeding the target of US\$1,500 even without a comparative figure at baseline.¹²⁰ Although the impact on net household income of oilseed farmers was positive, the projected income per hectare of US\$350 was surpassed in soya bean cultivation (US\$438), but missed for sunflower cultivation (US\$313).

¹¹² DLSP impact assessment 2015.

¹¹³ CAIIP1 PCR 2016.

¹¹⁴ ATAAS income data from the World Bank ICRR. Shows percentage change in real terms.

¹¹⁵ VODP2 income data from VODP2 PCR 2020. Annual household income data converted from US\$5326 from oil palm and US\$568 from oilseeds into UGX, based on exchange rate of 3762UGX=US\$1 (1 June 2019).

¹¹⁶ For beneficiaries of functional adult literacy and no functional adult literacy respectively.

¹¹⁷ Inflation ranged from 3 to 15 per cent during the implementation of these projects from 2007 to 2015.

¹¹⁸ ATAAS implementation completion report, World Bank, 2019.

¹¹⁹ ICR Review conducted by the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group in 2019 also notes while the impact study was of reasonable quality, "yield assessments were not robust" due to an absence of non-beneficiary data and poor tracking by the M&E system (ICR Review, p. 8).

¹²⁰ VODP2 PCR 2020; IDS study (2015) Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships in Agricultural Value Chains. A case study of the oil palm public-private partnership in Kalangala, Uganda.

146. **For rural finance, the evidence suggests that savings have grown while income was not directly measured.** The 2014 impact assessment of RFSP found that phase II of the project led to long-term SACCO members spending more in all expense areas than the control group of new SACCO members. It also found that long-term SACCO members had a 14 per cent higher average monthly saving than new members. The incomes SACCO and CSCG members supported by PROFIRA have not yet been measured.¹²¹
147. **Income diversification has increased from dependency on crop farming alone into livestock rearing, trade and commerce and the services sector.** Four projects have evidence that a greater proportion of beneficiary households have become involved in diverse types of economic activities, contributing to improved household resilience (RFSP, CAIIP1, DLSP and PRELNOR).¹²² PRELNOR has seen a three-fold increase in the proportion of vulnerable household earnings from livestock production (15 to 46 per cent), the service sector, and trade and commerce, with a slight fall in those earning from crop farming and remittances.¹²³ Similarly, the proportion of CAIIP1 beneficiary household earnings from small business enterprises doubled from 20 to 40 per cent. Households in RFSP reported all around increases in those earning from agriculture, employment, trade, and the transport sector.¹²⁴ PRELNOR and VODP2 have also contributed to diversification within the crop sector by promoting oilseeds/oil palm production among their beneficiaries.
148. **There was also a general increase in household assets with beneficiaries accumulating farm equipment, bicycles, motor cycles, radios and mobile phones** (annex IX.B, table 3). DLSP showed greater improvements in ownership of household rather than productive assets, especially phones, which increased from 30 to 64 per cent ownership among beneficiaries. Comparisons between beneficiary households and control groups in RFSP also showed that the former spent more on more costly consumer durables (e.g. refrigerators) and farming equipment (e.g. irrigation pumps). In ATAAS, while both beneficiary households and control groups acquired more assets (e.g. radios, TVs, mobile phones and vehicles), the increases in assets were slightly greater among beneficiaries. Under VODP2, substantial increments in the assets of oil palm farmers occurred between 2014 and 2019. The proportion with iron-roofed main houses increased from 46 to 98 per cent while those with cement floors increased from 40 to 64 per cent. In Kalangala, however, the **sudden influx of wealth has had a negative impact on some families, including high levels of expenditure on consumption and unproductive assets**, limited financial saving to manage market fluctuations and more spending on alcohol, causing family disputes.¹²⁵ Finally, recent surveys on vulnerable-headed households show that by mid-term, PRELNOR had contributed to increases in assets, including cattle ownership, although the sample sizes are small and will require further validation.

Human and social capital and empowerment

149. **The portfolio fostered a conducive environment for promotion of human and social capital with significant gains in skills development and strengthening of existing social groups although the quality of documentary evidence is varied.** Beneficiaries met during the CSPE field mission demonstrated increased social capital because of their knowledge and skills acquired from training in areas such as financial literacy, agribusiness, and group leadership, and that these have been instrumental in their capacity to increase savings and farm productivity. However, the projects fell short in systematically collecting data at individual and

¹²¹ However, the PROFIRA baseline (2016) provides a useful breakdown of household income distribution by wealth quintile to compare against, hopefully in the outcome study planned for 2020.

¹²² At the time of the CSPE, data on household involvement in economic activities at baseline and endline or to-date were insufficient or unavailable for ATAAS, VODP2, PROFIRA and the farmer groups in PRELNOR.

¹²³ MOLG (2019) Report on the intermediate outcomes from the first cohort of vulnerable households, PRELNOR.

¹²⁴ RFSP impact assessment 2014.

¹²⁵ CSPE field mission interviews.

household levels in order to facilitate learning about the extent of the positive changes happening among the beneficiaries.

150. **There is strong evidence of improved skills and capacity of beneficiaries, community volunteers and local government officials in several projects.** The DLSP achieved positive changes in poorer households resulting from FAL and household mentoring, such as improved economic activities, improved sanitation, increased participation of beneficiaries in public speaking and self-esteem.¹²⁶ RFSP also achieved improvements in education levels and health status for 94 per cent of the beneficiaries¹²⁷ as well as empowerment of beneficiaries with respect to improved social status and participation in leadership roles.¹²⁸ CSPE field mission interviews with PROFIRA beneficiaries found positive benefits, such as better governance skills and increased voice and confidence from being part of a common interest group such as CSCGs.
151. **Through strengthening the financial management capacity of group members, the improved business skills and use of increased savings and credit have had valuable impacts on social capital and empowerment,** particularly in VODP2, PROFIRA and PRELNOR. From CSPE field interviews, women mentioned positive changes in the households, among them increased self-esteem from families, improved clothing for children, payment of hospital bills, and through the use of group loans to boost their businesses, greater respect from their husband and men.
152. While some studies noted significant improvement in joint decision-making between men and women,¹²⁹ other studies, however, have noted that the evidence was less clear due to poor documentation and changes in the indicators being tracked.¹³⁰ The degree of positive changes in social capital in Kalangala are mixed. On the one hand, marked growth in earnings have improved access to education for children and strengthened land ownership, including for women, and allowed some to take up leadership positions. On the other hand, however, conflicts have risen due to increased land prices and the inflow of migrants.¹³¹

Food security and agricultural productivity

153. **Evidence suggests that IFAD's projects have had a positive impact on agricultural production and food security although the survey data have limitations.** Agriculture-focused projects (DLSP, ATAAS, VODP2 and PRELNOR) have claimed impressive yield changes, generally meeting or exceeding baselines, although the performance of different target groups is not always documented (e.g. smallholder men, women and youth and nucleus workers and labourers) (annex IX.B, table 2). In the five tracked commodities in ATAAS, increases in yields over target were achieved in cassava, beans, maize, rice, and milk production. Oil palm and oil seeds under VODP2 have shown statistically significant increases, with oil palm rising from 4.5 tonnes per hectares to 12 tonnes per hectare leading to 178,730 tonnes of crude palm oil (596 per cent of target). Average sunflower yields for 2018 reached 1.7 tonnes per hectare (91 per cent of the target), while soybean yields reached 1.4 tonnes per hectare (127 per cent of the target). These resulted in the production of 647,963 tonnes per hectare (220 per cent of target). Early indications after two

¹²⁶ DLSP Impact Assessment 2015.

¹²⁷ RFSP PCR 2014, p16 – Reports that RFSP beneficiaries primarily used Government Health facilities, but about 30 per cent reported a higher ability to pay for private facilities, which is more than the 27 per cent reported by the control group. This also translated into improved health status for 94 per cent of beneficiaries.

¹²⁸ RFSP Impact Assessment Final Report, Page 18.

¹²⁹ ATAAS, 2018. ICRR, p 39 notes that: ATAAS has had considerable influence on gender in relation to asset ownership and decision making on investment. The Process Evaluation (2017) found joint decision making to be well above 50 per cent score, except for asset ownership.

¹³⁰ ATAAS restructuring after the MTR in 2014 made significant changes to the development objective indicators, and dropped some indicators tracking farmer yields by gender and farmer satisfaction with the advisory services.

¹³¹ Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships in Agricultural Value Chains, 2015, IDS, IFAD.

seasons appear to be positive for PRELNOR for soya beans, maize and sesame,¹³² and although baseline data are not yet available, the CSPE field mission found increased yields among farmers groups visited.

154. **For ATAAS, the productivity changes are surprising given that they occurred over a period when there was significant disruption to the extension system,** with major disease outbreaks and a switch to subsidized input provision using retired military personnel known as OWC. Assessments of OWC performance in 2018 concluded that although the quantity of inputs distributed increased markedly, the productivity of farmers did not match. The causes were wrong timing of input delivery to farmers, incidences of poor quality inputs delivered, and inadequate extension services to advise on their use.¹³³ According to some, OWC has resulted in huge losses due to limited extension services, inadequate information with regard to farmer, soil and water profiles, and elite capture of the program.¹³⁴ On the other hand, there is good evidence that ATAAS built on the farmer groups formed during the NAADS period, and so was able to deliver technologies to well-established groups with receptive lead farmers who were already on the path to commercial agriculture.¹³⁵
155. **There was a significant increase in the marketing of farmers' produce.** VODP2 data show that the project has had a positive impact on the bulking of agricultural production, with 2,645 farmer groups involved in bulking (against a target of 1,000 groups) by the end of 2018. This has allowed farmers to negotiate and obtain higher prices from millers for bulked produce due to reduced transaction costs. The CSPE field mission found that engaging in bulk marketing had helped VODP2 and PROFIRA households to improve their living standards and to invest in some small animals for multiplication and sharing on a revolving basis.
156. **There is some evidence that food security has improved.** There has been improvement in household food security across projects and regions and over the years. IFAD has also directly intervened through the provision of food security grant, such as those under DLSP and PRELNOR.¹³⁶ PRELNOR reported that the proportion of vulnerable households that were food secure for only six months or less had almost halved from 80 per cent to 41 per cent. The number of meals consumed by vulnerable households also increased from most (59 per cent) having one meal per day to most (87 per cent) having two.¹³⁷ Under RFSP, 85 per cent of beneficiaries reported improvements in food security and nutrition.¹³⁸
157. **ATAAS beneficiary farmers suffered lower periods of food deficit than non-beneficiaries,** with 35 per cent having a food surplus compared to 28 per cent (Figure 6).¹³⁹ Indeed, the CSPE field mission noted that the District Production and Marketing Officer (DPMOs) in Iganga, Lira and Masaka districts – with institutional memory of NAADS and ATAAS – stated that increased food security may have been one of the few significant impacts of ATAAS.¹⁴⁰ Under PRELNOR, the emerging picture is of supported vulnerable households increasing meals per day¹⁴¹ and food security grants assisting 400 households, while income diversification has been introduced

¹³² PRELNOR, 2019. First vulnerable household cohort outcome report.

¹³³ Implementation Review of NAADS interventions under Operation Wealth Creation, Empower Consult, 2018.

¹³⁴ ACODE, op. cit. 2018.

¹³⁵ ATAAS Impact Survey 2019 and see the ATAAS project performance evaluation; IFAD, 2020, for fuller discussion.

¹³⁶ PRELNOR gives vulnerable households Food Security Grants (worth US\$120 per household).

¹³⁷ PRELNOR first vulnerable households batch outcome report, 2019.

¹³⁸ RFSP, PCR 2014, p. 15: States that 85 per cent of RFSP beneficiaries reported improvements in household food security over the previous 5 years, higher than the 72 per cent of the control group.

¹³⁹ The difference, although small, was found to be statistically significant, particularly during the months of February–May (ATAAS Impact Survey p. 76).


¹⁴⁰ 2 District Production and Marketing Officers also believe that any impact (food security) was due to or built on legacy of earlier NAADS phases.

¹⁴¹ The PRELNOR outcome report in 2019 indicated that vulnerable households now have at least 5 months of full food security in a year, and those with at least two meals per day had increased from 38 to 59 per cent.

through enterprises such as apiary, agroforestry and water harvesting. DLSP – through its food security grants and household mentoring – increased food security for the vulnerable (although the PCR notes that due to the absence of reference groups these impacts cannot be fully ascribed to the project).

158. **In terms of reduced malnutrition, there is limited evidence available.** Reduced child malnutrition was indicated in VODP2 but there are no reliable data for ATAAS, CAIIP1, RFSP or DLSP in this area. The VODP2 PCR reports that chronic malnutrition or stunting in Kalangala was reduced from 66.2 per cent at baseline to 32.4 per cent in 2019, compared to stunting rates of 26.5 per cent in the central region and at 29 per cent nationally. Under RFSP, some positive changes in child malnutrition were recorded by a Results Impact and Measuring System (RIMS) Survey.¹⁴²

Figure 6
Farmers' experience of food security in ATAAS



Source: ATAAS impact evaluation, 2018.

Rural institutions and policies

159. The 2013 COSOP gave a prominent role to rural organizations – at the grassroots, district and national levels – in its strategy to empower the rural poor. It mentions support for the establishment of financially sustainable smallholder oil palm growers' organizations and for UCSCU to become a sustainable apex body for SACCOs.
160. **At the grassroots level,** with farmer groups and organizations, including the KOPGT and the Kalanga Oil Palm Growers Association, CSCGs and SACCOs, there has been significant impact in terms of institutional strengthening. VODP2 further grew KOPGT from VODP1 to the point where it received over UGX 10 billion (US\$3 million) in dividends, as the holder of 10 per cent shares in Oil Palm Uganda Limited (OPUL).¹⁴³ Alongside OPUL, it provides vital extension services, credit and support in transportation for farmers.
161. **At the intermediate level,** capacity building of DLG staff and district farmer associations tasked with supporting farmer-led extension service provision has strengthened their institutional capacity in PRELNOR and high-level farmer organizations in VODP2. ZARDIs have been enhanced through support from ATAAS and then PRELNOR to increase adaptive trials and demonstrations. DLSP and VODP2 also devoted considerable resources to building district capacity, but the wider impact

¹⁴² RFSP PCR 2014, p.15.

¹⁴³ VODP2 PCR.

of this support is not evident, and equally in CAIIP1, no rating is given for this sub-criterion.

162. **At the national level**, for example with Uganda Co-operative Alliance (UCA), the Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFFE), UCSCU and other farmer organizations, such as the Eastern and Southern Africa Small Scale Farmers' Forum that implemented the household mentoring approach in some districts. ATAAS delivered positive results as far as the strengthening of NARO is concerned and a new agricultural extension policy and strategy in 2016 – although IFAD's role in the latter was minimal due to its loan suspension in this period. The grant-funded Uganda Oilseeds Subsector Platform (OSSUP) played a significant market-making role in VODP2 by bringing key actors in the vegetable oil sector together, although it closed in 2017 when funding ended.
163. **IFAD's lending programme for agriculture and integrated rural development has had limited or no influence on policy.** This was either because there were no explicit policy objectives, or because of the limited level of policy engagement between IFAD and the Government during the COSOP period. This is reflected in IFAD's different engagement with MAAIF (ATAAS, VODP2), MOLG (CAIIP1, DLSP and PRELNOR) and MOFPED (RFSP, PROFIRA). In the case of ATAAS, because the intended policy reforms stated in the design (with regard to advisory services) were not a true reflection of the Government's appetite for reform (see Box 3).

Box 3

Policy influence the ATAAS experience

IFAD's decision to jointly fund ATAAS was partly premised on its wish to reinforce the extension service reforms under the earlier NAADS. The changes in government's commitment to NAADS, resulting in IFAD loan suspension in 2007 for a year, and its reorientation to more input-driven approach to agricultural advisory services, indicated the gap between IFAD's aim to support policy reform and the reality of policy turbulence under a strong presidential system and less reform-minded host ministry in MAAIF. IFAD's loan suspension under ATAAS occurred at a time when the Government promulgated a new agricultural extension policy and strategy in 2016, so IFAD had little influence on their formulation. Overall, IFAD's limited funding contribution to ATAAS (2 per cent of total at close) and its low capacity in country to engage in or respond to policy engagement opportunities led to no discernible policy influence.

Source: IOE draft project performance evaluation of ATAAS.

164. **CAIIP and DLSP had little or no policy influence in their design or implementation.** Working with the MOLG, DLSP and CAIIP1 were designed to work within existing policy mandates and guidance and relied on a favourable policy framework. They subsequently experienced implementation issues after certain policy changes affecting local government autonomy. The exception is around community access road design where MOLG as well as other donors such as AfDB have embraced lessons. Partners supporting CARs are ensuring that roads are full-gravel and no longer spot-gravel, as before. Ministry of Works and Transport plus local government have 'fully embraced this'¹⁴⁴, although as yet it would appear there is no specific policy change.
165. There are no explicit policy objectives in PRELNOR, although it was expected that the learning from PRELNOR's experiences will contribute to policy dialogue at the national and local government level.¹⁴⁵ These included influence on road design and agricultural marketing approaches. While the Project Policy Committee in MOLG is the intended forum intended for policy dialogue, it is too early for PRELNOR to claim any policy influence.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ ICO self-assessment for CSPE 2020.

¹⁴⁵ PRELNOR, project design report, para. 167.

¹⁴⁶ As indicated in PRELNOR's self-assessment, which did not comment on this aspect.

166. In value chains, VODP1 and 2 have provided a successful model of 4P engagement and the potential policy impact on Government thinking can be seen in the adoption of value chain and nucleus estate approaches in NDP3.¹⁴⁷
167. **The most significant policy results are in rural finance.** In supporting the development and passage of the Tier IV Act and the establishment of UMRA, PROFIRA helped strengthen and bring stability to the MFI sector. Together with RFSP, it has also facilitated UCSCU through the enhancement of good governance and management capacity development; establishment of UCSCU regional offices; and the development and implementation of the five-year strategic plan. PROFIRA has also been providing information for the formulation of the Financial Sector Development Strategy for MOFPED.
168. **Summary.** Statistical attribution of the results achieved to the support provided by IFAD is not demonstrated in most of the impact studies. Yet, the logic inherent in the theory of change elaborated for this evaluation indicates that IFAD will have *contributed* to the changes found in the impact domains assessed here. Incomes and assets have risen for the seven projects assessed, although income changes were not always adjusted for inflation. While human and social capital have also improved, systematic data collection was often missing and the reach of intensive household mentoring methodologies was limited. Evidence for improved food security is fair, although reductions in malnutrition levels are less clear. Grassroots institutions, including production and credit-based groups, have been strengthened, while capacity for better service delivery of local governments and zonal research institutes have been somewhat improved although broad changes in service delivery are not so evident. Policy impacts have been generally limited aside from microfinance (see the discussion under non-lending). Finally, questions over the validity of the data remain, and as a result **rural poverty impact is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**

A.5. Sustainability of benefits¹⁴⁸

169. This criterion is discussed in terms of institutional, financial and technical aspects. In general, the sustainability of benefits from older projects such as DLSP, RFSP and ATAAS have been bolstered by the sequential project approach and continued support in districts with national coverage.

Institutional

170. **Prospects for the sustainability of farmer organizations appear good, particularly where financial viability is established or strong community ties have been built** (such as for community-based natural resource management in PRELNOR or many of PROFIRA's CSCGs). There are questions over the sustainability of some farmer organizations, given the withdrawal of IFAD support at project closure and the declining support from local governments that have faced budget reductions (see Ch.V.B para. 295). The sustainability of CSCGs depends on the availability of support services once PROFIRA closes. To address this, PROFIRA has followed a two-track exit strategy – forming collectives of CSCGs and establishing village agents to provide paid services to CSCGs. Results, however, suggest that the institutionalization of payment for support services by CSCGs should have been started from the beginning of the project. By now, the CSCGs have had free access to support services for a few years. The viability of SACCOs remains mixed with the more viable ones supported by RFSP/PROFIRA having good prospects, while the

¹⁴⁷ See, for example, Fowler M. and Rauschendorfer J. 2019. Agro-industrialisation in Uganda, F-IH-UGA-006-1, IGC Working Paper.

¹⁴⁸ Sustainability refers to the likely continuation of net benefits from the development intervention after project completion. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.

majority remain fragile. The sustainability for apex organizations remains challenging.

171. **The sustainability of SACCOs relies on three different levels and institutions, all of which face difficulties**, including: District Commercial Officers (DCOs) providing the ground support; and apex institutions such as UCSCU, which provides lobbying and capacity building activities for SACCOs and UMRA, as the regulator of the sector, instilling proper financial and risk management standards.¹⁴⁹ DCOs and MTIC have limited resources to provide the ground support, and although much stronger, the UCSCU's operational self-sufficiency is currently only 85 per cent. UMRA's role in the sector is also questioned by the amendment to the Cooperatives Act in November 2019. Category B and C SACCOs also still require capacity building to improve their operational efficiency for which they do not have the resources. The sustainability of CSCGs is also overshadowed by recent policy changes, which could see the external infusion of funds by the Government into these institutions, thus risking: a) undermining the institution's efforts to raise their own funds in terms of shares and savings; b) elite capture with richer members borrowing more funds and c) moving away from savings-led and loan-driven institutions.
172. **KOPGT is now a relatively strong institution that operates without project support and has achieved operational self-sufficiency since the end of 2018**, in line with the design target. Although KOPGT posted an operational loss of UGX 238.5 million in the first half of 2019,¹⁵⁰ its sustainability is likely, given staff capacity, linkages with other farmer institutions, the active engagement of farmers and good levels of profitability. Nevertheless, technical and financial support may be required for a period. The role of OSSUP has proven effective but unsustainable, with calls for it to be funded as a public good by SNV. It is unclear how OSSUP's role will be replaced by the multi-service platform model proposed in NOSP and to what extent farmers and their organizations will have access to reliable market information and brokerage services.
173. **The security of land tenure has been noted as a concern** since IFAD's work under DLSP. While the COSOP did not aim to address land issues, questions of land rights and land loss have been noted in VODP2 as serious challenges to project implementation due to rising land values and the return of absentee land owners. Opportunities for support through advice centres have not been pursued because another ministry is responsible (Ministry of Lands).¹⁵¹ NOPP has taken on board the lessons from VODP2 and plans to address land security through measures, including civic education and public sensitization for communities involved in or affected by oil palm growing; local land dispute resolution and legal advice; and support for land registration.¹⁵²

Financial

174. **Value chain crops are proving the most profitable investments across the portfolio**, particularly in the case of oil palm.¹⁵³ Despite smallholders showing lower yields than the nucleus estate and their loan repayments affecting net incomes, the annual cost of production is progressively flattening while yields are increasing and levels of rejects are diminishing due to improved harvesting and post-harvest handling practices. For comparison, oil palm farmers who were interviewed by the field mission indicated that oil palm is much more profitable than other crops such as coffee and seasonal crops such as bean and fishing activities that were important in Kalangala prior to the project. Sunflower and soya bean production is also

¹⁴⁹ UMRA will only regulate the top layer of SACCOs (based on clear criteria) and thus many SACCOs will not benefit.

¹⁵⁰ Supervision mission September 2019.

¹⁵¹ Interview with IFAD staff.

¹⁵² NOPP Final quality assurance Review, para. 27, 2017.

¹⁵³ Average profit level is UGX 7.1 million per hectares per year (VODP self-evaluation report).

generating good and sustainable profit levels (averaging UGX 1.37 million per hectare per season) in the VODP2 oil seeds hubs.

175. While the Government's commitment to research and extension services has shown improvement, a recent expenditure review indicates that there are still grounds for funding uncertainty.¹⁵⁴ Even so, grants for extension services and for district roads are now in place, and following IFAD's support for new vehicles under ATAAS, MAAIF states there is a budget of UGX 80 billion (or US\$20 million) annually for vehicle operation.¹⁵⁵ CSPE field interviews with District Production Officers confirmed predictability and consistency of disbursements through the next five-year planning period, which they have incorporated in their five-year District Development Plans 2020/2021 to 2024/2025. The District Production Officer reported regular and institutionalized vehicle maintenance, buttressed by GPS disabling systems, to reduce risks of misuse. Field evidence, however, indicated some instances of misuse of vehicles by local politicians.
176. **Nevertheless, there remain concerns over project exit strategies** in terms of farmers' willingness to pay for private services after programme closure and PSPs being able and willing to finance hub platforms, markets and advisory services.¹⁵⁶

Technical

177. **Sustainability of technical benefits are mixed and dependent on continued funding.** Unlike in the 2013 CPE, the prospects for maintenance of community access roads are better. Community access road sustainability is rated as high due to the upgraded design to all-weather standard, and therefore inclusion in the Road Fund for maintenance (CAIIP1, DLSP and PRELNOR). Ninety per cent of CAIIP1 roads are reportedly still functioning and maintained.¹⁵⁷ Community satisfaction was found to be high across the seven roads visited during the CSPE field mission. Some farm roads although are less likely to endure.
178. **In rural finance, CSCG continuity depends on their affording private support services and DLG resourcing.** Technical support for CSCGs in terms of sustaining business skills have been initiated through community-based trainers, but their continued engagement, after PROFIRA ends next year, will depend on CSCGs being able to meet the pay-for-fee services. It will also depend on DCOs and DCDOs having a sufficient budget to integrate support for SACCOs and CSCGs into their annual work plans, as well as them accessing and using the high-quality training modules prepared by PROFIRA's PSPs.
179. **Sustaining extension service quality will depend on continued training of field staff.** IFAD's funding of the rapid and extensive training under ATAAS of 4,000 staff was valuable in building the technical capacity of public extension agents, many of whom were newly recruited. However, the intended continuation of this training to provide continuous skills enhancement has not manifested, as it is not included in the next five-year MTEF indicative figures.
180. **OWC's continued subsidized input distribution remains a key issue for technical and financial sustainability.** OWC's continued role weakens the ability of private sector actors to engage in input supply, constrains farmers' choice of inputs, and also affects NARO plans for commercialization of technology outputs. The involvement of farmers in input selection or distribution was reported in 2018 to be limited under the OWC system and so inputs such as seedlings and fertilizer were given without attention to the actual needs of farmers. There has also been

¹⁵⁴ Agriculture Sector Public Expenditure Review Uganda, World Bank, 2019.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with MAAIF.

¹⁵⁶ See for example VODP2 PCR para .163 ff, RFSP PCR.V.

¹⁵⁷ Interviews with AfDB IFAD staff.

widespread evidence of corruption in the way inputs are sourced and distributed under OWC so that the intended recipients fail to receive their allocations.¹⁵⁸

181. **Summary.** The 2013 CPE found sustainability to be the weakest performing criterion (giving this criterion a rating of 3 or moderately unsatisfactory). It found that physical infrastructure was poorly maintained by local government and that supported agribusinesses had viability problems. In rural finance, many of the supported savings and credit cooperatives had poor prospects of becoming self-reliant and sustainable. The situation now is somewhat improved. Growing profitability and productivity indicates farmers should be able to maintain their incomes, especially in vegetable oil production, while better designed roads should provide greater access and many rural credit groups are diversifying and viable. Much depends on the ability of local government services to expand support as well as on farmers' willingness to pay for private advisory services in the face of subsidized input supply and changes in rural finance policy. Overall, **sustainability of benefits** is rated **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

B. Other performance criteria

B.1. Innovation¹⁵⁹

182. **The portfolio features a number of innovations in the Ugandan context, although most of the examples found were inherited from the earlier COSOP period. There were also a number of missed opportunities to be innovative.**
183. **VODP2 has built on innovative VODP1 features that were new to Uganda,** including most notably the continued development of oil palm as a new perennial crop via a 4P approach, with substantial private sector investment commitments and dividend returns to the Government and KOPGT from the miller OPUL. The multi-stakeholder KOPGT created under VODP1 was innovative as it provided longer-term financing for the full cycle of smallholder plantation farming. VODP2 has also served to validate other innovations introduced earlier, including the engagement of private sector agronomic services and market linkages built around farmer-miller consortia. VODP2 has also supported farmer-to-farmer seed multiplication that has improved quality seed availability. The overall success of the VODP1/2 experience has had a marked influence on Government thinking, yet much of the innovation must be attributed to the original design of VODP1 developed under the 1998 COSOP as recorded in the 2013 CPE.¹⁶⁰
184. The Small and Medium Sized Agricultural Development Fund (SMADF), or Uganda Yield Fund, is an innovative example of leveraging private sector financing; however, this was promoted as part of non-lending activities rather than the lending portfolio and is discussed in chapter IV.
185. **The use of a sector development approach in IFAD's rural finance programmes was new to Uganda and also started under the 2004 COSOP.** Rather than support institutions, RFSP purposely attempted to "fill gaps" in the existing institutional structure, including a focus on policy and apex institutional development. RFSP also pioneered the contracting out of most activities to expert providers and included a market-driven matching grant component used elsewhere in IFAD but new to Uganda. Innovative design allowed CSCG formation contractors to introduce new approaches to the mobilization of groups within IFAD guidelines.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Public Expenditure Governance in Uganda's Agricultural Extension System, ACODE Centre for Budget and Economic Governance, 2018.

¹⁵⁹ To be considered innovative, according to IFAD's definition, an intervention, idea, technology or process needs to be: (i) new to its context of application (with reference to the country context, scale, domain, discipline or line of business); (ii) useful and cost-effective in relation to a goal, with positive value for its users (e.g. empower the rural poor to overcome poverty better and more cost-effectively than previous approaches); and (iii) able to "stick" after pilot testing.

¹⁶⁰ Some innovations have emerged under VODP2, including the use of community-based facilitators to support extension and farmer learning platforms.

¹⁶¹ Integrating health training was an innovation introduced by community savings and credit group promoters.

SACCO board mentoring and exchange visits was innovative and has significantly improved governance levels of SACCO beneficiaries.

186. **Continued use of household mentoring and GALS approaches have been followed by IFAD projects although their introduction predates the CSPE period.** Household mentoring was introduced under DLSP's design (and it was given recognition in the 2013 CPE and as an IFAD award in 2011) and has been continued under PRELNOR. Similarly, GALS was first developed in 2008 under Oxfam NOVIB's programme¹⁶² for women's empowerment, mainstreaming and networking, and has been adopted by DLSP and subsequent projects.
187. **Agricultural research in NARO under ATAAS led to a range of technologies being disseminated, some of which were innovative in the Ugandan setting.**¹⁶³ The Competitive Grants Scheme was an effective way to broaden stakeholder involvement in agricultural research and tap into private sector skills. It also supported 91 collaborative public-private investment partnerships that have expanded the scope of research and introduced competition and clearer objective-setting and monitoring. While these innovations can be accorded to ATAAS, IFAD's role can be seen as minimal given that its funds were mainly spent on procuring vehicles and training for extension services (see Box 6).
188. **Mobile plant clinics have been a new approach to bringing scientific knowledge to farmers** in PRELNOR.¹⁶⁴ Extension staff are trained as "plant doctors" who train farmers to make correct diagnoses of pests, diseases and mineral deficiency in crop fields. The plant doctors link farmers to soil testing services and provide them with recommendations on management options.
189. **There have also been some lost opportunities for innovation.** Under ATAAS, the early plans to strengthen the NAADS legacy of demand-led extension services, which had been seen as highly innovative in the 2000s, were dropped in favour of more conventional public sector-led extension delivery. IFAD has begun to use GIS and satellite imagery and drones better for road planning, but this needs to be taken further under NOSP/NOPP. In rural finance product and service development, greater use of ITC for mobile money and electronic banking could have been pursued.¹⁶⁵ Greater support for producer group and miller contracts would have enhanced the menu of project innovations and represents a missed opportunity.
190. Therefore, overall the CSPE rates **innovation** as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)** since many of the innovations noted in project reviews in fact originate prior to the CSPE period and even though some have been further adapted under the evaluation period these cases do not constitute substantive examples of innovation.

B.2. Scaling up¹⁶⁶

191. IFAD defines scaling up as the extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and other agencies. The potential for scaling up or IFAD

¹⁶² GALS, Practical Guide for Transforming Gender and Unequal Power Relations in Value Chains, Oxfam Novib 2014.

¹⁶³ 198 technological innovations were disseminated, exceeding the project target of 110 by 80 per cent. These innovations spanned yield, nutrition and climate-smart, high adaptation as well as labour-saving technologies (project performance evaluation ATAAS).

¹⁶⁴ Household mentoring and mobile plant clinics were presented at the East and Southern Africa Knowledge and Learning Event in Kenya in October 2019, and will be selected for publication by the IFAD Strategy and Knowledge Division.

¹⁶⁵ PROFIRA had expectations that its partnership with BoU would support innovations in information technology and communications for banking (ITC) and financial literacy, but limited action to support ITC innovation.

¹⁶⁶ According to IFAD's definition, scaling up is when the Government, another donor, private sector or other stakeholders, mobilize resources to increase the results of an activity initially funded by IFAD. Instead, the term "replication" is used when a new IFAD-funded project includes approaches already tested by IFAD. There may be cases where both scaling up and replication are done.

transforming small projects into larger ones are not considered. Thus, household mentoring in PRELNOR would not be considered as the scaling up of DLSP results.

192. **There are some examples of scaling up that have occurred beyond IFAD projects.** Though not rated separately until 2017, the earlier projects such as CAIIP1, DLSP and RFSP were not found to have produced innovations that were subsequently scaled up outside of IFAD investments according to their PCRVs. There are, however, four scaling up examples elaborated below.
193. Following the experiences of VODP1 and VODP2, **oil palm nucleus plantations** have been started and there has been Government discussion of employing this modality in other commodities.¹⁶⁷ The Government's new NDP3 states that 4P partnerships will be pursued under the nucleus estate model.¹⁶⁸
194. **Household mentoring and GALS methodologies** have been replicated to some extent by other actors in Uganda such as with NGOs like UCA, the Community Organisation for Rural Enterprise Activity Management¹⁶⁹ and Participatory Ecological Land Use Management,¹⁷⁰ although there are obstacles in terms of the time and cost that have prevented their wider uptake. Within IFAD, there have been important lesson learning across country programmes and regions. This is because of the toolkit prepared from Uganda experiences, and learning routes that have exposed IFAD project staff from other countries to these methodologies, for example Malawi, Sudan, Rwanda and Nepal –countries that went on to adopt household methodologies in IFAD-supported loan programmes.¹⁷¹
195. **Improved agricultural technologies** developed through ATAAS-funded adaptive research at ZARDIs have been scaled up in Uganda and the wider region, using District Agricultural Research Support Teams and Multi Stakeholder Innovation Platforms (MSIPs).¹⁷² Similarly, under PRELNOR, seed multiplication has occurred through farmer groups using ZARDI foundation seed beyond the supported project groups. The CSPE field mission also found some evidence of non-supported farmers groups adopting production and processing methods that have arisen from the 4P approach in VODP2.
196. Based on field interviews with district staff, IFAD approaches to strengthen SACCOs and CSCGs have been adopted by DLG DCOs and DCDOs as well as PSPs to strengthen non-project SACCOs and groups.
197. **Non-lending activities are a key driver for scaling up innovations and results.** Some grants that supported activities within projects have aimed at explicit scaling up of good practices (for example the Global Environment Facility-funded SLM activities under ATAAS and the World Overview of Conservation Approaches and Technologies (WOCAT) /Uganda Landcare Network supported climate-resilient agricultural practices in PRELNOR that promoted replication of conservation technologies¹⁷³). These are discussed in chapter IV which also highlighted the limited time available to the ICO for partnership building and policy engagement to facilitate the uptake of IFAD approaches.
198. Overall, the number of examples of scaling up beyond IFAD's projects merit a rating of **moderately satisfactory (4)**. More effective scaling up could have occurred if

¹⁶⁷ Interview with VODP2 PMU.

¹⁶⁸ NDP3, p. 70.

¹⁶⁹ Community Organisation for Rural Enterprise Activity Management, GALS in savings and lending groups. Case Study in Uganda, 2013.

¹⁷⁰ GIZ interview.

¹⁷¹ Interview, IFAD headquarters staff. IFAD's gender team in headquarters also identified household methodologies champions from Uganda (from NGOs involved in grants and from some rural communities) and used them as a pool of experts to assist other projects (in other countries).

¹⁷² ATAAS PCR.

¹⁷³ Overview of engagement of PRELNOR in scaling sustainable land management activities, June 2020 by J. Tukahirwa.

stronger knowledge management efforts to share results and lessons learned beyond IFAD to its partners could have been achieved (see chapter IV.A).

B.3. Gender equality and women's empowerment and youth

199. **Project gender strategies have become more comprehensive over time in line with IFAD instruments to mainstream gender and implement gender transformative approaches.** The evaluation found a high level of commitment across the portfolio to implement gender strategies in line with national policy to enhance more equitable participation of women and youth.¹⁷⁴ The country portfolio has also taken a significant step towards promoting gender transformative approaches through household mentoring and GALS, albeit to varying degrees. Dedicated officers or gender focal points ensured the implementation of these strategies, however, according to CSPE field mission interviews, the quality of implementation and results could have been improved through more technical implementation support on IFAD missions.
200. **The portfolio has seen participation rates of women showing an increasing trend over the years** from 30 per cent to 50 per cent targets, with some components such as PROFIRA CSCGs achieving 74 per cent women's participation. All the projects ensured that women and youth participated in the trainings, in farmer groups, community-based financial institutions, stakeholder meetings in production, marketing, and in household mentoring.
201. Gender equitable participation was enhanced by interventions that positively impacted women's lives especially choice of crops mainly grown by women, and by using quotas for female and youth participation. Value chain agriculture focused on oil seeds such as sesame and sunflower that are traditionally seen as women's crops helped to increase project outcomes for women. The strategy to mobilize groups through VSLAs, rural entities where women are already traditionally mobilized, helped PROFIRA, VODP2 and PRELNOR reach substantial numbers of women.
202. **IFAD portfolio has registered positive outcomes in ownership and access to assets by women, albeit, with limitations for decision-making regarding land.** Women have invested in assets, including ox-traction, land for production (buying or renting plots for cultivation) built or upgraded their homes, bought phones, bicycles and motorcycles. A number of beneficiaries interviewed during the CSPE field mission had invested in animals for commercial and nutrition purposes, including cows, pigs, goats and poultry. In VODP2, women and men received fertilizers and other oil palm implements and the participation criteria requiring the out-grower farmer to show evidence of ownership of the land was a driver for families to register land in women's names. The ceiling of five acres per member also resulted in benefits to women.¹⁷⁵ However, there is less evidence to show that women controlled the resources from oil palm sales and gaps still exist in asset ownership by women. For example, in PROFIRA, women underlined the difficulty of convincing their husbands to offer their land as collateral to facilitate access to loans from SACCOs or a commercial bank.¹⁷⁶
203. **IFAD projects addressed gender barriers with respect to access to finance but was limited in addressing constraints to women's participation in SACCOs.** The projects provided opportunities for women to save money, borrow or earn from shares in group savings and credit schemes. Projects registered increased access to income sources. VODP2 linked 6,231 individual farmers to financial institutions for credit, of which 3,528 were female, most of it used for expanding production capabilities, starting up small business, purchasing animals and seed, and

¹⁷⁴ Aligned to the Uganda National Gender Policy 2007 on women's participation and the Local Government Act 1997 that provides for women's representation in Local Councils Uganda.

¹⁷⁵ VODP PCR 2020.

¹⁷⁶ PROFIRA Nov 2019 supervision report.

hiring labour.¹⁷⁷ ATAAS also reduced income inequality between male and female beneficiaries. PROFIRA has seen a growth of women accessing savings services from 34 per cent in 2014 to 51 per cent in 2018, and credit services from 34 to 58 per cent.¹⁷⁸ Yet, the number of women borrowers in SACCOs was at 32 per cent, slightly less than the targeted 33 per cent.¹⁷⁹ Constraints to women's participation in SACCOs and SACCO leadership have not been actively addressed in PROFIRA or RFSP, and gender barriers in this area remain poorly addressed.

204. **Improved access to knowledge and services created positive outcomes for women, with some limitations of decision-making due to women's more limited control over assets.** Women highlighted positive benefits such as increased capacity to manage their finances, better management of their groups, record keeping, planning and visioning, use of savings and credit and managing their assets. Women have improved their knowledge of value chain and market-oriented approaches and advisory services, as well as environmental protection by making fuel-saving stoves and building agri-business skills such as manufacturing cooking oil, soap, soybean cakes, packaging soy flour, and bulk marketing (PROFIRA, VODP2, PRELNOR, ATAAS).
205. **Gender disparities, however, disadvantage women more than men** in terms of accessing opportunities for hosting training sites, improved seed multiplication sites or farmer learning platforms because of the preconditions that many women cannot meet.¹⁸⁰ ATAAS required a host farmer to meet 70 per cent of the value of the market-oriented enterprise, while the vegetable oil subsector (VODP2) learning platform required the host farmer to have land, invest some resources, and also become a learning point for others. This was difficult for women who did not have decision-making power over household production resources.
206. **There is positive evidence of women holding leadership roles in project structures although concrete data on gender composition is often missing.** PRELNOR design set 40 per cent as the minimum quota for leadership of women,¹⁸¹ while women's representation in leadership of PROFIRA SACCO boards was 35 per cent, above the design target of 33 per cent. Findings from SACCOs during the CSPE field mission indicate that women had an increasing role in SACCO leadership. However, these are limited examples amid a general picture of insufficient monitoring of the quality of women's leadership. Some groups that met in the field had passed bylaws that reduced the minimum shareholding and capped the maximum in order to prevent dominance by well-off members, and to guarantee that poorer members have a voice, a measure that would also benefit women who have lower income. The CSPE field interviews also confirmed that membership in groups had helped women build their self-esteem and confidence, acquire friends, and learn new skills.¹⁸²
207. **While some positive changes in social norms around workload re-distribution in households have been reported, the extent of this is not documented, and women's workloads largely remain the same.** The CSPE mission interviews with beneficiaries were able to confirm positive changes happening with respect to women hiring labour, investment in labour-saving

¹⁷⁷ MAAIF/IFAD: 2020. Impact of Oil Seeds Development Activities 2012–2019 – A compendium of VODP2 Success Stories, January 2020.

¹⁷⁸ CSPE Field Mission Interview.

¹⁷⁹ The benefits for women from SACCOs nationally remain low, given that the national average for women participation in SACCOs is around 30 per cent. Bank of Uganda/GIZ FSD Programme, Agricultural Finance Year Books 2011, Coping with Economic Realities.5.2 "SACCOs and MFIs: How a Focus on Gender Can Improve SACCOs' services to their members, By Lisa Peterlechner.

¹⁸⁰ CSPE Field Mission interviews with VODP2 staff shows that Host Farmers for VODP2 were 26 per cent females compared to men at 74 per cent, community-based trainers and lead farmers were 33 per cent women and 67 per cent male, and yet the farmer composition in VODP2 oil seed was 60 per cent women and 40 per cent men, and 39 per cent women and 61 per cent men in oil palm.

¹⁸¹ PRELNOR project design report page 54.

¹⁸² See VODP2 PCR 2020.

technologies and, to a limited extent, reports of men taking up some farm roles previously performed by women.¹⁸³ Gender equitable workloads and workload distribution have also been discussed through value chain training.¹⁸⁴ In Kalangala, it was reported that women reduced their workload by using income from oil palm produce sales to hire farm labour.¹⁸⁵ Field mission group discussions in eastern Uganda also reported using credit from groups to purchase labour-saving assets such as oxen and ox-ploughs that increased women's cultivated land acreage. VODP2 provided some post-harvest equipment such as coffee and maize mills, rice and soybean hullers or threshers that have helped reduce women's labour from laborious traditional post-harvest handling chores. Fuel-saving stoves also reduced women's time for collecting firewood. Women's access to project-supplied, labour-saving technology, however, has been limited because social norms disadvantaged women's ability to become host farmers for demonstrations and acquire ox-drawn implements such as ox-carts, and weeders and shellers, or grain mills.¹⁸⁶

208. **The Uganda programme was at the forefront of development in gender transformative approaches** with the piloting of household mentoring and GALS in DLSP, funded by an IFAD grant to Oxfam Novib. Projects which properly incorporated household mentoring and GALS in the design (DLSP, PRELNOR), have had positive results because they also developed relevant strategies and budgeted for the activities, while those that did not have struggled with the update of GALS (PROFIRA and VODP2). PRELNOR added value to create a hybrid of household mentoring and GALS by adding the GALS methodology challenge tree to the household mentoring (situation analysis) as a way to introduce gender issues right from the start while working with vulnerable households. Cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, environment and nutrition were introduced to beneficiaries through household mentoring. Cross-learning on household mentoring from PRELNOR to VODP2 occurred with PRELNOR taking the lead in training trainers from VODP2 in household mentoring,¹⁸⁷ although the implementation of this cross-project linkage started late and was affected by COVID-19 restrictions. PROFIRA, on the other hand, largely relied on general gender sensitization, which was part of the training areas in the VSLA methodology, except in three PROFIRA districts where the project contracted the Community, a service provider already trained in GALS by Oxfam Novib.
209. **Evidence suggests gender relations have generally improved, while gender roles at household level remain the same.** CSPE evaluators were informed by focus group discussions that in households with IFAD project group members: women were more respected by men (and husbands); that they tended to have reduced frequency of gender-based conflicts; and that decision-making between men and women (husband and wife) was more mutual compared to those not in groups because of interventions such as household mentoring and joint visioning.
210. **Youth have been mobilized to participate in some of the projects and have had some benefits** (DLSP, RFSP, PROFIRA and VODP2). PROFIRA has exceeded youth targets. From a target of 10 per cent for SACCOs and 15 per cent of CSCGs (a total of 194,728 youth), PROFIRA SACCOs achieved 10 per cent youth membership, 43 per cent of membership of new CSCGs, and 34 per cent youth membership of mature CSCGs. The youth participated in value chain training, financial literacy training and business skills development. RFSP reported that about 24 per cent of

¹⁸³ PCRS and Reports – VODP2, DLSP, PRELNOR and CSPE field mission interviews.

¹⁸⁴ Moreover, the projects that implemented Household Methodologies were consistent in using the gender balanced tree from GALS methodology with individual households and with groups to address the gender disparities in workload at the household level. (PRELNOR, DLSP, PROFIRA with the Community Organisation for Rural Enterprise Activity Management and International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, VODP2 in east and northern Uganda, VODP2 – Oil Palm).

¹⁸⁵ VODP2 2020 PCR.

¹⁸⁶ Interviews with PRELNOR and VODP2 PMU.

¹⁸⁷ Interviews in Kalangala.

the beneficiaries were youth,¹⁸⁸ while NOPP's design in contrast plans to have 50 per cent youth, with 30 per cent youth to benefit from loan financing for oil palm.¹⁸⁹

211. **Youth may offer labour in value chain production, yet earlier projects typically had no clear strategy for addressing constraints to youth involvement around labour and land issues.** PRELNOR has been more deliberate in targeting youth.¹⁹⁰ The main gap here is that "exclusively youth groups" have not been well integrated. The CSPE field mission concluded that while projects tried to include youth, the evidence of youth access to assets and influence in IFAD projects was weak. However, in all groups visited during the CSPE mission, it was evident that the projects have adjusted to accommodate the youth within mixed groups, and although age data are collected at the group level, there is limited analysis of the status of youth participation beyond the numbers, and data are not aggregated at the project level. Evidence of youth influence in decision-making, especially in mixed groups with adults, is anecdotal and many of the youth do not hold leadership positions on executive committees of groups.¹⁹¹
212. **Summary.** The evaluation found a high level of commitment across the portfolio to implement gender interventions in line with the IFAD Policy on gender equality and women's empowerment and relevant Ugandan national policies. The evidence shows positive results in women's access to assets, income generation and leadership roles. The interventions, however, have largely concentrated on increasing the numbers of women and youth, and have fallen short in addressing the interests of youth. Systemic gender constraints and power relations continue to prevent empowerment and transformation of women and youth. While sex-disaggregated data have been collected, most projects fell short on aggregating age data for youth and have not collected project-wide data on gender outcomes. This is partly constrained by insufficient resources and investment in relevant gender actions and limited technical capacity for gender mainstreaming among most PMUs. **Gender equality and women's empowerment is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**

B.4. Environment and natural resources management

213. **ENRM has been a strong and mostly successful theme for the projects that addressed this topic at design,** but especially in VODP2, PRELNOR and ATAAS. Other projects, such as PROFIRA and RSFP, were not designed to have an impact on this domain. On the other hand, CAIIP1 was required to conduct an environmental impact assessment and develop an environmental management plan on the basis of which NEMA concluded that mitigation measures that were implemented largely responded to recommendations. Furthermore, while ENRM was not directly addressed by DLSP, it did ensure that road contractors rehabilitated gravel borrow pits and installed drainage on rehabilitated CARs, although the PCR also noted that trees planted on roadsides were cut and inferred that the adoption of animal traction led to a reduction in soil degradation.
214. ATAAS and PRELNOR performed very well in this domain and activities have resulted in **improved access to natural resources and a growing empowerment of communities to manage these resources in a sustainable manner.** ATAAS covered 20,930 hectares of land with sustainable land management practices and structures, significantly exceeding the target of 11,000 hectares. Key outputs featured highlands terracing and rehabilitation of degraded watersheds as a result of

¹⁸⁸ RFSP PCR (2014).

¹⁸⁹ NOPP 2017 project design report.

¹⁹⁰ PRELNOR captures youth beneficiaries at three points: a) youth as household heads for mentoring (vulnerable households) where 21 per cent benefit, way below project targets; b) at the farmer group level within mixed groups where 40 per cent participate (aged 18–35 years); and c) through innovative interventions such as the mechanization and post-harvest handling grants where youth are engaged to manage and operate machinery that requires a lot of labour.

¹⁹¹ CSPE Mission Interviews with farmer group leaders indicated that in many groups, youth are represented on the executive committee as members but do not hold substantive positions of authority and their level of contribution to decision-making is not clearly spelt out.

adopted practices and structures established by communities, with a final coverage of 3,391 hectares and 3,337 hectares (771 and 556 per cent) of respective targets.¹⁹² Achievements under the SLM were significant to the extent that they impacted not only yields, but both beneficiary and non-beneficiary farmer groups, especially in eastern and western Uganda.¹⁹³

215. The ATAAS PPE reported other achievements that included the **establishment of a dedicated environmental and social safeguards (ESS) function within NARO** to address mainstreaming of environmental issues in all its research activities. Furthermore, MAAIF developed a draft ESS management policy, guidelines and plans for operationalizing the system. The guidelines include an ESS manual; environmental and social risk management procedures, including the environmental and social grant screening checklist and risk register template; and management plans for biodiversity, hazardous waste and pests. The CSPE field mission found that DLGs had established dedicated staff to coordinate SLM issues. Furthermore, in addition to the passing of a number of ordinances and bylaws, DLGs also mainstreamed SLM practices into their annual work planning and budgeting processes.
216. Major natural resources management issues in the PRELNOR target area included increasing variability and uneven distribution of rainfall; soil fertility declines; deforestation; encroachment on wetlands; bushfires; lack of access to inputs and tools for SLM as well as low access to water and sanitation.¹⁹⁴ **A number of these have been mitigated through actions that include the provision of technical and financial support to empower communities to sustainably manage their natural resources.** These activities include the development of community-based natural resource management plans, the distribution of rural energy technologies, testing of SLM practices, the promotion of pit latrines and roads with reforestation and water harvesting incorporated into their designs. Achievements registered through these activities are significant¹⁹⁵ and also include partnership with WOCAT.¹⁹⁶ The project is also working through NARO and the Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience International's (CABI) Plantwise programme to conduct demonstrations for farmers on the use of a fertilizer optimization tool that allows for the optimal application of fertilizers on crops to give the optimal returns within the farmer's economic means and with minimal impact on the environment.
217. Under VODP2, **while evidence on deforestation and changes in carbon stocks is incomplete, preliminary evidence suggests that deforestation rates have decreased.**¹⁹⁷ VODP2's main stakeholders (the PMU, KOPGT and OPUL) have made efforts to ensure the sustainable production of oil palm, and there is clearly willingness to ensure continual improvement.¹⁹⁸ Strong concerns from environmental groups about the introduction of oil palm has led to extensive environmental assessments to examine loss of biodiversity and land acquisition issues. VODP2 has

¹⁹² The technologies selected for promotion and scaling-up were terraces, contour and grass bunds, conservation agriculture (low-till), rehabilitation and/or reclamation of degraded watersheds, agroforestry woodlots, agronomic and vegetative SLM practices (e.g. mulching, intercropping, rotations, integrated nutrient management, grassland improvement), small-scale irrigation, and water harvesting.

¹⁹³ Interviews with MAAIF, NARO and DLG officials during the July 2020 mission.

¹⁹⁴ Project design report, appendix 12.

¹⁹⁵ According to the MTR, the preparation of CBNRM plans has enabled over 400 communities to gain skills in better NRM practices. A total of 217 CBNRM plans had been funded by MTR and a data monitoring system has been set up to record outcomes and sustainability – although training is still required of extension staff on data collection methodologies. Beneficiaries of the RETs reported that they have led to a reduction of fuelwood use by 50 to 60 per cent thus reducing pressure on woodlots and communal tree cover.

¹⁹⁶ WOCAT complements the project's work in SLM through their local partners, Uganda Land Care, and has identified and documented 34 SLM approaches within the PRELNOR target areas for scale up. Currently, 54 pilot sites are being established to demonstrate some of those approaches (mulching; compost; energy-saving cook stoves; conservation farming basins for soil and water conservation; apiculture; aquaculture; intercropping; agroforestry; fruit growing; cover cropping; reduced tillage; and tree nurseries).

¹⁹⁷ NOPP SECAP Review Note draft for CPMT, IFAD, 2017.

¹⁹⁸ A. Inamdar – Willets (2016) Environmental and Social Audit of VODP2 on Bugala Island, Kalagala, Uganda.

responded with a series of studies that have examined these issues and led to mitigation and protection measures, and also to an environmental compliance certificate from NEMA in 2015.¹⁹⁹ Recent studies found there to be low impact on land reserved for forest in Kalangala.²⁰⁰ Efforts to continue the good practice into NOPP have been stated in the NOPP project design report, including compliance with the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil principles.²⁰¹

218. **Overall, ENRM is rated moderately satisfactory (4)** based on the positive achievements of ATAAS, PRELNOR and VODP2, while less evidently effective results have occurred under other projects.

B.5. Adaptation to climate change

219. Significant dependence on agriculture and natural resources, coupled with high rates of poverty and environmental degradation, and combined with the country's increasingly strong but still fragile DLG governance structure, leave Uganda vulnerable to climate change impacts. Climate variability and change pose significant challenges in terms of the availability and quality of the country's water resources and pose significant risks to its national food and nutrition security as well as its foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports.
220. **Under the IFAD portfolio, several projects targeted climate change adaptation in varying degrees.** ATAAS, which aimed at supporting Government's efforts to reduce risks arising from climate change and land degradation; VODP2 whose oil palm and oil seeds activities are based on rain-fed practices, leaving them vulnerable to climate change risks; PRELNOR whose design recognized that climate change challenges beneficiaries' livelihoods in northern Uganda and may substantially impact food security and household income; DLSP redesigned access roads to be all-weather to mitigate the risk of increased flooding and heavy rains; and PROFIRA, which has sensitization programmes with environment modules on protecting natural resources to combat climate change.
221. **A number of climate change adaption achievements were registered although mainly at local scale rather than at national or policy level.** The most significant could be the SLM practices promoted under ATAAS to avert climatic risks to agricultural production, with an estimated sequestration of 1,964,831 mt of carbon with a value of US\$151 million.²⁰² NARO also produced a number of drought-resistant varieties and supported 24 MSIPs that, in part, addressed climate change and adaptation. Furthermore, in collaboration with the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, the Department of Agricultural Extension Services is putting in place an e-weather information system and has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Uganda National Meteorological Agency to put up 15 weather stations to provide climate information to farmers as supported currently by PRELNOR.
222. Under PRELNOR, other relevant approaches are being introduced that include the introduction of stress-tolerant crop varieties of cassava, maize, beans and rice; dissemination of agroforestry technologies as well as soil and water conservation practices; promotion of renewable energy technologies such as fuel-saving stoves in households and institutions, offering both mitigation and adaptation benefits; and household income diversification through supporting enterprises such as propagation

¹⁹⁹ The PMU and IFAD have also piloted real-time deforestation monitoring in collaboration with the European Space Agency and the firm Satelligence.

²⁰⁰ Nangendo, G. 2018. Land use changes (1990–2015) in Kalangala and Buvuma districts, southern Uganda. In: Ssemmanda, R. and Opige, M.O. (eds.). Oil palm plantations in forest landscapes: impacts, aspirations and ways forward in Uganda. Wageningen, the Netherlands: Tropenbos International.

²⁰¹ The Roundtable on Sustainable Oil Palm manages a scheme for Certified Sustainable Palm Oil, the largest certification scheme, which currently covers 17 per cent of global palm oil production and includes 134,000 smallholders. Uganda is not yet included.

²⁰² According to the ICCR, based on an estimated value of a ton of carbon emission (tCO₂e) for 2018 of US\$77 was applied using the ex-ante carbon-balance tool.

and selling of seeds. The scale and impact of these measures are yet to be measured, although initial results are positive.²⁰³

223. **DLSP improved the resilience and durability of CARs by upgrading them to an all-weather design that incorporated reforestation and water harvesting with the objective of adaptation to climate change and increased resilience.** This has been followed in PRELNOR, although implementation has been affected by increased design and construction costs and challenges in adhering to NEMA guidelines as well as to IFAD's evolving SECAP. The most recent SECAP guidance introduced in 2019 requires new and more stringent compliance measures; however, there have been difficulties in applying the measures retrospectively, for example with the first batch of PRELNOR roads. There are **important issues here related to how SECAP compliance is supported and monitored, and how links need to be better forged with national environmental management systems.**²⁰⁴
224. **There is limited evidence in the rural finance sector regarding climate adaption measures** although under PROFIRA many SACCOs having special loan products for solar energy, some of which were observed during the field mission. VODP2's adaptation to climate change were largely achieved through the introduction of improved seed varieties that mature faster and are more drought tolerant, as well as conducting demonstrations of better soil and water management.²⁰⁵ Under oil palm, the project promoted the planting of leguminous cover crops, front stacking, implement circle weeding, zero-tillage, zero burning and forest protection through boundary roads.²⁰⁶ The July 2020 mission observed significant achievement in most of these activities and believes they will conspicuously contribute to adaptation and resilience objectives of the said projects.
225. **Overall, adaptation to climate change is rated moderately satisfactory (4)** based on the positive results achieved at the local level, while acknowledging that measures with greater scale will be required, and stronger links between NEMA and the Ministry of Environment needed to be made if IFAD's investments are to effectively address this major concern in the future, especially given that NOSP and NOPP are category A projects.

C. Overall portfolio achievement

226. IFAD's portfolio has been built around a highly relevant set of COSOP objectives and has been effectively sequenced such that the more recent interventions have built on earlier projects using their experience, lessons and staff. **At the same time, IFAD has moved away from broad community-based engagement towards a more focused value chain approach.** This has proved effective in bringing greater geographical coherence and private sector participation. The sustained support for vegetable oil production and rural finance have led to positive economic returns while building notable partnerships with the private sector. The limited levels of development partner funding have been well compensated by growing private sector investment. Targeting has been well addressed, except for youth where more specific interventions could have been conceived and integrated.
227. **The shift to value chain support has allowed IFAD to build private sector partnerships and raise farmer incomes substantially, however the level of beneficiary outreach has declined and the cost per beneficiary has risen** substantially as a result of this shift. This has been partly offset by the continued inclusion of access roads from the start of the CSPE period through to the new round of projects and also the reach of the inclusive rural finance investments.

²⁰³ Interviews and ASAP review mission report, June 2019.

²⁰⁴ Interviews with IFAD, PRELNOR MTR team and staff.

²⁰⁵ The oil palm component experienced water deficits between design and MTR of up to 350 mm, caused by poor rainfall distribution in 2011. This was significant considering that, in general, for every 100 mm of water deficit, there is a yield drop of 10 per cent (MTR paras. 16 and 17).

²⁰⁶ Supervision mission report September 2019.

228. **Incomes and assets have risen for project beneficiaries, which is an important result in the context of an agricultural sector showing low growth over the past decade.** Rising domestic vegetable oil production in particular has been a key strategic success of the portfolio given the heavy reliance on imported oil. Improving crop production and household food security have also shown generally broad improvement although the surveys underpinning these changes have not clearly attributed the results to IFAD’s investments.
229. **Efficiency has been challenged by delayed implementation, slow procurement and some financial irregularities, although positive economic returns were obtained.** Project extensions have enabled the achievement of full loan disbursement and re-designs have helped improve resource use in light of changing circumstances. Project operations have been dramatically affected in the past nine months by the COVID-19 pandemic.
230. The portfolio has supported innovations that were developed under the previous COSOP and while it has adapted some of them further, there have been **limited examples of new innovations and some opportunities missed.** Scaling up has occurred to some extent for value chains, household mentoring and technology development. **For gender and youth, the focus has been on improving participation rather than addressing more systemic constraints.** Environment and climate change has been well addressed by part of the portfolio, especially in relation to sustainable aspects of agricultural productivity, although interventions have been mainly at the local level, while these topics were less in evidence in others.
231. **Overall project achievement is rated 4 (moderately satisfactory),** which is consistent with those of individual projects except ATAAS (annex II).

Table 10
Assessment of project portfolio achievement

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>CSPE rating</i>
Rural poverty Impact	4
Project performance	4
Relevance	5
Effectiveness	4
Efficiency	3
Sustainability of benefits	4
Other performance criteria	
Innovation	3
Scaling up	4
Gender equality and women’s empowerment	4
Environment and natural resources management	4
Adaption to climate change	4
Overall project portfolio achievement	4

Key points (chapter III)

- Project designs have been well aligned with national and IFAD policies in particular around addressing regional poverty dimensions and growing value chain approaches, although pro-poor aspects such as land and youth could have been better addressed.
- Outreach has been strong, with good technology adoption and up-take of inclusive finance. Service delivery has been affected by reforms to extension and the role of OWC and most recently the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Efficiency has been good in terms of disbursements, project management costs, project sequencing and rates of return, but at the same time affected by unnecessary procurement delays, staffing gaps and financial mismanagement weaknesses.
- Although there are concerns over the robustness of impact survey data, beneficiaries generally show higher incomes, assets, food security and productivity. Grassroots production and credit-based groups have been strengthened. Policy impacts have been generally limited aside from microfinance.
- With growing profitability and productivity farmers should be able to sustain their incomes especially in vegetable oil, while better designed roads will provide access for longer and many credit groups are diversifying and viable. Much depends on the ability of local government to expand support as well as on farmers' willingness to pay for private advisory services.
- Efforts at innovation and scaling up have been fairly modest and mainly built on the successes of predecessor projects, such as with mentoring and value chains.
- Gender and youth have been addressed through increasing numbers without addressing their underlying constraints. Mentoring and GALS have been valuable but on a relatively modest scale due to their intensive nature.
- ENRM and climate change has been addressed unevenly, although positive results occurred at the local level.

IV. Assessment of non-lending activities

232. The term "non-lending activities" refers to actions supported by IFAD that are not organized directly under the investment projects but are instrumental to enhancing the programme's development effectiveness. The assessment covers knowledge management, partnership building and country-level policy engagement as well as a sample of grants that covered Uganda. The lines between the activities under investment financing and non-lending activities are not always clear-cut. Investment projects often finance activities relating to knowledge management or policy engagement with broader implications beyond the specific projects. As such, this section also discusses activities under the investment projects where appropriate.
233. According to the 2013 COSOP, non-lending activities would have the aim of enhancing the country programme coherence, including the production of evidence from projects to inform policy decision-making. The country director was to lead non-lending activities and play a key role in promoting synergies and complementarities among the projects with the Uganda COSOP Team serving as a forum for strategic discussion of policy issues, lessons and best practices. The Country Programme Management Team (CPMT) – consisting of key project management staff – would provide a forum for cross-learning and exchange among the projects.
234. **Over the COSOP period, fluctuations in the ICO staffing have had implications on IFAD's capacity to engage in portfolio management and non-lending activities.** The main changes were the move of the country director from headquarters to the ICO in Kampala in 2014 and then to the regional hub in Nairobi in 2018, and finally the decision to no longer fund a knowledge management officer from 2016. The efficient use of a small country team noted in the 2013 CPE continues with the supervision of projects divided among the CD who covers the value chain projects, the CPO who covers the community development and decentralization projects and the programme officer recruited to administer the European Union grant Small and Medium Sized Agricultural Development Fund (Uganda Yield Fund) covering rural finance. The other project officer recruited for the European Union grant covers financial management across the country programme. However, **this efficient division limits the knowledge exchange across the country programme so that it is a portfolio of value chain, community development and rural finance projects that lacks an overall country programme approach or exchanges on non-lending activities.** Finally, while the 2013 CPE commended the IFAD country programme in Uganda for allocating budgetary resources for non-lending activities, these resources have declined precipitously from 2016 until 2020 without the compensatory staff time resources (see chapter V.A.3 paras. 283–286).

A. Knowledge management

235. **The 2013 COSOP implies a knowledge management strategy that draws on project-level monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems and structures to promote learning among projects and provide inputs for policy dialogue.** Based on the 2013 COSOP, knowledge management was to be mainstreamed into the country programmes to: facilitate cross-programme and peer-to-peer learning and exchange; document lessons and good practices; and provide inputs for pro-poor policy dialogue. The instruments would be the COSOP results framework and project monitoring systems; project level knowledge management strategies and capacities; the Uganda COSOP team; and the CPMT.
236. **The COSOP'S implicit knowledge management strategy lacked a stable architecture and resources for consistent implementation.** While the 2013 CPE mentions a communications strategy since 2008, it was not apparent during this evaluation and no country-level knowledge management strategy was prepared during the COSOP period. The limited resources and attention to knowledge management noted by the 2013 CPE was initially remedied in 2011 with the

appointment of a consultant in the ICO as the knowledge management officer. However, after her departure in 2015, resources for knowledge management and communications declined precipitously and consistently until 2020. Non-staff resources for knowledge management and communications declined from US\$38,553 in 2013, to US\$6,075 in 2017 and was zero by 2020. The regional knowledge management architecture also fluctuated in this period with the abolishment of the P4 regional knowledge management officer position in the ESA division at headquarters in 2013 resulting in the Uganda knowledge management officer also covering – regionally. After her departure, the knowledge management officer was not replaced in the ICO or regionally. In 2020, a knowledge management focal point was appointed in the subregional office in Nairobi from the Production, Markets and Inputs division.

237. **The ICO-based knowledge management officer primarily promoted knowledge management activities at the project level.** Originally working for SNV to implement a regional knowledge management grant to promote market access, she worked with VODP1 in 2010 to improve communications by documenting results from the field. Due to the reputational risks associated with oil palm, this knowledge management officer was initially recruited as a consultant to support communications in VODP1 to utilize project data and present results to journalists and other partners in order to address environmental issues surrounding oil palm. These knowledge management and communications activities proved effective in addressing negative media relating to environmental issues associated to oil palm production. In 2011, as knowledge management officer in the ICO, she continued to pursue an approach of drawing evidence from the projects, organizing knowledge exchange among project stakeholders, and presenting the knowledge to policy makers. Through this approach, PROFIRA also provided inputs relating to the COSOP objective to promote Tier IV regulations. The officer also leveraged regional grants that offered knowledge management opportunities for the projects and training for the project staff (e.g. learning route approach).
238. **Despite the lack of a documented knowledge management strategy and declining resources at the country level, knowledge management practices at the project level continued.** IFAD projects developed under the 2013 COSOP were all follow-up projects, and in many cases project staff also continued. From 2011 to 2015, the knowledge management officer promoted in all projects a knowledge management strategy and appointment of knowledge management officer and/or focal points. In most cases, the knowledge management focal point was also the M&E Officer. These focal points received training on knowledge management by the officer and through the various regional grants on knowledge management that she leveraged for the country programme. The continuity among the sequential projects meant that training done in the early 2013–2016 of project staff resulted in continued knowledge management practices and focal points in later projects.
239. **Continuity over various project cycles also contributed to the transferral of lessons learned, especially among more recent projects.** The sequencing of projects provides reiterated learning opportunities and tangible evidence for adjustments if needed. Many lessons learned were transferred from VODP 1/2 to successor projects NOPP and NOSP, and between RFSP and PROFIRA, albeit few through formal knowledge management channels. A cross-programme lesson learned from RFSP integrated into VODP 2 (and later NOSP and NOPP) was to adopt a CSCG approach to smallholder finance after its failure to establish a guarantee fund for securing loans from formal financial institutions. However, the older DLSP did not incorporate lessons learned from other IFAD projects in matters of land tenure.
240. **While cross-programme and peer-to-peer learning and exchanges were notable, applied pro-poor policy dialogue was more limited.** The approach to strengthen M&E and use monitoring systems to derive data for communications and lessons leading to policy engagement is evident only for PROFIRA and VODP2.

Lessons from VODP's 4P approach were adopted in the Government's ASSP (2015/16–2019/20) and used as a basis for developing the agriculture sector value chains strategy under the ASSP 2020/21–2024/25 and the NDP3. Lessons from VODP2 were adopted in the design of the National Agriculture Extension Policy (2018) and the draft Agriculture Finance and Insurance Policy. PROFIRA also utilized its M&E and knowledge management to contribute to the Government national policy agenda by drafting SACCO/CSCG guidelines and strategy paper.

241. **For most projects, the focus of knowledge management has remained on communication rather than strengthening M&E systems and drawing from them for knowledge management and policy dialogue with the Government.** One of the weak areas was the failure to use knowledge management and M&E outputs and successes to influence and engage other stakeholders such as donors beyond IFAD projects. The ICO attributed this to a lack of adequate financial and human resources at country level to conduct studies and convene wide stakeholder fora to share lessons and experiences. The time needed to develop knowledge management products was also an issue because it requires a person with the right capabilities to harness and build the approach – another indication of low capacity.
242. **The contribution of grant-funded knowledge management activities varied depending on the strength of their linkages with the lending programme.** knowledge management activities in four grants had an important influence on the country programme (public–private–producer partnerships [4Ps], OSSUP, SLM). For example, the 4Ps grant achieved the planned knowledge development and learning activities outlined in the project knowledge management strategies. Knowledge products comprised in-depth case studies, analysis papers and guidelines for practitioners. The OSSUP grant's knowledge management activities helped to address information asymmetries among value chain stakeholders. The grant on scaling-up SLM practices strongly contributed to knowledge management through the capacity building of PRELNOR staff and extension workers and the development of the national SLM database. **While evidence is limited on learning from earlier grants and projects, the mainstreaming of household methodologies provides a positive example shown in Box 4.**

Box 4

Household methodologies used in the Uganda country programme

DLSP benefitted from a small IFAD grant on household methodologies (Gender Justice in Pro-Poor Value Chain Development, 2009–2011) given to Oxfam Novib to develop the GALS methodology in western Uganda. The project was already implementing household mentoring to engage with poorer households and then district-level project implementers were trained in how to blend GALS into household mentoring. After an impact assessment of the small IFAD grant, the approach was rolled out by Oxfam Novib, with local partners in Uganda linked to NAADS, DLSP and VODP2 (as well as in Rwanda and Nigeria) with the support of a large IFAD grant (Community-led value chain development for gender justice and pro-poor wealth creation, 2011 to 2014). During this period, the IFAD gender team from the former Policy and Technical Advisory Division organized a workshop in Uganda, which contributed to the IFAD toolkit on household methodologies, used to promote the approach throughout the IFAD's wider loan portfolio. Within Uganda, cross-project learning, supported by IFAD grant-funded learning routes by Procasur as well as project staff now "specialized" in household methodologies, has contributed to mainstreaming household mentoring and GALS into subsequent loan programmes, such as PRELNOR, PROFIRA, VODP2, NOPP and NOSP.

Sources: Household methodologies stock-take; Community-led value chain development for gender justice and pro-poor wealth creation, Grant Results Sheet, 2017.

243. **The Uganda Yield Fund provides substantial knowledge and lessons learned related to rural pro-poor private sector and financial sector development.** IFAD's ability to attract US\$20.4 million is "proof of concept" for a single country, single-sector impact investment fund in Uganda, given an appropriately structured

fund.²⁰⁷ The Yield Fund experience encouraged the formation of IFAD's ABC fund and provided knowledge more generally to growing interest in IFAD of supporting non-programme financial investments. While the Yield Fund attracts considerable media attention and has participated in numerous and important forums, it has not had an internal programme to support a systemic means of capturing and disseminating lessons learned, investee experiences and development outcomes. This would be valuable to donors and farmer institutions in Uganda, regionally and internationally, as well as to existing and potential future funds.

244. **Summary.** Knowledge management efforts have been uneven over the 2013 COSOP period. Earlier projects designed under the previous COSOP show little evidence of knowledge management. The knowledge management officer in the ICO strengthened the knowledge management architecture within the projects designed under the 2013 COSOP and successfully promoted an approach of capturing data for communication. Grants linked to projects and sequential project designs has enabled learning from past projects and continued knowledge management practices among project staff, despite a steep decline in knowledge management resources. However, knowledge management at the country level (and in terms of non-lending) was limited by the overall weak knowledge management architecture, including *inter alia* the discontinuation of a knowledge management officer in the ICO and the lack of a knowledge management strategy. **Overall, knowledge management is rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3).**

B. Partnership-building

245. The 2013 COSOP defined the Government, rural organizations, the private sector and development partners as IFAD's key partners. Within government, MOFPED, MOLG and MAAIF were to continue to be principal partners while building a partnership with NEMA and the Ministry of Water and Environment. Rural organizations were to be given a more prominent role under the 2013 COSOP and their representatives would be members of the Uganda CPMT and steering groups for the design and oversight of IFAD-supported projects. Private sector partnership would continue to develop solid public-private partnerships (PPPs), especially in the vegetable oil sector and expand in other value chains. Multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) would be supported as forums for coordination and dialogue among value chain stakeholders.
246. Limited staffing in the ICO made partnership-building at the country level (beyond projects) challenging, especially with the country director in Nairobi. With the country director based in Kampala from 2014 to 2018, there was another full-time ICO-based staff resulting in more efficient management of tasks. The situation has deteriorated with the relocation of the country director to Nairobi. Partnerships are developed over time with regular interactions, including informal meetings. Often, IFAD does not participate in official events as the staff are engaged in supervision missions. The ICO also faces protocol challenges when only heads of agencies are invited. While international donors note that the country director visits when she is in Kampala, it is difficult to develop the relationship further on this ad hoc basis. For example, representatives of the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) based in Kampala have engaged in strategic planning meetings and supervision missions in districts where they have complementary activities – agricultural production (FAO) and post-harvesting and marketing (WFP) – resulting in strong bilateral Rome-based agency collaboration. IFAD is not part of this strategic Rome-based agency collaboration due to its overstretched staff and its engagement in different districts and activities.
247. **IFAD is a respected partner in the agriculture development partners group.** IFAD primarily engages with international donors through sector working groups such

²⁰⁷ In particular, the first loss structure, which would have the European Union absorbing the first US\$10 million in losses before affecting other investors. Interviews with IFAD staff.

as the agriculture sector working group and the now defunct microfinance partners group. IFAD's participation in these groups is detailed further under country-level policy engagement. United Nations and bilateral partners interviewed had limited knowledge of IFAD's work and approaches although they recognized the CPO as highly knowledgeable and adding value to discussions when he is able to join.

248. **IFAD's government partnership was mainly cultivated through its lending portfolio.** IFAD's partnership with the Government is strongly associated with its respective investment projects: MOPPED with RFSP and PROFIRA; MOLG with CAIIP1, DSLP and PRELNOR, and NOSP; and MAAIF with ATAAS, VODP2, NOPP and NOSP. IFAD also began developing a partnership with NEMA through PRELNOR's issue with compliance with national and SECAP guidelines. IFAD and the Government as partners in the lending portfolio is detailed under that section.
249. **Public and civil society sector partners in PRELNOR were primarily for project implementation.** These include local governments, district farmers associations, the Uganda National Meteorological Authority, and UNFFE with funding support through the large ASAP grant. While UNFFE was requested to assist the engagement of farmer organizations at the district level, there is no evidence of their representatives sitting in steering committees or engaging in the Uganda CPMT. PRELNOR has also collaborated with WOCAT on sustainable land management. Overall, this partnership has worked well to link extension, with use of improved varieties plus enabling farmers to access weather information. The project also worked with Biodiversity International to provide training of trainers on improved family nutrition. The project has been **less proactive in developing collaboration with donor initiatives in the same geographic area or the private sector with the exception of the MSPs.** These have enabled different stakeholders, including representatives of farmers, agro-input dealers, traders, transporters and local governments to work together to identify sites for markets and discussions on management arrangements.
250. **In the oilseeds subsector, and concerning value chain development, the country programme developed a strategic partnership with SNV through the grants on OSSUP and 4Ps, both closely tied to VODP2.** SNV proved a productive and cooperative partner with relevant experience in the oilseeds subsector, inclusive agriculture value chain development, developing market-based solutions and collaborating in PPP settings both with the public sector (to address systemic market constraints and inequities) and the private sector (to successfully build sustainable smallholder supply chains).²⁰⁸ The grant work also benefitted from SNV's sharing and cross-fertilization of experiences between local and national stakeholders across the region. However, there are questions over how farmer organizations will continue to engage now that the grant has ended (see para. 172).
251. The Regional East African Community Trade in Staples grant through the Kilimo Trust drew on its long-term strategy and experience in improving trade in the agricultural sector and food security. It is among very few home-grown and independent regional development organizations working on agriculture for development across the EAC region. **However, its few interactions with VODP2 limited the strength of the partnership forged between Kilimo Trust and the country programme.**
252. **Oxfam Novib has proven to be a complementary partner for IFAD, through its direct interactions with communities and households, to implement GALS in rural communities.** Between 2009 and 2020, IFAD awarded three grants to Oxfam Novib to roll-out and scale-up GALS in Uganda and other countries in Africa and, most recently, throughout IFAD operations. Oxfam Novib also brought significant technical expertise to the IFAD-funded grants thanks to its broader work

²⁰⁸ Note that SNV Uganda was one of OSSUP's founders in 2007, alongside Makerere University and Wageningen University and Research Center.

on GALS under the Women's Empowerment Mainstreaming and Networking programme (2008 to 2020) operating in Africa and Asia.²⁰⁹ Their closeness to rural communities helps to build trust, which is essential to bringing about behaviour change. However, recent projects have not fully utilized Oxfam Novib's technical expertise due to limitations in the structure of the IFAD grant and financing disconnect between grant deliverables and gender financing of IFAD projects.

253. **In the rural finance sector, the grant embedded in PROFIRA to support UCSU to become a sustainable apex institution, strengthened the country programme's partnership with the Canadian Credit Association and the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU).** This was an appropriate choice given their internationally recognized quality of service to financial cooperatives and apex organizations, experience with grant-based technical assistance contracts, and activities in Uganda and the region. The organizations demonstrated capacity to recruit highly qualified staff to mentor UCSCU management and to provide short-term technical assistance assignments (including some volunteer retired executives).
254. Also in the rural finance sector, grants contributed to strengthening partnerships between IFAD and African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (AFRACA),²¹⁰ PostBank Uganda and Posta Uganda. However, the limited linkages between the grants on rural finance knowledge management partnership III and scaling-up remittances partnerships and the loan programmes, reduced the potential of strategic partnerships between these organizations and the country programme in Uganda. **This was a missed opportunity given the relevance of these institutions to the country programme.**
255. **The Uganda Yield Fund – through the partnership with the European Union – has created a new network of partners for IFAD, both within and beyond its traditional sovereign debt programme funder, government, and NGOs network. Linkages with the lending portfolio, however, have been limited.** The partnerships developed by the Yield Fund is helping IFAD learn the language of venture and equity investment, and opening investment and capital leveraging opportunities in Uganda and other markets (e.g. through participation in the East Africa Venture Capital Association). Within Uganda, the Yield Fund will start an Investee Company Networking Platform for investees to share and compare experiences, which would help the Yield Fund in its management support to investees and importantly, better understand other potential investees. The partnership with KMPG will also expose IFAD and its partners to insights on enterprise due diligence and business development. Such information will be highly valuable, particularly as IFAD's value chain development includes supporting small and medium-sized enterprises and finance activities. Increasing IFAD's equity and venture financing competency in Uganda provides a notable knowledge management opportunity supporting both investment activities in Uganda, the region and elsewhere as a means to better understand how financing can benefit smallholders and poor households through agricultural enterprise and value chain finance.²¹¹
256. **Summary.** Partnership building is constrained by the reduced staffing in the ICO, particularly the relocation of the CD to Nairobi. At the country programme level, the CPO primarily engages international development partners through the agriculture development partners group. There were no significant partnerships among them as evidenced by the overall limited cofinancing in projects designed under the 2013 COSOP. Partnerships with the Government, rural organizations and the private sector are primarily cultivated through the projects with strong support from country-

²⁰⁹ Unpublished internal partnership story (April 2018) on IFAD and Oxfam Novib, and interviews with former Programme Manager at Oxfam Novib and former IFAD staff, senior technical specialist on Gender and Social Equity and the manager of the past IFAD grants to Oxfam Novib.

²¹⁰ AFRACA is a regional association of financial and non-financial institutions that promotes rural and agricultural finance in Africa through policy work and supporting members to provide sustainable quality financial services mainly to poorer communities.

²¹¹ Interview European Union Delegation to the Republic of Uganda.

specific grants. These grants fostered partnerships between the country programme and the projects with their respective recipients, including SNV, Oxfam Novib, Canada Credit Association, and WOCCU. **Partnership building is rated as moderately satisfactory (4).**

C. Country-level policy engagement

257. The 2013 COSOP aimed to engage in policy dialogue with the Government to “keep pro-poor concerns high on the policy agenda” and “IFAD-supported projects were to serve as vehicles for learning and identifying key policy issues to be addressed for broad-based rural economic growth.” Engagement in policy dialogue would entail: (i) production of evidence from projects to inform policy decision-making; (ii) active participation in the relevant sector working groups; (iii) capacity-building of partner government agencies (e.g. MOPED and MAIIF) to formulate pro-poor policies; and (iv) support for rural organizations (e.g. UNFFE, UCA and UCSCU) to effectively promote their own policy agenda.
258. **The 2013 COSOP’s policy focus provided both a *general* strategic direction for keeping pro-poor concerns high on the policy agenda, and *specific* direction** for engaging the Government on the oil palm subsector to ensure a sustainable institutional framework for smallholder growers’ organizations (see Box 5) and in rural inclusive finance development. In contrast, the previous 2004 COSOP’s broad policy focus on conducive and supportive legislative frameworks for sustainable pro-poor policy development largely targeted issues important to poverty alleviation but not directly related to interventions in VODP 1, 2 or RFSP design, save for the importance of agriculture enterprise investment policy.²¹²

Box 5

Oilseeds Subsector Platform grant

The OSSUP grant was instrumental in supporting VODP 2 oilseed sector development and was able to aggregate vegetable oil subsector interests at the national level. It also specifically supported the quality declared seed policy, which aims to increase the quality of and speed at which oil seeds for planting are brought to market. The OSSUP grant focused on activities and operations in the oil seed hubs rather than on strategy and policy issues, so the planned evidence-based documents to influence policy were largely unachieved. However, the Government was interested in the high-level issues being discussed in the annual national multi-stakeholder platforms in Kampala, resulting in the issuance of a Seed Declaration in November 2012 that improved the timely access by oilseed farmers to quality seeds (already mentioned above). Another key issue raised at the multi-stakeholder platforms was the need to strengthen standards and the quality of vegetable oil. This resulted in the decentralization of laboratories for testing by the Uganda National Bureau of Standards. It now takes relatively less time to test samples, thereby making certification of unrefined vegetable oil (known as virgin oil) easier.

Sources: ICO self-assessment and interviews.

259. **Under the 2013 COSOP, IFAD has primarily pursued a strategy of policy engagement through the lending program with mixed results.** While institutional change and policy dialogue through the projects are assessed under rural poverty impact, impacts at the country level are presented under this criterion according to the 2013 COSOP’s four policy dialogue objectives in table 11.

²¹² Uganda Country Strategic Opportunities Programme, 2013, para. 50.

Table 11
COSOP 2013 proposed areas for engagement

<i>Indicated areas/issues for policy engagement</i>	<i>CSPE comments linkage/dialogue</i>
Reorientation of NAADS from distribution of subsidized agricultural inputs to provision of relevant pro-poor advisory services	Not achieved. There is little indication that NAADS has been reoriented – its main functions as stated on its website and following interviews with MAAIF staff is to procure a wide range of inputs covering crops and livestock as well as agroprocessing equipment related to specified value chains. The latest newsletter (June 2020) highlights tea, coffee, pineapples, citrus and fish farming. NAADS staff have been sidelined from the development of the public extension system (under the Single Spine Extension system). NAADS was left as a parallel system, and after the new extension policy was introduced in 2013/14, public extension delivery was moved to MAAIF under the Department of Extension.
Support for the establishment of smallholder oil palm growers' organizations that are financially sustainable.	Partly achieved. VODP1 established KOPGA ²¹³ to represent farmers' interests and VODP2 was designed to strengthen the association and to take over some of the functions of KOPGT. Nearing the end of implementation, farmers and the management of KOPGA realized the legal framework of the association was inadequate to be a member-owned and managed organization that could carry out some of KOPGT's functions. Farmer representatives of oil palm growing blocks and units therefore established Ssesse Oil Palm Growers Cooperative (SOPGCO) and registered it as a cooperative. VODP2 engaged UCA to strengthen SOPGCO as an institution, but at completion, this was still work in progress. Demarcation of roles and responsibilities between KOPGT and SOPGCO also still needs to take place. ²¹⁴ However, there is evidence that SOPGCO is becoming active. ²¹⁵
Establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework for fourth-tier institutions (including SACCOs) and a conducive policy framework for savings and credit groups.	Achieved. PROFIRA achieved its objectives to support the passing of Tier IV legislation and set up UMRA for SACCO regulation. The Act was passed in 2016 and UMRA is now functional and fully staffed. However, developments beyond the control of the country programme have altered the original UMRA regulatory plan. Although UMRA has started regulating moneylenders and MFIs, an amendment of the Cooperatives Act, ascended in November 2019, now includes MTIC as a 3rd regulator of SACCOs in addition to the Bank of Uganda and UMRA. It is expected that Bank of Uganda will regulate the 40 biggest SACCOs, UMRA about 120 SACCOs and MTIC 1700 SACCOs. IFAD, along with other donors, but principally the World Bank, has continued to engage in a stakeholder-working group finalize these regulations. ²¹⁶
Support to the Uganda Cooperative Savings and Credit Union	Partly achieved. This loosely formulated objective was given a clear direction through the design of PROFIRA that aimed to develop a sustainable SACCO Union. PROFIRA collaborated with the Canada Credit Association ²¹⁷ and WOCCU through a grant to bring this about. The Canada Credit Association provided performance linked grants coupled with technical assistance to UCSCU to establish key policies, procedures and the strategic plan as well as to provide training and capacity building of the board and staff members. A new revitalized and streamlined board in 2018 improved the institution's operational efficiency. UCSCU was also able to improve its image in the SACCO sector in policy discussions. However, operational self-sufficiency was 79 per cent in March 2020, below the target of 100 per cent. Achievements in active membership, savings and loans are also below UCSCU's own targets. Operational self-sufficiency has dropped from 85 per cent in 2019 due to extensive yet expensive consultations and lobbying efforts that are important for the sector's development. ²¹⁸

Source: CSPE Team elaboration.

260. **IFAD's ability to engage in country-level policy engagement has been constrained by limited country presence.** The Government and international partners agreed that policy dialogue in Uganda requires the country presence of the Country Director. Many bilateral and multilateral development agencies have a strong presence in Uganda for policy dialogue including the World Bank, FAO, WFP, the European Union and the United States Agency for International Development. Policy advisers (e.g. United States Agency for International Development) and specialized technical staff are available often sitting in MAIFF (e.g. FAO) to provide policy advice and produce studies and the data needed to support policy decisions. Government

²¹³ Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association.

²¹⁴ VODP2 PCR 2020.

²¹⁵ Evidence from CSPE field mission.

²¹⁶ PROFIRA supervision mission report, November 2019.

²¹⁷ Now the Cooperative Development Foundation.

²¹⁸ PROFIRA supervision mission report, May 2020.

officials indicated the importance of technical knowledge and availability for policy dialogue with international partners. However, the Government and international partners across the board noted the limited availability of IFAD staff for the daily or impromptu engagement required for effective policy dialogue.

261. **With limited technical capacities, IFAD’s country-level policy engagement is primarily through sectoral partner groups.** IFAD does not singly engage in policy dialogue with the Government about specific policy issues but engages through established systems and structures in Uganda (i.e. through sector working groups in specific areas). At the start of the COSOP period, IFAD was an active member of the Microfinance Sector Group. The Government’s shift, however, towards more interventionist policies in microfinance and the relative maturity of the sector, resulted in most international donors withdrawing support for the sector. As a result, the groups dissipated and IFAD was left as one of the only international donors in the sector.
262. **The ICO continues to participate actively in the agricultural development partners’ group that IFAD chaired in 2018.** Through this group, the ICO participates annually in reviews of the budget framework paper for the agricultural sector. The ICO also participates in sector strategic policy development and reviews (i.e. NDP and ASSP). However, the demands of direct supervision of the projects makes it challenging for IFAD to attend the meetings, particularly when the country director position was moved to Nairobi. International partners value IFAD participation in the group and the strong institutional knowledge of the IFAD Country Officer.
263. Lacking a strategy for policy dialogue, any engagement by other IFAD technical staff is dependent on the interest of the officer as well as availability of budget for such dialogue. For example, the IFAD Lead Land Tenure Specialist, through supervision of VODP, further engaged and developed dialogue with local NGOs. While potentially other IFAD staff from ECG or the Sustainable Production, Markets and Institutions Division of IFAD could engage in policy dialogue in Uganda, they mainly come for project supervision and do not engage with the country programme as a whole or participate in meetings with the Government or other partners. Consequently, IFAD staff from other technical divisions have not been mobilized to engage effectively in policy dialogue. With the new subregional hubs this may change and the recently recruited regional offices may have a greater sense of ownership for country-level policy results.
264. **Work has commenced with the Government on the development of an oil palm policy as other private sector players begin to enter the sector to grow oil palm.** VODP2 and the ICO had frequent interactions with the Government, including informal and knowledge management exchanges through the 4P grant, which was notably relevant to COSOP’s goals. Establishing sustainable MSPs in NOSP and the Uganda Oil Palm Growers Trust in NOPP is meant to build on loan and grant-based policy engagements in both subsectors as their value chains mature.
265. **During RFSP (2003–2013), the ICO engaged in the vibrant Microfinance Donors Group and numerous programmes thereby helping to build the inclusive finance sector.** Successful good practice regulatory policy and regulation was encouraged through this group, donor programmes, and other means and contributed to the 2016 passage of the Microfinance Money Laundering Act. Regulations related to the Act were articulated for the primarily urban-focused Tier I and III institutions soon after its passage. Rural inclusive finance was seen as the purview of IFAD via support for Tier IV organizations, including SACCOs and CSCGs, the regulatory regime for which has yet to be passed. Through the ICO, IFAD and other donors, principally the World Bank, there is a push to finalize these regulations but within the context of broader financial sector reform or development. Despite

IFAD's active engagement, the Government worked closely with the World Bank on financial reform issues, including microfinance.

266. **Summary.** The small size of the ICO, the current absence of a resident CD, and the attention required to manage the country programme's large, complex value chain projects, has constrained the policy work of ICO staff. Cognizant of this constraint, the 2013 COSOP envisioned policy dialogue primarily through projects and relevant sector working groups. The policy objective related to rural finance regulation was achieved, whereas that relating to extension was not achieved and those relating to supporting rural institutions were partly achieved. Country-level policy engagement based on drawing evidence from project to inform policy decision-making was evident in the rural finance projects and VODP2. However, capacity building of Government agencies to formulate pro-poor policies and supporting rural organizations to promote their own policy agenda were not apparent. **Country-level policy engagement is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**

D. Grants

267. **The 2013 COSOP did not give importance to the use of grants for the country strategy and programme.** Regarding non-lending, it implicitly refers to the use of two grants to support the 2013–2018 country programme in specific policy dialogue and partnership-building activities. Concerning the lending programme, COSOP refers to an ASAP grant of US\$10 million to cofinance PRELNOR. Reference to grants is otherwise limited to how previous grants supported past activities such as CSCGs and VSLAs.
268. **In spite of this, the CSPE has identified 50 grants funded and/or supervised by IFAD that are linked to Uganda, indicating an opportunistic approach.** A detailed analysis of the sample of seven grants analysed for this CSPE is found in the online Appendix IV. Although many of the thematic issues dealt with by the grants²¹⁹ broadly align with the COSOP strategic objectives, they cover a rather broad spectrum. This indicates more of a supply-driven approach to grant selection and suggests that there is scope for a more strategic approach ensuring relevance to the country programme – in line with recent findings by ESA in the draft 2019 Grants Strategy. **The ability of the country programme to link to these grants and benefit from them has been limited, except for a relatively small number of cases.** Such cases are mentioned in the relevant non-lending sections above.
269. **The extent to which these grants were embedded into loan programmes had a direct bearing on their relevance and contribution to the country programme.** At one end of the scale, the country-specific OSSUP grant and grant to develop a sustainable SACCO Union were subcomponents in VODP2 and PROFIRA, respectively, and integral to project theory of changes and the expected project outcomes and impacts. The global and regional grants on 4Ps and to scale-up SLM practices were not embedded into loan programmes but focused activities on the same target areas of projects (VODP2 and PRELNOR, respectively) and worked closely with, and trained, project staff and implementing agencies or extension workers. It is also notable that IFAD supervised all four of these grants (with results presented in supervision mission reports), reflecting the importance given to them for the performance of the loan programmes.
270. **Given the limited resources within the ICO for non-lending activities, the country programme would have benefitted from more grants, thereby placing the main emphasis on supporting non-lending activities.** The couple

²¹⁹ Including, value chain development, public-private-producer partnerships, inclusive rural finance, remittances, extension services, apex organizations, farmers' organizations, agricultural productivity, genetic breeding and diversity, climate change adaptation, sustainable land management, land, gender, youth, nutrition and livestock.

of grants that specifically promoted learning and supported non-lending activities²²⁰ across projects and at the country level were reported as effective.²²¹ Most grant recipients (62 per cent) were based wholly or in part in Uganda or another developing country, and were set to benefit from a degree of institutional strengthening and/or capacity development. Yet, the potential immediate benefits gained by this for IFAD's ultimate target group are diminished by the relative lack of linkages between many of the grants and the country programme.

271. **The use of different grant instruments has largely been relevant for the country programme, providing linkages between loans and grants were made.** IFAD-funded grants predominantly consisted of global and regional grants that enable grant projects to look beyond national boundaries and learn across countries. For example, the use of different country circumstances, different value chain arrangements and different commodities have helped to inform the piloted 4P brokering approach. Four of the sample seven grants analysed were global or regional of which two were effective (4Ps, SLM) due to their strong relevance and linkage with loans. The country-specific nature of the OSSUP grant and grant to develop a sustainable SACCO union meant that support could focus on precise context-specific issues prevailing in priority areas identified in the COSOP.²²²
272. In contrast, the country-specific grant on scaling-up remittances is being implemented separately from the loan programmes and supervised by FFRs based in IFAD. The FFR sought potential synergies but the grant design lacked formal linkages so interactions are largely informal and limited to informing the ICO about the progress of the project and inviting its staff on monitoring missions.²²³ This grant is also representative of a subset of grants related to the country portfolio that have leveraged funds from outside IFAD to support activities highly relevant to COSOP's strategic objectives. Even though this particular grant was not linked to the loan portfolio, evidence suggests that other such IFAD-managed funds have benefitted the loan portfolio. For example, insurance for rural resilience and economic development, funded by SIDA and managed through the Platform for Agricultural Risk Management, supported the design of insurance into NOSP, and there are plans that it will further support the development of insurance products for oilseed farmers.²²⁴
273. **Summary.** Although the 2013 COSOP did not give importance to the use of grants, IFAD funded or supervised 50 grants linked to Uganda over the COSOP period. This indicates an opportunistic rather than a strategic approach to grants in the country and limits the ability of the country programme to link to, and benefit from, them. However, the relatively small number of grants that were embedded into loan programmes and operations were highly relevant and effective, contributing to improved performance in multi-stakeholder platforms, brokering 4Ps, inclusive rural finance, sustainable land management, gender equality and the empowerment of vulnerable households. Given the limited resources in the ICO for non-lending activities, the country programme would have benefitted from more grants focusing on non-lending activities. More supportive grant processes and systems at the regional and corporate level, notwithstanding the good efforts already made, are also required.

E. Overall assessment

274. Non-lending activities have been negatively affected by the size of the ICO and the relocation of the CD to Nairobi, and by declining budgetary resources. Results at the

²²⁰ ROUTESA grant with Procasur on learning routes (2011–2014), IFAD Africa Knowledge Network phase II with PICO Knowledge Net on knowledge management and learning (2012–2014).

²²¹ ICO self-assessment, 2020; Interview with IFAD staff; COSOP Results Review 2018.

²²² For example, the OSSUP grant could directly contribute to addressing the weak performance of the vegetable oilseeds value chain in Uganda by strengthening the organizational and institutional capacity of value chain actors, which would also directly improve the performance of VODP2, and moreover benefit its target group of smallholder oilseed farmers.

²²³ Communication with FFR on 18 May 2020.

²²⁴ ICO self-assessment.

national level have been less effective when set against the aims of COSOP. At the project level, non-lending activities in terms of knowledge management, support for policy development and implementation and working with partners, has been effective. Some grants have played an especially useful role, but many other grants have not been well linked to the country programme. Overall assessment of **non-lending activities is rated moderately satisfactory (4)**.

Table 12
Assessment of non-lending activities

<i>Non-lending activities</i>	<i>CSPE rating</i>
Knowledge management	3
Partnership-building	4
Country-level policy engagement	4
Overall	4

Key points (chapter IV)

- Knowledge management at the project level was weak initially but improved over time; a lack of strategy and declining resources at the national level limited the effectiveness of knowledge management, which in turn hampered policy dialogue.
- Partnership building has been constrained by the location and size of ICO staff. Nevertheless, IFAD is respected as a partner because of its lending operations and its engagement in sector working groups. It has used grants to build partnerships with a range of civil society and private sector actors.
- Policy engagement has been pursued through the lending programme with mixed results, with strongest results in microfinance. IFAD's in-country capacity has limited the depth of policy engagement to working through sector working groups.
- IFAD has administered over 50 grants in the CSPE period, but only a few have been linked effectively with the country programme. Those embedded into the lending programme played a positive support role.

V. Performance of partners

275. This section first assesses IFAD's responsibility for maintaining a quality standard at design, to managing and responding to emerging changes in context, to help solving problems and implementation bottlenecks. For the Government, the CSPE assesses the degree of ownership and responsibility for implementing operations, policy guidance, mobilization of human and material resources, implementation management, and responsiveness to supervision recommendations and fiduciary aspects.

A. IFAD

A.1. Design of interventions

276. During the current COSOP period, IFAD has used its growing resource envelope (US\$1,446 million, representing 81.6 per cent of the historical total project costs in IFAD's programme) to work in three pillars related to smallholder production improvement, rural finance and value chains. In each of these pillars, **projects have been well sequenced and the lessons learned from earlier operations have been successfully brought forward to more recent ones.**

277. At the same time, **IFAD's strategic focus has changed markedly, reflecting the move away from integrated community approaches to specific value chains, particularly in the vegetable oil sector.** In rural finance, IFAD persisted with its engagement by designing PROFIRA on the experience of RFSP, even while other donors and the Government have moved away from using subsidized funds to support the sector.

278. **IFAD has brought its considerable global expertise in these areas and has been seen as a leader in value chain and marketing operations** in Uganda, particularly in building connections with private sector and Government. On the other hand, **designs have been relatively blind to the political and economic context**, and could have provided deeper analysis of how projects can be subject to volatile and frequent policy shifts related to the centralized power structures under the strong presidential system and to related systems of patronage.

279. Designs have been undertaken in a detailed and consultative manner and usually in response to Government requests, and with good interaction with concerned ministries and the private sector. As noted earlier, delays in approval by the Government have affected timely start-up of projects.

A.2. Supervision and implementation support

280. Project supervision across most of the portfolio has been seen as constructive by projects and the Government. IFAD has generally undertaken two missions per year per project (annex IX.A. table 5), and the technical and implementation support has been generally well received. Most missions provided follow-up recommendations prepared in consultation with project staff, the Government and partners. MTRs have been used to redesign projects to cope with changes in implementation circumstances and policy context; for example, RFSP was redesigned to reflect changes in government policy, and VODP2 was moved out of a problem status to perform more effectively.

281. **For ATAAS, IFAD's involvement was deliberately more limited yet it did not achieve the influence sought through co-funding with the World Bank.** IFAD had limited involvement in supervisions until 2017,²²⁵ and did not engage strongly during the MTR or the project redesign.²²⁶ The decision to suspend IFAD's loan in 2016 was correct in terms of sending a signal to the Government over the radical change in project design and the declining performance of NAADS. Since the World

²²⁵ IFAD participated in just one ATAAS supervision mission in February 2013, when a new CPM took up their post.

²²⁶ For example, the recovery of ineligible expenditures in 2014/2015 was supervised by the World Bank on behalf of IFAD.

Bank continued lending, the impact of IFAD's decision was minimal. Although loan cancellation was seriously considered, IFAD chose to re-engage in 2017, a decision taken largely for strategic reasons to strengthen the relationship with the Government. The allocation of remaining funds to vehicles and training allowed IFAD to demonstrate its support and was widely approved by the Government at all levels. It was a high-risk decision, however, given the known difficulties of procurement and the fact that ATAAS was closing with no prospect of continued external funding.

282. **COSOP reviews have been conducted in 2015, 2018 and 2020, and although not on a regular annual basis as intended, these have been useful in tracking progress.** The reviews have triggered changes in the COSOP results framework, for example around ATAAS in relation to changes in extension policy (Box 3) and for VODP2 in relation to the delay in Buvuma land acquisition (para. 122).

A.3. Support from IFAD office architecture

283. **The country director's location has affected non-lending performance in terms of policy engagement and partnership building as well as the performance of the lending portfolio.** The period under review has seen the country director presence shift from Rome to in-country and then to the regional hub in Nairobi. The period of in-country presence (2014–2018) has been seen by all stakeholders as the most effective period in terms of supporting lending operations, policy dialogue and partnership building. Since the country director moved to Nairobi in mid-2018 under IFAD's decentralization policy there has been an obvious decline in IFAD's influence and engagement. The absence of the country director on the ground in Kampala has affected the quality of participation in forums, donor working groups and informal interactions with partners and the Government.
284. **The country office programme budget and time allocation of the ICO team has shown a declining trend, mainly affecting non-lending activities.** There has been a 10 per cent decline when comparing the average budget over the past four years (2017–2020) with the first four years (2013–2016). The main driver of this decline is a lower budget for ICO administration followed by a decline in the budget for non-lending activities, and the main component to be reduced was advocacy and knowledge management.²²⁷ Conversely, the budget increased for supervision and implementation support.
285. While the number of total staff supporting the Uganda country programme has remained the same, the full-time equivalents of officers supporting the programme has declined slightly. In 2013, there were four officers in the ICO in Kampala (the country director, a programme officer, a knowledge management officer (consultant), and an associate programme officer). In 2020, there are only 1.6 FTEs in Kampala and 2.6 overall since the programme officer and financial analyst mainly support the Small and Medium Sized Agricultural Development Fund's grant, the Uganda Yield Fund.
286. **Overall, the resources (budget and staff time) are focused on the lending portfolio, particularly on supervision and implementation support,** which occupies 50 per cent of the country director and CPO's time (Figure 7). The country director and CPO each spend 15–24 per cent of their time on policy dialogue and partnership development, and for the CPO, especially, much of this takes place through an active presence in the sector working group. The decline in knowledge management budget is not compensated in time spent by the Uganda country team who spend between 1 and 6 per cent of their time on knowledge management. Time spent on design has reduced post 2018 as there has only been one project (NOSP) under preparation during this period.²²⁸

²²⁷ The budget for the design of the new COSOP bolstered the non-lending budget from 2018 to 2020.

²²⁸ A final point to note is that the Uganda Yield Fund grant provides 1.7 FTEs to support this grant while 2.6 officer-level FTEs are supporting the entire country programme. Once the grant is complete, the programme will return to just 2 FTEs officers and 5 staff overall.

Figure 7
Time allocation for the country director and country programme officer in Uganda



Source: Data provided by ICO staff.

287. **Support from IFAD HQ and the regional hub has been generally well received, particularly during supervisions and technical backstopping.** Provision of relevant expertise has been appreciated by the Government and project PMUs. A notable exception has been the problems arising around conducting PRELNOR’s baseline study.²²⁹ The support for some issues were too narrow. For gender, support mostly focused on levels of participation, with insufficient guidance on addressing gender gaps, while for M&E the advice tended to focus more on reporting issues than on the quality of evaluation studies.
288. **Summary.** IFAD has performed well in evolving the portfolio in line with COSOP aspirations, and in bringing its expertise to key sectors such as value chains and rural finance. It could have done more to place the designs within the political and economic context. Supervision has been effective, ensuring projects deliver as expected and are redesigned when needed. The resources allocated to administer the country programme reflect this and the limited capacity to deliver on the non-lending side. Overall **IFAD performance as a partner is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**

B. Government

289. The Government of Uganda’s performance with regard to the IFAD portfolio under the 2013 COSOP is mixed, and has to be viewed within the context of an evolving national policy framework.²³⁰

B.1. Project management

290. **In general, the quality of PMU staff across the portfolio has been high, especially for transitioned projects** and those that have recruited staff from previous IFAD projects (para. 126). High-quality, however, has not necessarily always been translated into strong project performance, especially in financial management and procurement. Delayed recruitment has affected some projects (e.g. VODP2 suffered an 18-month delay due to slow recruitment) and in some instances, there was high staff turnover (PRELNOR). On the whole, however, PMUs have ensured functional M&E, sound financial management (with some exceptions) and compliance with all loan covenants. PMUs have also routinely prepared work

²²⁹ An ex-ante study was earmarked as part of IFADs Research and Impact Assessment Unit (RIA) work plan, however due to changes in funding commitments between IFAD10 and IFAD11, ex-ante studies were dropped in favour of ex-post studies and, combined with delays on the ground in terms of road construction, has resulted in no substantive baseline being conducted.

²³⁰ DLG policy changes in 2007 that affected DLSP; the shift from demand to supply driven rural finance policy (for RFSP); and change in extension policy (NAADS to Single Spine Extension; OWC role in input distribution) for ATAAS.

plans, audits and monitoring reports and have undertaken analytical work, and in the case of VODP2, even contributed to the design of follow-up projects such as NOPP and NOSP.

291. **The downside for PMU performance has been weak procurement.** This has resulted, in the case of ATAAS, in ineligible expenditures and slow and disrupted procurement of IFAD-funded vehicles and training (Box 6). Other PMUs registered long delays in identifying project investments, which in turn caused delays in achieving project outputs. PRELNOR has struggled to implement planned infrastructure (chapter III.A.3).
292. **PMUs have established collaborative relationships with DLG staff** and have contributed to their capacity building through training and experience sharing. In some instances, there was reported weak coordination between teams managing different components or with related projects to facilitate synergies. In others, the management information systems were weak and challenged by national-scale agencies and the number of reporting entities (e.g. ATAAS).

B.2. Fiduciary responsibilities, financial management and audit

293. **Government fiduciary performance with regard to counterpart funding has been mixed.** Actual funding levels exceeded appraisal for RFSP and VODP2 and with complete disbursement for DLSP and a significant shortfall for ATAAS.²³¹ The situation is uncertain for PROFIRA with an expected shortfall of 52 per cent of expected funding²³² as well as for PRELNOR with 23 per cent of funds disbursed by Government with just two out of seven years to go to project completion in Sept. 2022 (see Table 13).

Table 13

Planned and actual Government disbursements by project

<i>Project</i>	<i>Agreement US\$ million</i>	<i>Actual US\$ million</i>	<i>Disbursement rate</i>
RFSP	1.1	12.15	1,105%
DLSP	2.4	2.4	100%
VODP2	15	25.8	172%
ATAAS	499	299	60%
CAIIP	6.3	6.3	100%
PROFIRA	4.9	1.0 ^[1]	21%
PRELNOR	9.3	2.2 ^[2]	23%

Source: Project reports.

294. Adequate procurement systems and personnel have been in place to guide procurement. Weaknesses persist, however, especially in lengthy processes that caused delayed outcomes that in turn impacted implementation. Furthermore, all the projects use contract committees²³³ that oversee all procurement-related matters, including bid evaluations and vetting of contractors and service providers. PMUs also have had qualified procurement staff, although periodic vacancies have occurred. There were a few cases of lack of compliance with procurement processes, including with the *IFAD Procurement Guidelines and National Regulations*.²³⁴ Weak management of contracts has also resulted in delays in completing and extending

²³¹ Due to a policy shift that saw planned funds for ATAAS shifted to input procurement and distribution through NAADS and OWC (ATAAS PPE).

²³² Supervision mission May 2020.

²³³ In the case of PRELNOR an additional institution was created in the PMU located in Gulu with a cap on its spending limit.


²³⁴ Those cited were in relation to compliance with IFAD prior review requirements; the preparation of bidding documents; weak filing systems, including lack of contract monitoring (PCR VODP2).

contracts, as well as delays in preparing and submitting reports. There is also the case of changes in design specifications, such as for road infrastructure in CAIIP1.

B.3. Government’s funding for agriculture

295. **Despite commitments by Parliament, the Government has not increased the share of the budget for agriculture** in line with the Maputo-Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (10 per cent target), with sector funding averaging 4.5 per cent of total public expenditure from 2013/2014 to 2017/2018 fiscal years.²³⁵ Much of this expenditure has been recurrent (salaries and inputs) rather than investment, and has focused on central public agencies rather than local government extension services.²³⁶ The switch in recurrent expenditure support from local to central government reflects the emphasis on input provision through OWC (Figure 8).²³⁷ Nevertheless, the recruitment of 4,000 extension staff in the period from 2016 to 2019, and the establishment of the agricultural extension grant for extension activities, operation and maintenance of vehicles procured under ATAAS, reflects commitment to the Single Spine Extension approach.

Figure 8
Public sector expenditure on agriculture at the central and district level



Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics Annual Government Finance Statistics Abstract 2018.

B.4. Governance and anticorruption

296. While Government transparency and accountability frameworks have gradually evolved to include one of the oldest, comparatively comprehensive and progressive anticorruption legal regimes,²³⁸ they are operationalized in a context where violation of financial rules is considered widespread and enforcement weak.²³⁹ It is this legal regime that has provided the context in which the IFAD portfolio for the 2013 COSOP operated, albeit with instances where IFAD negotiated, and the Government

²³⁵ There was a peak in the election year 2016 but a decline thereafter.

²³⁶ Agriculture Sector Public Expenditure Review Uganda, World Bank, 2019.

²³⁷ ACODE also confirm the dramatic fall in funding to local level extension provision: see ACODE 2018 op. cit.

²³⁸ Inspector general of Government Act, 1988 which has a dual mandate; the Anti-Corruption Act, 2009 (as amended) which widened the definition of corruption, made it extra territorial, included recovery of proceeds, provided for interim orders as well as interim procedures; the Leadership Code Act, 2002 (as amended), Whistle Blower Protection Act, Anti-Money Laundering Act, Access to Information Act, Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act and Uganda is a Party to United Nations Convention Against Corruption and African Union Preventing and Combatting Corruption.

²³⁹ Assessing the Status of Implementation of the Whistle Blowers Protection Act and the Leadership Code Act (as amended), Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda, 2019.

accepted, additional instruments or mechanisms to ensure more robust enforcement measures in project operations. Major areas that have been vulnerable to corruption and which have occasionally been investigated in the IFAD portfolio include *financial management, procurement and contracting* (see also para. 135). A major example is presented in Box 6.

297. Procurement issues have been an area of underperformance, as described earlier, related to lack of staff capacity and overambitious implementation time frames as well as poor preparation of bidding documents, poor record keeping and filing system (para. 127).²⁴⁰ This has been compounded to some extent by limited support from IFAD until a dedicated procurement consultant was engaged in 2019. Lack of capacity in contractors has also caused delays and this has been compounded by failure to obtain guarantees, lack of requests for variations, and by weak supervision.²⁴¹
298. Poor financial record keeping has been a common feature noted in several missions and has led to difficulties in proving or disproving allegations of fund misuse due to an inadequate audit trail of transactions. The training support under ATAAS was subject to a lack of records even though the costs per trainee were considered very high.

Box 6

ATAAS vehicle procurement

Following amendments to the financing agreement agreed to by Government and IFAD in February 2017, high-level discussions between both parties concluded that support to the Single Spine Extension approach would reflect a wider strategic message of commitment. IFAD subsequently focused 60 per cent of its funding on one component that embodied the provision of equipment, including vehicles and training for extension services at the district and subcounty levels. The PCU in MAAIF initiated the procurement but according to IFAD's Office of Audit and Oversight, there were issues with the procurement, including in the assessment of the bids, which created confusion and perception of unfair treatment among the bidders.

The selection of the service provider after bid closure and subsequent evaluation was challenged by a competing bidder, a situation further compounded by allegations of payoffs to unnamed staff personnel. An investigation was launched by the Office of Audit and Oversight due to high materiality or significance of the issue. There was insufficient evidence, however, to substantiate the allegations.

Due to the impending project closure, MAAIF agreed with IFAD to request the United Nations Office for Project Services to carry out the expedited procurement of the 1,034 motorcycles, worth UGX 7.9 billion, (IFAD funded 88 per cent) and 115 double-cabin pick-up trucks, worth US\$8.4 million, to cover 83 per cent of the total of 138 districts.

Once procured, the vehicles supplied through IFAD funding appear to have been fairly distributed and reasonably well-managed at the district level. Distribution of the vehicles and motorcycles was confirmed in all the districts visited during the mission.

Source: ATAAS PPE and CSPE interviews.

299. At least five projects in the CSPE portfolio have been investigated by IFAD's Audit and Oversight Office based on whistle blower reports and news alerts. In relation to one case, an engineer who previously worked in DLSP's PMU was suddenly removed from PRELNOR's PMU, causing initial implementation delays. Furthermore, the recent suspension and non-renewal of contracts of PMU staff related to the potential violation of financial rules has impacted PRELNOR activities, with the result that key positions are held by acting personnel. In addition, several issues related to

²⁴⁰ Interview, IFAD consultant.

²⁴¹ Interview IFAD staff.

prohibited practices, including abuse of vehicles in some of the projects, have been raised.²⁴²

300. Anticorruption measures have included the development of *Core Values* (VODP2) and complaint mechanisms, although the impact on operations and behaviour is as yet undetermined. IFAD itself has been slow to introduce anticorruption safeguards in bidding documents, which have been introduced only this year. Some observers also note that the presence of the country director on the ground is an important tool to mitigate such issues.

B.5. Monitoring and evaluation at the project level

301. **Project M&E systems have been of mixed quality in terms of the reliability and completeness of information generated and shared.** There have been issues with updating logical frameworks following the introduction of an Operational Results Management System, as in the case for PROFIRA, PRELNOR and NOPP.²⁴³ The projects also had challenges associated with a lack of reliable and regular processes for outcome and impact measurement across all projects.²⁴⁴ In some projects, data quality was weak due to inconsistent figures or a failure to capture important data.²⁴⁵
302. **In terms of timeliness of information, many projects failed to conduct baseline surveys, MTRs and end-of-project evaluations within required timeframes** that subsequently affected project activities (see annex IX.B and online Appendix III). Some project M&E systems failed to capture some key indicators on time even when there is or was evidence of availability of such data²⁴⁶ as in the case of VODP2 data on impact on household assets which was not reported in the logframe.²⁴⁷
303. **In general, project M&E systems tracked and reported gender-disaggregated data.** However, gender issues prominently featured more in M&E systems of newer projects than for older projects. The performance of women and youth in terms of income, assets and technology adoption gains were inadequately captured in many of the reports, yet there is evidence of gender disparities between women and men in terms of access to productive assets, extension services and markets and market participation.
304. In terms of staffing, all projects had M&E specialists and while the more recent projects have more advanced M&E systems aided by inheriting experienced M&E personnel familiar with IFAD's requirements, the challenges of the **more complex value chain projects with multiple stakeholders in the public and private sector has also brought M&E challenges.**
305. **Summary.** The Government has been a close partner of IFAD and has provided active and significant support in the design and implementation of its projects. It has discharged its fiduciary responsibilities reasonably and generally provided its share of planned funding consistently. PMU staff have also been of reasonably good quality. These strengths are offset by several important weaknesses however. Staffing has been affected by periodic vacant positions, turnover, and delays in procurement and

²⁴² CSPE field mission received reports of a political head completely taking over an IFAD-funded project vehicle. DPMO survived interdiction when a project vehicle was forcibly taken by political head and was returned following intervention of the Department of Agricultural Extension Services of the MAAIF and threats of withdrawing it to MAAIF.

²⁴³ Logframes are difficult to read, too long and complex. Changes in the Operational Results Management System Logframe have reduced the clarity of project design and often some important indicators are missing (Maria Donnat Quality of M&E systems report February 2020).

²⁴⁴ Donnat, M., 2020 op. cit.

²⁴⁵ Inconsistencies in data concerning performance of oilseeds component under VODP2 were cited by a supervision report in September, 2019 which recommended that data cleaning should be undertaken.

²⁴⁶ Four of the seven implemented projects have conducted impact studies DLSP (2015), ATAAS (2018), VODP2(2019), and RFSP (2014).

²⁴⁷ This was supposed to feed into the indicators to measure progress towards the goal to "contribute to sustainable poverty reduction in the project area", with "50 per cent households with improvements in assets ownership index at project completion.

poor contract management. There has been persistent (although in most cases unproven or undocumented) reports of violation of rules or misuse of funds. Performance is further offset by weak M&E systems in terms of data quality and consistency, and delays in conducting key studies such as baseline surveys, MTRs and end of project evaluations. While grants have been introduced for extension services and road maintenance, Government's broad budgetary commitments to the sector and to supporting local government delivery over national spending have not been fully satisfactory and this in turn affected project performance. The weaknesses identified in these latter areas outweigh the positives noted earlier and, therefore, the CSPE rates **Government performance as moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

Table 14

Assessment of partners' performance

	<i>CSPE rating</i>
IFAD	4
Government	3

Key points (chapter V)

- IFAD has sequenced the evolution of the portfolio in a way that has allowed lesson learning and continued use of experienced PMU staff.
- The radical shift to value chains has allowed IFAD to bring its global expertise to bear but has limited its level of outreach.
- Supervision has been conducted regularly and is seen as constructive in helping projects overcome implementation challenges.
- Changes in ICO capacities have affected the country programme's non-lending performance in terms of policy engagement and partnership building.
- The Government has discharged its responsibilities well with regard to PMU staffing, counterpart funding but has been less effective in managing procurement, poor contract management and conducting baselines. There have also been serious incidences of misuse of project funds.
- The Government has reduced overall funding for the agricultural sector over the period but it has nevertheless supported value chain approaches and encouraged private sector investment.

VI. Synthesis of the country programme and strategy performance

306. This synthesis assesses the relevance and effectiveness of the country programme and strategy performance under the 2013 COSOP from 2013 until 2020.²⁴⁸ While the initial COSOP ran from 2013 to 2018, it was then extended for a further two years. This delay in extending the preparation of the new COSOP was appropriate as it allowed IFAD's country strategy to align with the next cycle for NDPIII (released mid-2020) and ASSP2 (due end of 2020).
307. **The country programme had mixed success in following the 2013 CPE recommendations.** Table 15 assesses how well the Uganda country programme responded to the main 2013 CPE recommendations. Two out of the five recommendations were fully addressed while the remaining three show limited and moderate progress as evidenced in this report.

Table 15
Assessment of response to CPE 2013 recommendations

2013 CPE recommendations	CSPE comment	Assessment
Expand geographic coverage of IFAD-funded operations to the northern region	Successfully achieved through PRELNOR and VODP2 and in the forthcoming NOSP which operate in several northern districts	Successful
Support commodity value chain development	Effectively delivered through VODP2, PRELNOR, NOSP and NOPP	Successful
Define a realistic and appropriately resourced agenda for policy dialogue	Insufficient resources and staffing were applied and no specific agenda formulated to guide policy dialogue beyond efforts at project level	Limited
Strengthen further project results (by exploiting synergies between activities and projects, providing more resources for natural resources and environmental management as well as human and social capital and empowerment, preparing exit strategies and strengthening the capacity of key institutions, and devoting more systematic efforts to scaling-up innovations)	Achieved to a modest degree: some synergies have been created between projects such as between ATAAS and PRELNOR, and VODP2 and PRELNOR though more could have been done; ENRM has been well resourced mainly through dedicated grant funding; effective support for social capital and empowerment has been delivered in most projects; exit strategies have been uneven largely because projects followed on from each other; scaling up has been limited	Moderate
Undertake functional and workload analyses as a basis for determining staff requirements and the division of labour (to manage the Uganda country programme)	It is not evident that such analyses have been developed to guide staffing	Limited

Source: CSPE Team elaboration.

A. Relevance

A.1. Strategic alignment

308. **The 2013 COSOP showed close policy alignment with the Government's policy framework for rural poverty reduction and the agriculture sector.** It was fully aligned with the 2011/2012 and 2014/2015 NDP and the NDPII (2015/2016 and 2019/2020), and ASSP (2015/2016 and 2019/2020). Specifically, NDP Objective 1 seeks to increase sustainable production, productivity and value addition in the agricultural sector (and two other sectors). ASSP targeted transforming the agricultural sector from subsistence farming into commercialization by increasing production and productivity, and market access. The COSOP SO1 and SO2 directly contribute towards this, and strategies of value addition and agroprocessing for

²⁴⁸ The assessment of COSOP relevance covers the alignment of its strategic objectives and direction, its geographic priority and thematic focus, with the Government and IFAD's strategies, as well as with the national priorities. It also covers the coherence of the main elements in the COSOP. COSOP effectiveness looks at the progress made against the COSOP objectives and other significant achievements.

industrialization and exports, and private sector-led growth and strong public-private partnerships are guiding principles for the NDP ASSP.

309. **The COSOP SOs also aligned well with IFAD's global strategic objectives (2016–2025)**, in particular with IFAD's SO1, which supports poor rural people's productive capacities and SO2 to increase poor rural people's benefits from market participation (see table 1 in annex VI).
310. **The COSOP was broadly coherent although no explicit theory of change was prepared, yet non-lending did not fit in well.** A results framework attached to the COSOP in Appendix III provides a summary of outcomes by each strategic objective with outcome and milestone indicators. The intended outcomes match the intention of each strategic objective, and in turn contribute logically to the goal. However, the chosen indicators contain several gaps in terms of the: (i) correct identification of outcome versus output indicators; (ii) absence of several outcome indicators; and (iii) absence of SMART attributes for some of the indicators to make them easily measurable.²⁴⁹ The role of non-lending assistance, however, was not well captured as its aim was to fit under the overall framework to enhance coherence, but no specific linkages were identified.
311. **The 2013 COSOP's identification of risks and mitigating measures was inadequate.** Only four risks were mentioned in the COSOP document. These relate to the effects of the oil boom on the competitiveness of Uganda's traded products, climate events, policy changes and corruption. This was not a comprehensive list, and the mitigation measures mentioned were largely deferred to being handled during project design or supervision. The theory of change – elaborated on in annex VI – provides a more comprehensive view of the risks affecting the COSOP's causal logic. It also seeks to include the role of non-lending more explicitly, and a fuller set of assumptions at different levels of the intervention model.

A.2. Synergies

312. **The COSOP's specific proposal to improve synergies between lending and non-lending and across projects was appropriate but unrealistic given the resources available.** In response to the 2013 CPE, which found limited examples of synergies, the COSOP proposed that a regional focus in the north and east was a way to achieve greater synergy, along with close engagement with the sector working group that could bring good synergy with other development partners. The ambition to resource the ICO appropriately to ensure that synergies occurred between the lending and non-lending arms of IFAD's programme was equally appropriate but it was not realized for the entire period. In the initial years, while the CD was located in-country from 2014 to 2018, and a knowledge management officer was in place from 2011 to 2015, synergies would have been achievable, but subsequently the declining ICO budget and staffing did not match the COSOP objective for synergy and cross-learning (see analysis in chapter V.A and below).
313. **Summary.** While the COSOP relevance was strong on alignment, targeting and lending synergies, it was less so on the synergies between lending and non-lending, the theory of change and risks. Therefore, **COSOP relevance is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**

B. Effectiveness

314. The overall goal of the COSOP was to increase incomes, improve food security and reduce the vulnerability of rural households living in poverty. The COSOP had three SOs: (i) sustainable increase in production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture producers; (ii) integration of smallholders into markets; and (iii) increased access to and use of financial services by the rural poor. The lending

²⁴⁹ SMART = Specific, Measurable, Attributable, Realist and Time-bound. M. Donnat, op.cit.

and non-lending parts of the programme were expected to blend together to achieve these.

315. The evidence base to judge the effectiveness at the COSOP level is partly based on a series of COSOP reviews.²⁵⁰ While these have allowed results to be monitored, there are gaps in the indicators, especially around outcomes. The findings given below draw on these sources and a range of key interviews.
316. **For SO1: the evidence indicates that planted areas and yields show positive gains, partly due to improved growing conditions and because of the legacy from earlier investments prior to this COSOP period.** Good technology development and dissemination has continued under ATAAS, DLSP, VODP2 and PRELNOR. Training and outreach targets have been met. Adoption rates are not reported widely, although it is evident that farmer groups started under the NAADS era continued to adopt improved technologies through ATAAS and even PRELNOR, and as a result, productivity and incomes have risen. IFAD's contribution is notable when placed in the wider context of slower economic growth and the agricultural sector's declining contribution to GDP over the COSOP period (para. 20). The rise in vegetable oil production from VODP2 is particularly key in a situation where Uganda relies heavily on imported oil and related products.
317. **Climate resilience has improved with IFAD lending and non-lending assistance, although the impact is modest within the national context.** Adoption of SLM techniques across 20,980 hectares under ATAAS and a further 92,108 hectares recorded under PRELNOR has helped reduce erosion through agroforestry, terracing and drought-tolerant crops, and both grants and lending assistance have contributed. These results, while important, are modest when the country's natural resources are facing immense pressures from forest degradation, and pressure on productive land from a rapidly growing population. Climate change has particularly been notable around Lake Victoria, with unprecedented rising water levels,²⁵¹ and while NOPP has incorporated extensive mitigation in its design, careful monitoring of risks factors will be critical.
318. **Land tenure reforms have produced limited results** under DLSP and there have been issues around land acquisition under VODP2. Pilot attempts proved effective in DLSP with 1,882 households receiving certificates, but they were not expanded to have wider impact. In VODP2, insecure land tenure has been a sensitive issue in Kalangala and Buvuma,²⁵² which is being addressed through several models including working with district land centres and the Social Tenure Domain Model. While there have been missed opportunities to use grants to support land centres in the past, NOPP includes a dedicated grant.
319. **For SO2: Agroprocessing and market linkages have been strengthened along selected value chains with some low usage.** Increased prices for farm produce due to reduced transport costs, collective marketing and better bargaining has caused farm incomes to rise for specific crops. There is some evidence of poorer households increasing market access and improving food security, but most benefits have tended to reach those farmers with the potential to increase cash crops, particularly vegetable oil, and improve their level of commercial operation.
320. With 7,246 km of community access roads provided across four projects, **road outcomes have been positive in terms of improved access and use.** However, there have been delays in completion and significant design changes that have raised the quality of access roads but also the costs. These have proved an effective means of reaching poorer areas and opening up areas of farming potential to greater

²⁵⁰ The performance of the COSOP has been tracked by a portfolio review in 2015, an MTR in 2015, an initial completion review in 2018 and a recent final completion review in 2020.

²⁵¹ <https://nilebasin.org/new-and-events/307-unprecedented-rise-in-water-levels-of-lake-victoria>

²⁵² <http://www.ecotrendsalliance.org/assets/files/Article-Kakungula-Mayambala-Tibuqwisa.pdf>

production and marketing opportunities. There are good results in terms of reduced travel time and costs, higher farm gate prices, and based on the CSPE field mission's limited evidence, the roads have been generally maintained and kept in all year-round operation.²⁵³ Under NOSP, a further 2,500 km of community roads construction is planned and the design builds on past lessons including ensuring community involvement in design and maintenance and building to higher standards to ensure access to district road maintenance funds. Delaying road construction until market demand is established makes sense, however there is a need to ensure that past delays in procurement and construction are avoided.

321. **Market linkages have been most effective under VODP2** through both the large private sector partner in Kalangala and the smaller oil seed hubs in Lira, Gulu and West Nile. Substantial income gains have occurred in the former for 2,063 farmers, and for 2,022 farmer groups in the latter, according to the most recent COSOP review. Bulking has helped farmers negotiate increased prices and realize higher earnings. A key success factor noted in the recent PCR was starting with confirmed market access for vegetable oil products, so that farmers could borrow and invest knowing demand existed.
322. **Value chain projects are complex, and while the production and incomes have risen, there have been issues around the provision of credit, processing and marketing.** Underutilized milling capacity has been an issue in VODP2 despite growing sunflower and soybean production. Financial management and outstanding credit under KOPGT remain a concern. Market infrastructures were completed, but were underused under CAIIP1, largely due to location and management issues. Under PRELNOR, more careful planning is expected to overcome these problems although it is too early to determine success.
323. The extended investment period for vegetable oil seen first under VODP from 1997 through VODP2, and now into NOSP/NOPP has fulfilled the COSOP aim of consolidating and extending, but also provides an illustration of the risks and challenges of building 4P approaches. ICO staff have invested considerable time and energy in handling environmental and social concerns raised by other development partners and NGOs in VODP2. The COSOP aim of moving into other value chains has only been partially achieved, with bulking and milling of rice and maize and cassava processing under PRELNOR, but the main thrust remains oilseeds.
324. **Under SO3: strengthened outreach and sustainable access to financial services particularly at community level has been achieved in a difficult policy environment.** Strong levels of coverage have occurred in financial services, with a combined outreach of 1.1 million households (target 750,000) and group formation (410,000 members in CSCGs). SACCO membership, share capital, and savings have increased, but the number of SACCOs supported has been below target, due to a narrowing of focus on the more viable SACCOs. This was a mitigating measure in the face of a national policy to establish SACCOs in every subcounty, with the accompanying challenges of weak capacity.
325. Linkages have been strengthened between community groups and SACCOs, private banks and apex institutions leading to a broader range of financial services and better support. Under oil seeds and oil palm, similar linkage efforts in VODP2 have mobilized loans of US\$850,000 for 3,604 farmers, and KOPGT is being used as a bridging mechanism to on-lend loans to small producers.
326. At the national level, IFAD played a valuable role in supporting the approval of the Tier IV Act in 2016. This was achieved by building the capacity in MOPPED and other key stakeholder institutions such as Bank of Uganda and UMRA, as well as inputs to a new Financial Sector Strategy through data sharing and review of the policy paper.

²⁵³ Out of seven roads visited, six were found to be in reasonable condition.

327. **Despite the above achievements, the country programme approach has been less effective than envisaged.** The COSOP expected strong synergies and complementarities between the projects and between lending and non-lending assistance. While geographic coherence has improved as anticipated, this has not led to strong operational linkages.²⁵⁴ While the three COSOP strategic objectives have been pursued through good project sequencing, the projects developed under each strategic objective have been operating largely in “silos” with modest cross-learning. There also has been limited synergy between projects, except in specific northern districts such as Lira and Gulu where oil seeds and sustainable food production along with community access roads have been complementary through VODP2 and PRELNOR.
328. **Beyond the projects, greater interaction between the lending and non-lending elements and the ICO could have been achieved.** For example, notable partnership opportunities created under the Yield Fund (para. 255) have not been used to build linkages to the lending portfolio. Furthermore, the participation of project staff in support missions for other projects has not been a marked feature of cross-learning. The CPMT also has not been as effective as envisaged. On the other hand, COSOP monitoring has been fairly regular, with the planned reviews taking place in 2015, 2018 and 2020.
329. **Changes in the location and declining resources and capacity of the ICO staffing have affected IFAD’s ability to manage both lending and non-lending aspects.** The move of the CPM to Nairobi has reduced the ICO capacity to interact quickly and flexibly with the Government and other stakeholders on lending operations. In terms of policy engagement and partnership building, the change has reduced the influence IFAD should have, given its scale of operations and long history of engagement. Although the CPO has increased the proportion of his time devoted to policy engagement, a large part of this is because of IFAD’s leading role in the agriculture sector working group from 2017 onwards and especially in 2018 as Chair. (See Ch. V.A).
330. Overall, the positive outcomes for the project portfolio are offset by the changes in ICO staffing and location. The **overall rating for effectiveness is moderately satisfactory (4).**

Table 16
Country strategy and programme performance assessment

	<i>CSPE rating</i>
Relevance	4
Effectiveness	4
Overall	4

²⁵⁴ Beyond PROFIRA supporting VODP2 in building capacity of the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers’ SACCO, and PRELNOR supporting VODP2 in capacity building for GALS and household methodologies.

Key points (chapter VI)

- In terms of strategic alignment, the 2013 COSOP linked well to national and sector development policies and IFAD's global objectives.
- The COSOP was broadly coherent even though no explicit theory of change was prepared, yet non-lending did not fit in well. Targeting was reasonable well defined, except for the means to target women and youth.
- Synergies were correctly identified between the lending and non-lending parts of the COSOP but the resources to see that this occurred were not adequate.
- Achievements have broadly reached the targets set under each strategic objective, especially around incomes, assets, productivity, road access, financial services; more modest gains occurred around land tenure, physical markets and improving climate resilience.
- The country programme approach was less effective because expected synergies between the different arms of the programme did not occur.
- Country programme management has been affected by declining resources and the shifting location of the country director.

VII. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

331. **The 2013 COSOP contained a highly relevant set of objectives that aligned with national and IFAD strategic frameworks, and continued the direction set in the 2004 COSOP**, with its emphasis on smallholder commercialization and community empowerment. Developed around these, IFAD's portfolio has been effectively sequenced with the recent interventions building on earlier projects, using their experience, lessons and staff. Greater geographical coherence in the north and east has reduced inefficiencies from previously scattered project locations, although interaction and exchange among projects has been insufficient.
332. **The three COSOP strategic objectives have been pursued through good project sequencing rather than a programmatic approach. As a result, the level of interplay and cross-fertilization between each strategic "leg" has been limited.** This is partly due to the adoption of a portfolio, rather than a country programme approach, which has entailed meeting each strategic objective through three separate strands: (i) integrated agricultural and/or rural development; (ii) rural finance; and (iii) value chains, all of which have been rooted in initial projects designed at the turn of the century. Such an approach has also been necessary with a small country team and a declining administrative budget supporting an increasing lending portfolio.
333. **While the strategic shift to value chain approaches from broader community development has led to a significant rise in private sector co-investment, it has also reduced beneficiary outreach.** This changed focus has allowed IFAD to build substantial private sector partnerships and raise farmer incomes. The level of beneficiary outreach, however, has declined and the cost per beneficiary has risen as a result. This has been partly offset by the continued inclusion of access roads, the reach of rural finance investments, and the higher number of indirect beneficiaries impacted by value chain activities. Additionally, the move to value chain approaches and private sector engagement has also helped insulate IFAD's investments from the repercussions of unexpected political events, election processes and low capacity in local government service provision.
334. **Poverty targeting has been well addressed especially by investing in northern Uganda, although efforts to meet the specific needs of youth and to transform the role of women have been modest.** The greater investment made in the north and east have enabled IFAD to deliver benefits to the poorer parts of the country. The number of women and youth reached has exceeded targets, although the specific constraints faced by youth have not been determined or addressed. Efforts to improve the opportunities for women while methodologically sound have not been sufficiently transformative or at a sufficient scale. While the role of women in the household and management of productive assets have seen some changes as a result of IFAD interventions, social norms still limit women's opportunities and there is immense potential to achieve more.
335. **Agroprocessing and market linkages have been particularly strengthened for the selected commodities through IFAD's integrated value chain approach.** Reduced transport costs and higher market prices due to improved road access, plus added value through bulking and processing, have contributed to higher household incomes. While there have been implementation delays, building infrastructure and support services around confirmed market demand has proved a successful approach, together with the extended support made possible by sequencing projects.
336. **The results in rural finance have been significant, and IFAD's decision to exit is correct although sustainability issues remain.** IFAD's investments have been effective in terms of outreach, building linkages between local savings and

credit groups and service providers, and in terms of regulatory reforms. IFAD's decision to move out of the sector, albeit with continued focus on value chain finance, aligns with the Government's policy. However, sustainability now depends on the ability of groups to pay for services and apex organizations still face challenges.

337. **Resilience has been enhanced within the communities reached, but the achievements are modest when set against the broad climate change challenges facing Uganda.** Agricultural research and weather information services have been valuable investments, and upgrading community roads to an all-weather standard, along with reforestation and water harvesting measures, have been important steps as well. Nevertheless, climate variability is increasing and its effects may cancel out IFAD's otherwise positive achievements on the livelihoods of rural poor people if not addressed more significantly going forward. This is all the more pertinent when IFAD's portfolio faces more stringent SECAP requirements and its designs are predominantly placed in category A.
338. **The country programme has generated a few innovations that have been scaled up within IFAD, although most of the innovations occurred prior to the current COSOP and scaling up in Uganda has been limited.** Important experiences have been shared across the region and IFAD globally from earlier innovations such as household mentoring, GALS, 4Ps within vegetable oil value chains, and capital seed funding approaches from the Yield Fund. While these have helped inform project design and best practice across IFAD, there has yet to be greater scaling up outside of IFAD operations.
339. **The 2013 COSOP's ambitions to achieve policy influence and build partnerships have been limited by the lack of a strategy and resources and the transfer of the country director to the subregional hub.** IFAD has been seen as an active and knowledgeable partner by the Government and other development partners. However, the wealth of empirical development experience arising from the project portfolio has not been effectively translated into influential and useful knowledge products as resources for this work have been insufficient and have declined over the CSPE period. The lack of a documented strategy systematizing and specifying how these non-lending activities would be achieved further hampered the direction of the work. Finally, the shifting location of the country director has affected IFAD's influence, particularly in the past three years when the position moved to the subregional hub. Consequently, the role of the hub and of IFAD's divisions outside of the East and Southern Africa Division in providing their technical expertise, knowledge and policy support have become increasingly critical.
340. **The Government discharged its obligations in funding and staffing but has been less effective in procurement, financial management and M&E.** Overall funding for agriculture has fallen below the Government's international commitments, and support to local government services has been mainly for recurrent expenditures related to the growth in public extension labour. IFAD's projects have faced challenges around governance and corruption issues, which have been partly exacerbated by poor record keeping and M&E. M&E systems have advanced in use of technology, but impact measurement remains challenged by delayed studies and weak methodology.

B. Recommendations

341. **Recommendation 1. Expand IFAD's effective value chain approach to other commodities with greater beneficiary outreach potential.** There are opportunities to expand marketing hubs to the entire country and regionally, built around key commodities identified in the NDP3 (e.g. livestock, especially dairy, horticulture and fisheries). IFAD should: (i) identify opportunities for small-scale producers to improve income diversity around production and processing; (ii) enhance access to reliable markets and raise product quality; (iii) expand

mechanisms such as the Yield Fund to help build private sector capacity; and (iv) strengthen synergies between programmes, where relevant and practical.

342. **Recommendation 2. Mainstream climate change more extensively with direct approaches in the new COSOP, given the growing urgency in Uganda.** Climate change has been indirectly addressed in past COSOPs. IFAD's portfolio going forward contains more category A projects than before. Therefore, IFAD should: (i) build into the next COSOP stronger support for SECAP measures, including social and environmental safeguards, and the technical expertise to supervise category A projects; (ii) partner with the most appropriate government entities (e.g. Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Works and Transport), NGOs and donor partners to undertake climate mitigation and adaptation measures more directly around the supported value chains.
343. **Recommendation 3. Deliver more transformative approaches and interventions tailored to the specific needs of women and youth.** This could be pursued by: (i) including strategies and targets on these aspects in the new COSOP; (ii) mainstreaming and scaling up proven methods such as GALS and household mentoring; (iii) greater cross-project learning and use of specialized service partners to identify opportunities around constraints such as land and ownership norms; (iv) strengthening PMU staffing to support and monitor the work of service providers; and (v) ensuring IFAD, in particular the Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion Division provides better and more consistent technical oversight on gender and youth.
344. **Recommendation 4. Develop a non-lending strategy that systematizes knowledge management, partnerships and country policy engagement, and provides the necessary resources for its implementation.** In order to foster innovation and scaling up within Uganda, IFAD needs to have a knowledge management system that captures project experiences and innovations so that they can be shared with partners and also used as evidence for policy engagement. This requires a documented strategy, and a stronger country presence that includes the country director in Uganda. IFAD's decentralized model also requires greater coordination within IFAD. Therefore, relevant divisions (RIA, ECG and the Sustainable Production, Markets and Institutions Division of IFAD) should be more involved in the knowledge management process to support non-lending aims by leveraging financial and human resources from IFAD headquarters and the regional hub in Nairobi.
345. **Recommendation 5. Strengthen M&E, reporting and financial management to bolster governance and anticorruption measures, and improve the assessment of results, especially at the impact level.** Relevant IFAD divisions should ensure risk mitigation around procurement, staff advances and related areas of financial management. In order to take a programmatic approach and to leverage IFAD's full capacities and resources, the ICO requires a knowledge management or M&E officer who can: i) strengthen M&E systems in projects to ensure timely reporting and better documentation that will underpin improved governance and anticorruption measures; ii) aggregate results across the portfolio (for lending and non-lending) and share them with government and other partners; iii) capture resources at the regional or global level (e.g. grants) for capacity development; iv) support stronger design and analysis of impact studies to improve their statistical accuracy, and delivery of more robust results, including include impacts on reducing malnutrition; v) extend the use of new monitoring methods and improve the use of web-based systems.

Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the individual and collective capacity of the poor, and, in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of the targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision-making; workload balance; and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, private sector and other agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resource management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition *</i>	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
	purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity – along with the goods and services they provide.		
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.	X	Yes
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resource management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Ratings of the IFAD lending portfolio in Uganda^a

Criteria	RFSP	DLSP	CAIIP1	ATAAS	VODP2	PROFIRA	PRELNOR	NOPP	NOSP	Overall portfolio
Rural poverty impact	4	4	4	4	4	5	4			4
Project performance										
Relevance	4	4	4	3	4	4	5	4	5	5
Effectiveness	4		4	4	4	5	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Efficiency	4	4	5	2	4	4	3	n.a.	n.a.	3
Sustainability of benefits	3	3	4	3	4	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Project performance^b	4	4	4	3	4	4.3	4			4
Other performance criteria										
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	5	5	4	4	4	5	n.a.	n.a.	4
Innovation	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	3
Scaling up	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Environment and natural resources management	NR	4	3	5	4	3	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Adaptation to climate change	NR	3	3	5	4	3	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Portfolio performance and results^c	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Partner performance										
IFAD	4	5	5	3	4	4	4			4
Government	4	4	5	3	5	4	3			3

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resource management and adaption to climate change.

Final ratings of the country strategy and programme in Uganda

	<i>CSPE rating</i>
Project portfolio performance and results^a	4
Non-lending activities^b	
Knowledge management	3
Partnership-building	4
Country-level policy engagement	4
Overall non-lending activities	
Performance of partners	
IFAD ^c	4
Government ^c	3
Country strategy and programme performance (overall)^d	
Relevance	4
Effectiveness	4

^a Not an arithmetic average of individual project ratings.

^b Not an arithmetic average for knowledge management, partnership-building and country-level policy engagement.

^c Not an arithmetic average of individual project ratings. The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall assessment ratings.

^d This is not an arithmetic average of the ratings of relevance and effectiveness of the country and strategy programme and performance. The ratings for relevance and effectiveness take into account the assessment and ratings of portfolio results, non-lending activities and performance of partners but they are not an arithmetic average of these.

IFAD-financed investment projects in Uganda since 1980

ID	Project		Dates				Financing (million US\$)*					Total cost	
	Name	Type	Approval	Effective	Completion	Closing	IFAD	IFAD total	Government	Co-financing	Beneficiary		
110000080	Agricultural Support Programme	PGMLO	17/12/1981	18/04/1982	31/03/1986	30/06/1986	19.03 (Loan) 1 (Grant)	20.03	1.5	-	-	21.53	
1100000159	Agricultural Development Project	Agricultural development	12/12/1984	14/05/1986	31/12/1992	30/09/1993	14.5 (Loan)	14.5	6.54	10.33 (World bank)	-	31.37	
1100000316	Smallholders Cotton Rehabilitation Project	Agricultural development	02/12/1992	28/04/1993	31/01/1998	31/01/1998	10.04 (Loan)	10.04	0.5	-	-	10.53	
1100000360	Cotton Sub-sector Development Project	Agricultural development	20/04/1994	18/11/1994	30/06/2001	31/12/2001	12.5 (Loan)	12.5	1.9 (Nat.Gov)	14 (World bank) 2.5 (Other domestic)	0.5 (Dom.Fin.Inst)	-	31.40
1100000442	Southwest Region Agricultural Rehabilitation Project	Agricultural development	03/12/1987	17/08/1988	30/08/1995	28/02/1996	12.00 (Loan)	12.00 (Loan)	5.14	10 (World bank)	-	27.14	
1100001021	Vegetable Oil Development Project	Agricultural development	29/04/1997	10/07/1998	31/12/2011	30/06/2012	19.9 (Loan)	19.9	3.78 (Nat.Gov)	33.13 (Loc.Private)	3.16	59.97	
1100001060	District Development Support Programme	Rural development	10/09/1998	24/05/2000	30/06/2006	31/12/2006	12.59 (Loan)	12.59	1.55	5.53 (BSF) 0 (Ireland)	0.97	20.64	
1100001122	Area-based Agricultural Modernization Programme	Rural development	08/12/1999	20/05/2002	30/06/2008	31/12/2008	13.22 (Loan)	13.22	1.45	-	1.38	16.05	
1100001158	National Agricultural Advisory Services Programme	Research	07/12/2000	27/11/2001	30/06/2010	31/12/2010	17.5 (Loan)	17.5	8.64 (Nat.Gov) 10.78 (Loc.Gov)	45 (World bank) 0 (Basket fund) 23.86 (TBD)	2.15	107.93	
1100001197	Rural Financial Services Programme	Credit and Financial Services	05/09/2002	18/02/2004	30/06/2013	31/12/2013	18.43 (Loan)	18.43	1.1 (National)	4.63 (Dom.Fin.Inst)	0.35	24.51	
1100001369	District Livelihoods Support Programme	Rural Development	14/12/2006	24/10/2007	31/12/2014	30/06/2015	27.44 (Loan) 0.4 (Grant)	47.83	2.42	-	0.62	50.88	

ID	Project		Dates				Financing (million US\$)*					Total cost
	Name	Type	Approval	Effective	Completion	Closing	IFAD	IFAD total	Government	Co-financing	Beneficiary	
							18 (Addl. loan)					
							2 (Addl. grant)					
1100001419	Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme	Rural development	12/09/2007	09/01/2008	31/03/2013	30/09/2013	15 (Loan) 16.97 (Addl loan)	31.99	5.49	43.83 (AfDB)	0.64	81.94
1100001465	Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services Programme	Research	16/09/2010	09/11/2011	31/12/2018	30/06/2019	14 (Loan)	14	497.30	119.99 (World bank) 20 (European Union) 7 (DANIDA) 7.20 (GEF)	-	665.50
1100001468	Vegetable Oil Development Project 2	Agricultural development	22/04/2010	21/10/2010	31/12/2019	30/06/2020	52 (loan)	52	14.14 (Nat.Gov)	0.29 (SNV) 70.38 (Loc.Private) 5.48 (Other domestic)	3.89	146.18
1100001630	Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas	Credit and Financial Services	19/09/2013	24/11/2014	31/12/2021	30/06/2022	29 (Loan)	29	4.93 (Nat.Gov)		1.44	35.38
1100001681	Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region	Marketing	16/12/2014	05/08/2015	30/09/2022	31/03/2023	50.20 (loan) 10 (ASAP grant)	60.20	9.29	-	1.49	70.98
2000001484	National Oil Palm Project	Rural development	16/04/2018	01/03/2019	31/03/2029	30/09/2029	75.82 (Loan) 1.21 (Grant)	77.03	25.58	30 (OFID) 6.15 (Heifer) 0.01 (Kuhne) 5.84 (Loc.Private)	17.21	210.44
2000002260	National Oilseeds Project	Marketing	17/12/2019	-	-	-	99.56 (Loan)	99.56	14.29 (Nat.Gov)		4.83	160.69
TOTAL FINANCING OF 9 PROJECTS IN CSPE								430	575	411	30	1,446
TOTAL FINANCING SINCE 1980								562	616	556	38	1,773

Source: IFAD Oracle Business Intelligence.

Table III.1
Implementation period, geographical coverage and types of projects

<i>Project name</i>	<i>Duration*</i>	<i>Geographical area</i>	<i>Institutions</i>	<i>Main focus, components**</i>
Rural Financial Services Programme - RFSP (2004-2013)	9 years	National	MOFPED	RURAL FINANCE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment, strengthening and outreach of SACCOs • Strengthening apex institutions, regional networks and financial linkages • Strengthening regulation and supervision
District Livelihoods Support Programme – DLSP (2007-2014)	7 years	Western, Northern, Eastern, Central regions (13 districts)	MOLG	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MARKETING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community infrastructure • Agricultural development • Community Development • District and sub-county support
Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme ¹ - CAIPP1 (2008-2013)	5 years	Central and Eastern regions	MOLG	ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural infrastructure improvement • Community mobilization
Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services – ATAAS (2011-2018)	7 years	National	MAAIF	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing agricultural technologies and strengthening the National Agricultural Research System • Enhancing partnerships between agricultural research and other value chain stakeholders • Strengthening agricultural support services
Vegetable Oil Development Project 2 - VODP2 (2010-2019)	9 years	Central region (Lake Victoria) Northern and Eastern regions	MAAIF	MARKET ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oil palm development • Oilseeds development
Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas- PROFIRA (2014-2021)	7 years	National	MOFPED	RURAL FINANCE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SACCO strengthening and sustainability • Community based financial services • Policy and institutional support
Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region PRELNOR (2015-2022)	7 years	Northern region	MOLG	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MARKETING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural livelihoods • Market linkages and infrastructure
National Oil Palm Project – NOPP (2019–2029)	10 years (planned)	Central and Eastern regions (Lake Victoria)	MAAIF	MARKET ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scaling-up investment in smallholder oil palm development • Livelihoods diversification and resilience • Oil palm sector development framework (policy, institutions, research)
National Oilseeds Project – NOSP (2020-2027)	7 years (planned)	Northern and Eastern regions	MAAIF MOLG	MARKET ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oilseed value chain development • Market linkage infrastructure serving oilseed sector

* "Actual" project duration, unless otherwise stated.

** Latest/final component structure.

Source: CSPE Team based on project documents.

¹ CAIPP1, a cofinanced project with the African Development Bank, received an award from the United States Treasury in 2013.

Portfolio of grants or supplementary funds approved/supervised between 2013 and 2019 and linked to Uganda

Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
1000004158	Uganda Oilseeds Subsector Platform	CSPC	Uganda	02/12/2011	30/06/2017	IFAD	1 140 000	SNV Netherlands Development Organisation
2000000266	Developing a Sustainable SACCO Union under PROFIRA	CSPC	Uganda	05/02/2015	30/09/2020	IFAD	1 000 000	Canadian Cooperative Association - WOCCU
2000001741	Scaling up remittances and financial inclusion in Uganda	CSPC	Uganda	17/06/2017	31/10/2020	FFR	465 000	PostBank Uganda
	Learning routes: a knowledge management and capacity building tool for rural development in East and Southern Africa (ROUTESA)	GLRG	Rwanda Kenya Uganda Madagascar Ethiopia Tanzania Malawi Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland Burundi South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe	12/04/2011	31/12/2014	IFAD	1 500 000	Procasur
1000004064	Community-led chain development for gender justice and pro-poor wealth creation	GLRG	Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda	11/11/2011	30/06/2015	IFAD	1 400 000	Oxfam Novib
1000004156	Rural finance knowledge management partnership	GLRG	Angola, Burundi, Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.	07/05/2012	31/12/2015	IFAD	1 500 000	AFRACA
1000004157	IFAD Africa Regional Knowledge Network - Phase II	GLRG	ESA countries, including Uganda	28/11/2012	30/06/2016	IFAD	1 800 000	PICO Knowledge Net Ltd
1000004347	Agricultural Advisory Services	GLRG	-	12/12/2012	30/06/2015	IFAD	1 000 000	African Forum for Agricultural Advisory Services (AFAAS)
1000004385	Plantwise, a country-based approach to improve farmer livelihoods through reduced crop losses and increased productivity	GLRG	Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda	20/02/2013	30/09/2016	IFAD	1 400 000	CABI
1000004463	Cash-on-the-bag - Scaling up a Secure, Transparent Trading Business Model for Smallholders in East Africa (COB2)	GLRG	ESA countries, including Uganda	29/07/2013	30/06/2017	IFAD	1 440 000	Trade4All Limited

Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
2000000040	AFRACA Development Programme 2013-2015	GLRG	All Countries represented through AFRACA membership, including those in ESA and WCA.	24/09/2013	31/03/2017	IFAD	1 000 000	African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (AFRACA)
2000000095	Land and Natural Resource Tenure Security Learning Initiative for East and Southern Africa – Phase 2 (TSLI-ESA-2)	GLRG	Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia	30/10/2013	30/06/2017	IFAD	1 425 000	United Nations Human Settlements Programme (United Nations Habitat)
2000000218	EAC Partner States@50	GLRG		29/11/2013	28/02/2015	IFAD	95 000	Kilimo Trust
2000000165	Country Level Support to External Validity of Project Impact Evaluations - across all IFAD Regions	GLRG	ESA: Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia. Benefitting investment projects include: Uganda CAIP1-II Plus NEN, APR, WCA, LAC	13/12/2013	31/08/2018	IFAD	500 000	International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie)
2000000275	IIASA - Impact Evaluation	GLRG	Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, China, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Gambia, India, Kenya, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Rep, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines Sudan, Senegal, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia	19/12/2013	30/06/2017	IFAD	500 000	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
2000000126	Intercontinental Network of Organic Farmers Organizations (INOFO)	GLRG	Main beneficiaries are Organic Farmers Organizations in Peru, India and Uganda	10/01/2014	31/12/2017	IFAD	400 000	International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
200000167	Understanding changing land issues for poor rural people in sub-Saharan Africa	GLRG	Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal and Uganda	01/04/2014	30/06/2017	IFAD	325 000	International Institute for Environment and Development
2000000453	Regional East African Community Trade in Staples – Graduating Smallholders to “Farming as Business” through Inclusive Regional Food Markets	GLRG	Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi	07/11/2014	30/06/2018	IFAD	920 000	Kilimo Trust
	Building capacity of the Batwa Pygmies for sustainable income generating enterprises using a cultural values approach	micro	Uganda	2015		Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility	39 000	Institute of Tropical Forest Conservation (Uganda)

Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
2000000310	Her Farm Radio	GLRG	Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda	01/01/2015	30/06/2017	IFAD	199 913	Farm International Radio
2000000517	Learning Alliance for Adaptation in Smallholder Agriculture	GLRG	Global with specific country work done in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda Vietnam	30/01/2015	30/09/2018	IFAD	1 000 000	Financial management by the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT). Technical management by CGIAR-Research program on climate change, agriculture and food security (CCAFS)
2000000503	Partnering for Value Promoting 4Ps in IFAD funded Value Chain Development Projects	GLRG	Mozambique, El Salvador, Senegal, Vietnam and Uganda.	05/02/2015	30/09/2018	IFAD	2 300 000	SNV Netherlands
2000001044	Regional Consultation with Pastoralist and livestock breeders CSOs - Towards better policies in support of pastoralism	GLRG	ESA: Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Plus countries in WCA, NEN, LAC and APR	05/08/2015	31/12/2017	IFAD	500 000	Vétérinaires Sans Frontières – Germany
2000001111	Strengthening Civil Society Support for Farmers' Organizations	GLRG	Tanzania, Uganda	16/11/2015	30/06/2018	IFAD	NA	InterAction (ACVIA)
2000001053	Promoting People-Centred Land Governance with International Land Coalition Members	GLRG	Bangladesh; Cambodia; Indonesia; India; Nepal; Philippines; Bolivia; Colombia; Ecuador; Guatemala; Nicaragua; Peru; Cameroun; DRC; Kenya; Madagascar; Malawi; Niger; South Sudan; Togo. During the project period, a similar NES approach has started in Uganda; Tanzania; Honduras and Mongolia.	10/12/2015	30/06/2018	IFAD	2 000 000	International Land Coalition
2000001103	Scaling-up Sustainable Land Management (SLM) practices by smallholder farmers: working with agricultural extension services to identify, assess and disseminate SLM practices.	GLRG	Cambodia, Lao project design report, Uganda	29/02/2016	30/09/2019	IFAD	2 000 000	Center for Development and Environment
2000001570	Regional Network of Farmers in Africa and South Asia (RENOFASA)	GLRG	-	14/06/2016	31/12/2016	IFAD	30 000	Regional Network of Farmers in Africa and South Asia (RENOFASA)

Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
2000001413	Food trees for diversified diets, improved nutrition and better livelihoods for smallholders in East Africa	GLRG	Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya	19/07/2016	31/03/2020	EC	1 020 480	World (ICRAF) Agroforestry
2000001315	Harnessing CABFIN knowledge	GLRG	Benin, China, Ghana, Indonesia, Morocco, Uganda, Zimbabwe	03/01/2017	2021	IFAD	1 000 000	FAO
2000001515	Integrating ICT tools into Plantwise to Support More Effective Data Capture and Use	GLRG	Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique	27/02/2017	30/09/2020	IFAD	1 700 000	CABI
2000001317	Rural finance inclusion through cooperatives	GLRG	-	14/03/2017	30/09/2021	IFAD	2 660 000	Canadian Co-operative Association
2000001373	Challenges and Opportunities for Rural Youth Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Mixed-Methods Study to Inform Policy and Programmes	GLRG	Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania.	17/03/2017	30/09/2020	IFAD	1 500 000	Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex
2000001833	Strategic support on mainstreaming nutrition in IFAD's investments	GLRG	Burundi, Nepal and Uganda	31/03/2017	End 2017	Canada	400 000	Bioversity International
2000001302	Strengthening Landscape-level Baseline Assessment and Impact-Monitoring in East and Southern Africa Project	GLRG	Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Kenya and Uganda	08/05/2017	31/12/2021	IFAD	2 000 000	ICRAF
2000001737	Driving transformative financial inclusion among migrants and their families to alleviate poverty via enabling cross-border mobile virtual network operator-Equitel	GLRG	Kenya / Uganda	17/06/2017	01/12/2019	Financing Facility for Remittances	246 000	Equity Bank Kenya
2000001855	Supporting Africa-wide Agricultural Extension Week themed: scaling up climate smart agriculture, integrating youth, women and the digital revolution.	GLRG	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo-DRC, South Africa, Burundi, Egypt, Gambia, Gabon, Swaziland, Somalia, Seychelles, Namibia, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Eritrea, Côte d'Ivoire, Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Senegal, Tanzania, and Angola	19/09/2017	30/06/2019	IFAD	350 000	African Forum for Agricultural Advisory Services


Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
2000001352	Rural youth access to finance	GLRG	Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda	11/10/2017	2021	IFAD	1 000 000	Eastern Africa Farmers Federation
2000001624	CGAP Inclusive Rural Finance	GLRG	Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda	06/02/2018	2022	IFAD	1 800 000	Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
2000001628	Scaling-up empowerment through household methodologies: from thousands to millions	GLRG	Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya	07/05/2018	31/12/2022	IFAD	2 250.000	Oxfam Novib and Hivos
2000001801	e-Granary Innovative Mobile Platform to Deliver Economic Services to Farmers in East Africa	GLRG	Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda	07/05/2018	2021	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program	2 980 777	Eastern Africa Farmers Federation
2000001629	Genetic diversity and breeding	GLRG	Ethiopia, Iran, Uganda	18/05/2018	2021	IFAD	3 500 000	Biodiversity International
	INSURED – Insurance for rural resilience and economic development		Global with core activities in Cambodia, Indonesia, Uganda and Zambia	2018	2022	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	6 000 000	IFAD (programmes)
2000002380	Leveraging South-South and Triangular Cooperation to share rural development solutions for private sector engagement	GLRG	Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda + APR countries	22/01/2019	31/03/2022	IFAD	500 000	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa/International Food Policy Research Institute
2000001435	Technical Assistance and Knowledge Exchange for Sustainable Management of Peatland Ecosystems in Malaysia	CSPC	Malaysia (but also facilitates knowledge exchange within Southeast Asia, and with other peatland countries in Africa, including Uganda)	28/01/2019	30/09/2023	IFAD	1 000 000	Global Environment Centre
2000002981	AFAAS support CAADP programme	GLRG	-	21/06/2019	30/04/2024	European Commission	5 110 000	African Forum for Agricultural Advisory Services (AFAAS)
2000002982	Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA) support CAADP programme	GLRG	East and Central Africa	21/06/2019	30/04/2024	European Commission	5 370 000	Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in

Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
								Eastern and Central Africa
2000003141	R-YES	GLRG	-			IFAD	1 750 000	Kilimo Trust
2000000924	ILC: CBA 1506 Uganda Land Alliance (ULA)	-		05/10/2015	31/05/2016	ILC	116 096	Uganda Land Alliance
2000002582	NES 1818 Trocaire	-		10/12/2018	30/10/2019	ILC	70 000	Trocaire
	Income, Food and nutrition Security First: The Indigenous Batwa Youth and their Households around Echuya Central Forest Reserve in Kisoro District, southwestern Uganda.	micro	Uganda	2019	2021	Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility	50 000	Biodiversity Conservation for Rural Development Uganda

Source: IFAD Oracle Business Intelligence; Grant Status Report tool; Operations Document Centre; IFAD IPAF webpage.

Analyses of IFAD-supported project portfolio in Uganda

Figure V.1
Timeline of IFAD-supported project portfolio, 1998–2019



Key: ■ COSOP 1998; ■ COSOP 2004; ■ COSOP 2004 (superseded); ■ COSOP 2013; ■ CPE (1997 – 2011);
 — Project (from effectiveness to completion); → Ongoing project; → Expected project effectiveness.
 * Integrated rural development

Source: IFAD Oracle Business Intelligence.

¹ The Area-based Agricultural Modernization Programme (AAMP) also focused on agricultural production and marketing similar to DLSP.

Table V.1
Periodization, main thrust and key thematic areas of the projects reviewed


<i>Project</i>	<i>COSOP period and main development thrust</i>	<i>Key thematic areas of project</i>
RFSP	COSOP 1998 – Rural financial system	Rural finance - service provision, apex institutions, regional networks, regulation
DLSP	COSOP 2004 - Community-based integrated development – decentralization – smallholder agricultural production	Community-based development, capacity building of local government, community infrastructure, agricultural production
CAIIP1	COSOP 2004 - Community-based integrated development – smallholder agricultural production – market integration	Rural infrastructure, community mobilization
ATAAS	COSOP 2004 – Smallholder agricultural production – access to capital and technology – market integration	Agricultural research/technologies, research and extension linkages, extension services, market linkages*
VODP2	COSOP 2004 – Smallholder agricultural production – access to capital and technology – market integration	Oil palm and oilseeds development including smallholder production, farmers' organization, market linkages, agroprocessing, infrastructure
PROFIRA	COSOP 2013 – Access to and use of financial services	Rural financial services, community-based financial services, rural finance policy and institutions
PRELNOR	COSOP 2013 – Production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture – market integration	Community planning and capacity development, climate resilient crop production systems, market access skills and partnerships, market access infrastructure
NOPP	COSOP 2013 – Production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture – market integration – access to and use of financial services	Oil palm development including smallholder production, farmers' organizations, market linkages, agroprocessing, infrastructure and policy, institutions and research. Livelihoods diversification and resilience including crop and livestock production, climate -smart practices, extension service delivery, community based rural financial services, land tenure security
NOSP	COSOP 2013 – Production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture – market integration – access to and use of financial services	Oilseed value chain development including supply chain cluster development, provision of financial and technical services, road infrastructure

* From original project design.

Source: CSPE elaboration, 2020.


Analysis of IFAD-supported projects in the CSPE

Figure V.2
Proportion of funding by project and source over the CSPE period



Source: Oracle Business Intelligence.

Figure V.3
Proportion of project financing by thematic area over time



Source: Oracle Business Intelligence, thematic dashboard, accessed November 2020. Projects divided into five-year time periods by their first year of implementation: 2004–2009 includes RFSP, CAIIP1 and DLSP; 2010–2015 includes VODP2, ATAAS, PROFIRA and PRELNOR; and 2016–2021 includes NOPP and NOSP.

CSPE theory of change for 2013-18 COSOP




Table VI.1

Correspondence between NDPII objectives, COSOP objectives and IFAD's Strategic Framework

<i>NDPII objectives (2014/15-2019/20)</i>	<i>COSOP objectives (2013-2018)</i>	<i>IFAD strategic objectives (2016–2025)</i>
<p>Overall Goal: To achieve middle income status by 2020 through strengthening the country's competitiveness for sustainable wealth creation, employment and inclusive growth.</p>	<p>Goal: To increase the income, improve the food security and reduce the vulnerability of the rural households living in poverty.</p>	<p>Overarching goal: Rural people overcome poverty and achieve food security through remunerative, sustainable and resilient livelihoods.</p>
<p>Objective 1: Increase sustainable production, productivity and value addition in key growth opportunities.</p> <p><i>Sectoral results (Priority area "Agriculture"):</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase agricultural production and productivity. - Increase access to critical farm inputs - Increase the sustainable use of environment and natural resources 	<p>SO1: The production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture is sustainably increased.</p> <p><i>Intended outcomes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase access to and utilization of appropriate agriculture technologies and inputs. - Enhance provision of relevant advisory services - Promote sustainable land and water management practices - Enhance farmers' capacities in climate-smart agriculture 	<p>SO1: Increase poor rural people's productive capacities.</p> <p><i>Area of thematic focus:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to natural resources - Access to agricultural technologies and production services <p>SO3: Strengthen the environmental sustainability and climate resilience of poor rural people's economic activities.</p> <p><i>Area of thematic focus:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environmental sustainability - Climate change
<p><i>Sectoral results (Priority area Agriculture):</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improve agricultural markets and value addition for the 12 prioritized commodities (para. 376) 	<p>SO2: The integration of smallholders into the markets is enhanced.</p> <p><i>Intended outcomes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Invest in strategic value chains - Develop climate resilient economic infrastructure - Promote agroprocessing and value-addition - Strengthen farmers organizations - Partner with local private service providers 	<p>SO2: Increase poor rural people's benefits from market participation Diversified rural enterprise and employment opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rural investment environment - Rural producers' organizations - Rural infrastructure.
<p><i>Sectoral results (Priority area Agriculture):</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increasing access to agricultural finance with specific attention to women (para. 378) 	<p>SO3: The access to and used of financial services by the rural population are sustainably increased</p> <p><i>Intended outcomes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthen SACCOs - Scale-up community savings and credit groups - Support the institutional, policy and regulatory framework 	<p>SO1: Increase poor rural people's productive capacities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusive financial services

Source: adapted from 'Quality of M&E Results and COSOP results management', M. Donnat, 2020.

Mission itinerary

CSPE in-country field mission

District	Projects	Time	Site	Activities	Team
Masaka Monday 13 th July 2020	ATAAS	Morning (9.00am - 2.00pm)	DLG ZARDI	Interviews: DPMO HR Kamenyamiggo (Part of Mukono ZARDI) View ATAAS infrastructure (Offices, furniture & Laboratories) SLM & Gender, Environment Focal Point & DARST member View SLM infrastructure/activity	Team B (AK+CS)
Masaka Monday 13 th July 2020	ATAAS	Afternoon (1.30- 3.30pm)	Field	View Motor Cycles View Market infrastructures under ATAAS	Team B (AK+CS)
Kalangala Monday 13 th July 2020	VODP2 NOPP	Morning (8.00am 12.30pm)	DLG OPUL KOPGT	Interview key DLG staff (Project Focal Points) Interview KOPGT staff (Manager, Finance, extension) Interview OPUL manager Interview farmer group (Hope)	Team A (AB+HK)
Kalangala Monday 13 th July 2020	VODP2 NOPP	Afternoon (1.30- 3.00pm)	Field	Interview grower association key persons Interview 1 group	Team A (AB+HK)
Kayunga Tuesday 14 th July 2020	RFSP PROFIRA CAIIP1 ATAAS	Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm)	DLG Field	Pay Courtesy call to CAO Interview key DLG staff- DCO, DCDO Interview 1 SACCO (PROFIRA) Interview 1 PSPs (PROFIRA) Visit CAR and market infrastructure sites DPMO (ATAAS) 2 Extension Staff (ATAAS) District Engineer (CAIIP1)	All Teams
Kayunga Tuesday 14 th July 2020	RFSP PROFIRA CAIIP1 ATAAS	Afternoon (2.00- 5.30pm)	DLG Field	Interview 1 CSCG (PROFIRA) Interview 1 VSLA 2 Farmers Groups ATAAS (women and youth) View M/vehicle & M/Cycles	All Teams
Iganga/ Bugweri Wednesday 15 th July 2020	RFSP PROFIRA VODP2 CAIIP1 ATAAS	Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm)	DLG Field	Pay Courtesy call to CAO Interview key DLG staff View motorcycles (ATAAS) Interview SLM Focal Point Visit CAR and market infrastructure sites	All teams
Iganga/ Bugweri Wednesday 15 th July 2020	RFSP PROFIRA VODP2 CAIIP1 ATAAS	Afternoon (2.00- 5.30pm)	Field	Interview 1 CSCG (PROFIRA) Interview oil seed linked farmer group Interview 1 PSP (VODP) Visit CAIIP1 processing infrastructure(Coffee, maize & rice mills) Hold an FGD with an ATAAS farmer cooperative	All teams
Mayuge Thursday 16 th July 2020	RFSP NOPP PROFIRA DLSP ATAAS	All Day	DLG field	Pay Courtesy call to CAO Interview key DLG staff (DPMO, DCDO, DCO) Interview SLM Focal Point Interview 2 Mixed and women groups- ATAAS View vehicle & motorcycles Interview oil palm farmer group (VODP 2) Interview oil miller Interview 1 SACCO (PROFIRA) Interview 1 PSP (PROFIRA)	Team A (AB & CS)

Annex VII

<i>District</i>	<i>Projects</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Site</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Team</i>
Bugiri Thursday 16 th July 2020	RFSP NOPP PROFIRA DLSP ATAAS	All Day	DLG field	Pay Courtesy call to CAO Interview key DLG staff (DPMO, DCDO) View motorcycles Interview 2 youth and women groups- ATAAS Interview 1 SACCO (PROFIRA) Interview 1 PSPs (PROFIRA)	Team B (AK&HK)
Mbale Friday 17 th July 2020	RFSP VODP2 PROFIRA CAIIP1	Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm)	DLG field	Interview key DLG staff Interview 1 large miller Interview 1 SACCO (PROFIRA)	Team A (AB+HK)
Mbale Friday 17 th July 2020	RFSP VODP2 PROFIRA CAIIP1	Afternoon (2.00- 5.00pm)	Field	Interview 1 market-linked farmer group Interview 1 VSLA (VODP2) Interview 1 PSP (VODP)	Team A (AB+HK)
Mbale Friday 17 th July 2020	ATAAS	Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm)	Buginyanya ZARDI	Focal point ATAAS / Estates officer Focal point SLM and Gender View investments in infrastructure in ZARDI Hold FGDs with SLM farmer groups	Team B (AK&CS)
Mbale Friday 17 th July 2020	ATAAS	Afternoon (2.00- 5.00pm)	DLG	DPMO Extension staff View Vehicle/Motor cycles SLM Investments/Infrastructure 2 Host farmers (youth and female) 3 groups (mixed, women and youth) Visit CAIIP1 rice mill	Team B (AK&CS)
Sironko Saturday 18 th July 2020	RFSP VODP2 PROFIRA CAIIP1 ATAAS	Morning (8.00am - 2.00pm)	DLG field	Interview DLG staff (DE, DPMO, DEO, DCO) View m/vehicle & m/cycles Interview oil seed marketing group Interview 1 CSCG (PROFIRA) Interview 2 PSPs (PROFIRA/VODP2) Interview 2 Farmer Groups (Youth and women- VODP2)	All Teams
Sunday 19 th July 2020		10.00a m	Travel		Team A
Lira Monday 20 th July 2020	PRELNOR ATAAS	Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm)	Ngetta ZARDI	Pay Courtesy call to D/CAO Interview DPMO & DAO(ATAAS) Focal point ATAAS Focal point SLM and Gender View investments in infrastructure in ZARDI PRELNOR Focal point Interview DARST member	Team B (CS+AK)
Lira Monday 20 th July 2020	PRELNOR ATAAS	Afternoon (2.00- 5.00pm)	DLG	View Vehicles/Motor cycles SLM Investments/Infrastructure 1 Host farmer	Team B (CS+AK)
Soroti Monday 20 th July 2020	PROFIRA RFSP VODP2	Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm)	DLG Millers PSP	Interview key DLG staff (DCO, DCDO) Interview 1 oil seed miller Interview 1 hub coordinator with SPS Interview 1 SACCO	Team A (HK&AB)
Soroti Monday 20 th July 2020	PROFIRA RFSP VODP2	Afternoon (2.00- 5.00pm)	field	Interview 1 oil seed farmer cooperative Interview 2 CSCG (PROFIRA)	Team A (HK&AB)
Pader Tuesday 21 st July 2020	PRELNOR	Morning (8.30am- 1.00pm)	Field Visits DLG Office	Pay Courtesy call to LCV chairperson & CAO Interview key DLG staff DPMO/DCO/DEO	Team B (AK&CS)

Annex VII

District	Projects	Time	Site	Activities	Team
Pader Tuesday 21 st July 2020	PRELNOR	Afternoon (1.00- 5.00pm)	Field Visits DLG Office	CAR 1 st batch Farmer groups View M/vehicles/M/cycles Meet CBFs & AEFs Meet Market stakeholder platform Talk to D/Engineer on site	Team B (AK&CS)
Apac/Kwania Tuesday 21 st July 2020	PROFIRA RFSP VODP2 DLSP	Morning (8.30am- 1.00pm)	DLG field visits	Interview key DLG staff Interview 1 CSCG (PROFIRA) Interview 1 Farmer or youth group (VODP2)	Team A (AB+HK)
Apac/Kwania Tuesday 21 st July 2020	PROFIRA RFSP VODP2 DLSP	Afternoon (2.00- 5.30pm)	field visits	Interview 1 VSLA (VODP2 or RFSP) Interview 1 medium/small miller (in Lira or Apac) CAR (DLSP) if location is contiguous to other activities	Team A (AB+HK)
Omoro Wednesday 22 nd July 2020	PRELNOR ATAAS	Morning (8.00am- 12.00pm)	DLG	Pay Courtesy call to LCV chairperson & CAO Interviews with DPMO, DCO Meet Market stakeholder platform Meet 20 CBF & 10 AEFs View vehicles and motor cycles	Team B
Omoro Wednesday 22 nd July 2020	PRELNOR ATAAS	Afternoon (1.00- 5.00pm)	Sub- County	3 DFA representatives 1 RETs institution Market linkage activities CAR 1 st batch 1 Farmer Group 2 Vulnerable HHs 1CBNRM Community	(CS&AK)
Oyam Wednesday 22 nd July 2020	RFSP NOSP VODP2 PROFIRA	Morning (8.30am- 1.00pm)	DLG Field visits	Interview key DLG staff (TBD) Interview 1 VSLA (VODP2) Interview 1 oil seed miller	Team A (AB+HK)
Oyam Wednesday 22 nd July 2020	RFSP NOSP VODP2 PROFIRA	Afternoon (1.00- 5.00pm)	Field visits	Interview 1 SPS (VODP2) Interview 1 SACCO (Board and management, 2 members – M & F) FGD with 1 farmer producer/marketing cooperative Interviews with 1 PSP (PROFIRA)	Team A (AB+HK)
Gulu Thursday 23 rd July 2020	PRELNOR ATAAS	Morning (8.00am- 12.00pm)	DLG	Interviews with DPMO, DCO, DE, DCDO 2 CBF 2 Extension staff Meet Market stakeholder platform View M/ Vehicle & M/cycles 1 RETs institution	Team B (CS&AK)
Gulu Thursday 23 rd July 2020	PRELNOR ATAAS	Afternoon (1.00- 5.00pm)	Sub- County	DFA representatives CAR 1 st batch 2 Farmers Groups CBNRM community 1 RETs institution Weather station Visit one of the New bridges	Team B (CS&AK)
Gulu Thursday 23 rd July 2020	PROFIRA VODP2 PRELNOR	Morning (8.00am- 12.00pm)	DLG	Interviews with DPMO, DCO, DE, DCDO 2 CBF 2 Extension staff Meet Market stakeholder platform View M/ Vehicle & M/cycles 1 RETs institution	Team A (HK&AB)
Gulu Thursday 23 rd July 2020	PROFIRA VODP2 PRELNOR	Afternoon (1.00- 5.00pm)	Sub- County	DFA representatives CAR 1 st batch 2 Farmers Groups CBNRM community 1 RETs institution	Team A (HK&AB)

Annex VII

District	Projects	Time	Site	Activities	Team
				Weather station Visit one of the New bridges	
Nwoya Friday 24 th July 2020	PROFIRA VODP2 PRELNOR	Morning (8.00am- 12.00pm)	DLG Field visits	Pay Courtesy call to CAO Interview key DLG staff Interview 1 PROFIRA SACCO (initial support) Visit CARs Interview 1 cooperative of farmer groups (VODP)	All Teams
Nwoya Friday 24 th July 2020	PROFIRA VODP2 PRELNOR	Afternoon (1.00- 5.00pm)	Project Office after Field visits	PMU meeting: Key Project Staff (PC, M&ES, ECCS), interviews DFA meeting Vulnerable HH 2 Farmer Groups 2 Extension workers Market linkage focal points/activities CBNRM community 1 RETs Institution	All Teams
Gulu Saturday 25 th 2020		Morning (8.00am- 1.00pm)		Wrap-up team meeting	All Teams
Gulu Saturday 25 th 2020		2.00pm	<i>En- route</i>	Travel to Kampala	All Teams
Kampala Sunday 26 th July 2020		10.00am- 2.00pm		Preparation and sharing of week 2 highlights	All Teams

* Field Mission National Consultants: AB – Asaph Besigye; AK – Allen Kebba; CS – Christopher Sebatta; HK – Hope Kabuchu
Source: field mission members.

List of key persons interviewed

Government of the Republic of Uganda

Embassy of the Republic of Uganda in Rome

HE Elizabeth Paula Napeyok, Ambassador of the Republic of Uganda to Italy
Siragi Wakaabu, Agriculture Attaché, Alternate Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to IFAD

Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF)

Beatrice Byarugaba Director, Agriculture Extension Services
Robert Khauka, Assistant Commissioner M&E
Okaasai Opolot, Retired Director of Crops Resources
Fred Mayanja, Commissioner Agriculture Planning Dept.
Stephen Ojangole, former MAAIF ATAAS Project Coordinator
Stephen Muwaya, National Coordinator Soil and Land use Management
Patience Rwamigisa, Commissioner Agricultural Extension
Fred Mukulu, District Production and Marketing Officer, Mukono District Local Government
Innocent Mutalya, District Coordinator SLM, Mukono District Local Government
Abbey Seguya, Principal Planner NARO

Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development

Maris Wanyera, Acting Director, Directorate of Debt and Cash Management Policy
Molly Opolot, Legal Officer and IFAD Desk Officer, Development Assistance and Regional Cooperation
Julius Mukholi, Principal Legal Officer, Development Assistance and Regional Cooperation

Ministry of Local Government

Benjamin Kumumanya, Permanent Secretary

Representation of the Netherlands in Uganda

Josephat Byaruhanga, Senior Policy Officer

International and donor institutions

African Development Bank

Asaph Nuwagira, Agriculture Specialist

Department for International Development

David Radcliffe, Consultant, PRELNOR ASAP grant

European Union Delegation to Uganda

Adolfo Cires Alonso, Programme Manager, European Union Delegation

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Antonio Querido, FAO Representative in Uganda
Priya Gujadhur, FAO Deputy Representative in Uganda

World Food Programme

Miyuki Yamashita, Head of Food Systems

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit

Armin Kloeckner, Head of Programme, Agriculture and Rural Finance
Robert Ocaya, Agriculture and Rural Finance Advisor

United States Agency for International Development

Martin Fowler, Senior Agriculture Adviser

World Bank Uganda

Rasit Pertev, Former Task Manager /Ag Economist World Bank

Ashesh Prasann, Agro Economist (ATAAS)

Jeehye Kim, ATAAS

Joseph Oryokot, Task Team Leader for ATAAS, IFAD-supported projects

David Nielsen, IEG Coordinator

International Fund for Agricultural Development

Asia and the Pacific Division

Alessandro Marini, former Country Director of Uganda

Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion Division

Paxina Chileshe, IFAD Regional Climate and Environment Specialist

East and Southern Africa Division

Lakshmi Moola, Country Director of Uganda

Pontian Muhwezi, Country Programme Officer of Uganda

Dagmawi Habte-Selassie, Programme Officer SMADF

Stella Okot, Finance Analyst SMADF

Henrik Franklin, Lead Portfolio Advisor

Shirley Chinien, Regional Economist

Bernadette Mukonyora, Country Director Eritrea and South Sudan, Former Officer in charge of grants

Marian Bradley, Former Country Programme Manager of Uganda

Elena Pietschmann, Programme Officer

Financial Management Services Division

Robert Creswell, Chief Financial Management Officer

Sustainable Production, Markets and Institutions Division

Harold Liversage, Lead Global Technical Specialist, Land Tenure

Robert Delve, Lead Global Technical Advisor, Agronomy

Elizabeth Ssendiwala, Senior Regional Technical Specialist, Institutions

Research and Impact Assessment Division

Alessandra Garbero, Senior Econometrician

Romina Cavatassi, Lead Economist

Strategy and Knowledge Department

Helen Gillman, Senior Knowledge Management Specialist

West and Central Africa Division

Ann Turinayo, Country Director, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone (former knowledge management consultant/ officer in Uganda ICO)

IFAD consultants

Mohamed Abdul Latif, Procurement Consultant

Rami Salman, Consultant, PRELNOR MTR Co-leader and ENRM/CC

William Steele, Rural Finance Consultant

Jorma Ruotsi, Rural Finance Consultant

Davis Atugonza, IFAD consultant, Financial Management

Rose Namara, IFAD consultant, M&E and Social Inclusion

Silvia Sperandini, Knowledge Management, Communication and Capacity Building Focal Point for the Gender Team

Baptiste Renard, ESA consultant

IFAD project staff

Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services (ATAAS)

Larry Adupa, ATAAS Consultant

Jane Baitanunga, ATAAS Chairperson NaMbale Agribusiness Cooperative

Mayega Lawrence, Task Manager ATAAS/VODP2/NOPP, DPMO

Emmanuel Mukama, ATAAS, NOPP Consultant M&E Commissioner ACDP

Fred Mukulu, District Production and Marketing Officer, Mukono District Local Government

Innocent Mutalya, District Officer

Stephen Ojangole, ATAAS Consultant Project Coordinator, ACDP

Peter Ssentengo, ATAAS Consultant MTR

Ssentengo, ATAAS Consultant

Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme (CAIIP1)

Sserunkuuma Kibuuka Bbosa, CAIIP1 Processing facility manager

Juuko Erias, CAIIP1 District Engineer

Senyonga Musa, CAIIP1 Maize and rice Mill Manager

Yasin Sendaula, Agriculture National Project Facilitator National Project Facilitator CAIIP1

Abbey Iga, Agriculture National Project Facilitator National Project Facilitator CAIIP1

Mutesi Zainah, CAIIP1 Maize and rice Mill Manager

District Livelihoods Support Programme (DLSP) & PRELNOR

Judith Ruko, DLSP-Project Sociologist/ PRELNOR Community Development Specialist

Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region (PRELNOR)

Ivan Ebong, Ministry Coordinator, Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region (PRELNOR)

Prossy Akumu, PRELNOR Ass. Accountant

Godfrey Obura, new Project Coordinator PRELNOR, Engineer

Martin Okeny, PRELNOR Gulu District Farmers Association

James Oguta, PROFIRA, VODP2, PRELNOR CSCG Kayunga and Iganga

Joseph Wadribo, PRELNOR GALS Service Provider

Adong Anna, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator

Owiny Alfred, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator

Ojok Dennis, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors Agriculture Extension Facilitator (AEF)

Okello Simon, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors Community Based Facilitator

Auma Christine, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator

Odongokara Christopher, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator

Nippo Geoffrey, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator

Acellam Richard, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator

Atimango Nancy, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, HH Mentor

Kinyera Dennis, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, AEF

Okot Peter Loris, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator

Okello George Alber, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP Member Policy and Committee

Angom Stella, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP Member Law and Policy

Ouma Thomas, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, AEF

Ongwech Peninah, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, AEF

Okot Phillipi Ongom, PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, AEF

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Non-governmental organizations and associations

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Food Rights Alliance Uganda

Agnes Kirabo, Executive Director

Oxfam (Uganda)

Peace Chandini, Project Coordinator/ Empower@skills

Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFFE)

Kenneth Katungisa, Chief Executive Officer

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Kirinya Bee Masters - Bugiri

Bugadde Sacco – Mayuge Chairman Board

Busiu Sacco - Mbale

Market Vendors SACCO – Soroti

Alutkot SACCO – Oyam

Focus Group Discussions – Farmer Groups/CSCGs/VSLAs

KOPGT, Kalangala	11 staff (5f, 6m)
Beta Farmers Group, Kalangala Mugoye Subcountry	5 members (2f, 3m)
Kacyanga A, Kayunga, Busana Sub-County	17 members (11 f, 6m)
Iganga, Namungalwe Sub-County, Rural Agribusiness Marketing Group (RAMKA)	4 members (2f, 2 m)
Bukaboli ACE – Mayuge, Mayuge	5 members
Namwony Women Farmers Group, Mbale, Busiu Subcounty	9 members (7f, 2m)
Aliwulira CSCG – Bugweri, Iganga (Bugweri) Igombe Subcounty	26 members (15f, 11m)
Shiner Savings Group – Sironko, Nalusara SubCounty	14 members (10f, 4m)
Ebumakinos Women's Group- Soroti, Soroti Sub-County	9 members (14f, 5m)
Amina Edeke Farmer Group – Soroti Arapai Sub-County	8 members
Apac Farmers Cooperative Society, Apac NOTE EN TEKO CSCG,	4 members
Apac Municipal Council	
Par-Pdiki Youth Group –Kwania, Aduku Sub-County	8 members (3f, 5m)
ABEKAM ACE (Group Cluster Cooperative), Oyam, Aber Sub-County	5 members (5m)
Langala Pe Lony CSCG – Omoro	5 members
Alero Oil Seeds Growers Association Nwoya, Nwoya	15 members

Private Sector

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Supporting data and tables for CSPE assessment

A. Finance and supervision

Table IX.1
Timeline between approval to disbursements (months)

<i>Project name</i>	<i>Approval to signing</i>	<i>Signing to effectiveness</i>	<i>Approval to effectiveness</i>	<i>Effectiveness to 1st disbursement</i>	<i>Approval to 1st disbursement</i>	<i>1st to 2nd disbursement</i>
RFSP	13.7	3.7	17.5	7.1	24.6	11.8
DLSP	7.6	2.7	10.3	1.9	12.2	5.9
CAIIP1	0.2	3.7	3.9	17.9	21.8	5.3
ATAAS	-. ^a	0 ^a	13.8	18.3	32.1	1.8
VODP2	-. ^a	0 ^a	6.0	7.4	13.4	7.4
PROFIRA	-. ^a	0 ^a	14.2	3.3	17.5	1.4
PRELNOR	-. ^a	0 ^a	7.6	5.0	12.7	4.3
NOPP	-. ^a	0 ^a	10.5	6.4	16.9	-
Uganda average	7.2^b	3.4^b	10.5	8.4	18.9	5.4
East and Southern Africa regional average^c	-	-	9.0	5.6	14.6	-

^a Since the General Conditions for Agricultural Development Financing was amended in 2009, financing agreements between IFAD and governments enter into force upon the signature by both parties (unless the respective financing agreement states that it is subject to ratification). Prior to this, financing agreements used to contain conditions for effectiveness, upon fulfilment of which the financing agreement was declared effective. Hence, for the financing agreements signed after this change, the date of effectiveness, or now called "entry into force" is the same day as the date of the financing agreement. Since 2009, the timeline between approval and signing is therefore the same as between approval and effectiveness and data are populated in the latter column. Since 2009, the timeline between signing and effectiveness is 0. ^b In light of point "a", the average is computed without data ATAAS, VODP2, PROFIRA, PRELNOR, NOPP. ^c For projects in the East and Southern Africa region approved between 2000 and 2019.

Source: IFAD Oracle Business Intelligence.

Table IX. 2
Project disbursement schedules

Year	RFSP	DLSP		CAIIP1	ATAAS	VODP2	PROFIRA	PRELNOR	
		Loan	Grant					Loan	Grant
1	5%	2%	0%	0%	0%	8%	10%	12%	10%
2	6%	6%	16%	3%	21%	18%	22%	19%	10%
3	12%	14%	16%	21%	33%*	25%	42%	32%	27%
4	27%	23%	16%	35%*	35%	32%*	64%*	58%*	54%
5	34%	31%	16%	64%	35%	43%	75%	64% ^b	59% ^b
6	43%*	41%*	16%	98%	47%	52%	79% ^b	-	-
7	57%	58%	37%	98%	82%	70%	-	-	-
8	74%	81%	97%	98% ^a	97%	80%	-	-	-
9	90%	100% ^a	100% ^a	-	-	95%	-	-	-
10	100% ^a	-	-	-	-	100%	-	-	-

Source: IFAD Oracle Business Intelligence.

Table IX.3
Extension of project period up to the closing date

Projects	Project period extension	Comments
RFSP	9-year project including two extensions of two-years and 3 months	100 per cent disbursement at closing. Initial delays from approval to effectiveness and after effectiveness, and then the loan extension, contributed to a slow rate of implementation.
CAIIP1	5-year project with a 3-month extension to the closing date	98 per cent disbursement at closing. A three-month extension to the closing date was required after the poor performance of suppliers of agroprocessing equipment. The time was used to partially terminate these contracts and to find alternative suppliers of good quality equipment.
ATAAS	7-year project including two extensions of 1.5 years and 0.5 years.	97 per cent disbursement at completion. In 2015, the project was restructured and the closing date was extended by 1.5 years to implement the new and revised activities. In 2017, the project was restructured again and the closing date was given a six-month no cost extension to address both the outbreak of Fall Army Worm and the effects of the prolonged drought of 2016/17.
VODP2	9-year project including two extensions of 1 year and 2 months	The slow start-up (with a year's delay due to extended negotiations between the World Bank and Government and then slow parliamentary approval) and the subsequent two loan extensions slowed implementation and in turn the delivery of benefits.
		98 per cent disbursement at completion. The completion date of the oilseeds component was extended by one year to ensure that a large percentage of the farmer groups supported did not risk collapsing once project support ended and a further extension of 2 months due to the impact of COVID 19. Support for group consolidation was also useful in preparation for NOSP.

Source: Analysis of the data from Oracle Business Intelligence; project documentation; RFSP PCR; ATAAS draft PPE, VODP2 PCR.

Table IX.4
Project management costs and projects costs per beneficiary

Project	Project management cost ratio (% of project total)			Project cost per beneficiary ^a		
	Planned ex-ante ante	Interim	Ex-post	Ex-ante	Interim	Ex-post
RFSP	6	-	6	82	-	17
DLSP	11	-	9	42	-	32
CAIIP1	4	-	n/a	7	-	19
ATAAS	11	-	12	65 ^b	-	43 ^b
VODP2	6	-	11	175	-	152 ^c
PROFIRA	16	15	-	49	24	-
PRELNOR	9	13	-	92	49	-
NOPP	6	-	-	1389	-	-
NOSP	7	-	-	357	-	-

^a Beneficiaries in this table refers to all household members, except for RFSP and PROFIRA where it refers to members of SACCOs/CSCGs; ^b Number of beneficiaries in ATAAS calculated by multiplying design/actual outreach to households by 6 members per household. The assumption of 6 members per household is used in outreach data from PRELNOR and VODP2.

^c VODP2 covered 89,782 households and 538,692 household members (PCR 2020)

Sources: Design reports, project completion reports, PCRVs and latest supervision mission reports for PROFIRA and PRELNOR, June 2020.

Table IX.5
Number of missions undertaken per project per year by IFAD in Uganda

Project	Project years (a)	Total number of missions (b)	Number of missions per year (b/a)
RFSP	9.4	16	1.7
DLSP	7.2	12	1.7
CAIIP1	5.2	9	1.7
ATAAS	7.1	5	0.7
VODP2	9.2	17	1.8
PROFIRA*	5.8	12	2.1
PRELNOR*	5.1	11	2.2
NOPP*	1.5	3	2.0

*For ongoing projects, data on project years and number of missions are as at September 2020.

Source: Operational Results Management System, accessed September 2020.

B. Adoption yield and income data

Table IX.6

Proportion of households/beneficiaries adopting improved agricultural technologies (%)

<i>Technology type</i>		<i>VODP2 (Oil seeds)</i>	<i>ATAAS</i>
Improved seed variety/certification	Baseline	17	63
	Target	90	78
	Endline	67	95
Fertilizers	Endline	Significant positive impact	
Pesticides/Herbicides	Endline	Insignificant impact	
Improved Livestock	Baseline	-	48
	Target	-	63
	Endline	-	63
Improved fisheries	Baseline	-	6
	Target	-	21
	Endline	-	3
Sustainable Land Management (SLM)	Baseline	Insignificant impact	
	Target		10
	Endline		32

Source: VODP2 Oilseed baseline survey report 2015; VODP2 PCR 2020; World Bank ATAAS ICRR 2019.

Table IX.7
Final average farmer yields for target crops by project against target and baseline

Project	Cereals, tubers and legumes												Oil seed crops									Palm oil			
	Maize			Rice			Cassava			Beans			Soybean			Sunflower			Groundnut			Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	
	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target				
PRELNOR ¹	1.9	18	-	2.1	8	-	-	-	-	1.7	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PRELNOR VHHs ²	0.8	69	-	0.5	-11	-	0.8	-	-	0.5	31	-	0.9	164	-	-	-	-	0.6	-3	-	-	-	-	-
VODP2 ³	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	147	65	1.7	91	1	-	-	-	12	218	-20	-
ATAAS ⁴	2.3	77	53	2.8	180	143	4.1	141	116	0.7	40	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DLSP ⁵	0.8	35	-	0.02	-37	-	0.2	24	-	0.3	33	-	-	-	-	0.05	72	-	0.2	49	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Project M&E data.

¹ PRELNOR MTR (2019) with yields at the household level (beans, maize, rice) and from adaptive trials and farmer demonstrations (cassava) comparing improved with local crop varieties.

² PRELNOR second vulnerable household cohort outcome report, with sampling of 394 mentee households (November 2019).

³ VODP2 PCR (September 2020).

⁴ World Bank ICR and ICRR 2019. Data rounded to nearest hundredth. Plus, milk yield of 6,600 litres/day/cow (120 per cent of baseline).

⁵ DLSP impact assessment 2015.

Table IX.8
Impact on the proportion of households owning assets

		RFSP ¹		CAIP1 ²		DLSP ³		ATAAS ⁴		PRELNOR VHH ⁵	
Asset		Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Outcome to-date
Productive assets	Cow	43%	51%	38%	43%	-	-	-	-	5%	23%
	Sheep	10%	15%	3%	5%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Goats	48%	62%	42%	41%	-	-	-	-	34%	52%*
	Chicken	52%	62%	64%	69%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Hoes	83%	90%	92%	98%	95%	92%	-	-	89%	94%
	Plough	7%	9%	7%	1% ⁶	-	-	-	-	6%	31%
	Cart	4%	5%	-	-	5%	6%	-	-	2%	13%
Household assets	Beds	-	-	-	-	81%	92%	-	-	26%	38%
	Fridge	11%	16%	2%	1%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Radio	87%	92%	77%	79%	27%	47%	56%	55%	15%	39%
	Television	32%	41%	4%	7%	4%	4%	14%	20%	-	-
	Mobile phone	77%	92%	59%	78%	30%	64%	75%	85%	22%	44%
Transport assets	Bicycle	54%	61%	51%	53%	62%	67%	-	-	21%	43%
	Motorcycle	21%	34%	13%	17%	7%	14%	10%	15%	-	-
	Car/vehicle	9%	13%	-	2%	-	-	6%	7%	-	-

Source: Project M&E data and surveys.

¹ RFSP impact assessment, comparing the assets of “borrowers” in 2008 to 2013.

² CAIP1 2014 Follow-on RIMS study, comparing assets from 2007 to 2013.

³ DLSP 2015 impact assessment, comparing “before” and “after” situations of respondents

⁴ ATAAS 2018 impact evaluation, 2014 to 2018.

⁵ PRELNOR 2019 reports on the intermediate outcomes from the first cohort (655 vulnerable households, from 2017 to 2019) and second cohort* (394 vulnerable households, from 2018 to 2019).

⁶ Animal drawn plough. There was a decrease in the proportion of households using animal drawn tools/ploughs from 7 per cent to 1 per cent, largely explained by extended periods of insurgency and loss of livestock in areas where draft animals were used for farm work.

Table IX.9
Project baseline and completion reports

<i>Project</i>	<i>Project effectiveness year</i>	<i>Baseline report year</i>	<i>Gap</i>	<i>Project closing year</i>	<i>Project completion report year</i>
RFSP	2004	2008	+4	2013	PCR (June, 2014)
DLSP	2007	2007	0	2015	PCR (December, 2015)
CAIIP1	2008	2011	+3	2013	PCR (June, 2014)
ATAAS	2011	2015 ⁷	+4	2019	ICR (2019) by World Bank PCR (June, 2019)
VODP2	2010	2014	+4	2020	PCR (August, 2020)
PROFIRA	2014	2016	+2	2022	N/A
PRELNOR ⁸	2015	N/A	-	2023	N/A

Source: CSPE analysis from project documents.

⁷ The ATAAS baseline study was done by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics.

⁸ PRELNOR has no project baseline study. However, in a piece-meal manner, the PMU M&E office has been collecting baseline data from the vulnerable household batches (Source: Field Mission, 2020 interview with PRELNOR PMU).

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- Mid-term review reports
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- Other knowledge products
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